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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, I study the similarities and differences between the development of
Scottish and Ukrainian nationalisms in the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first
centuries, analyzing the role of the ideology in successful proclamation and maintaining
of the Ukrainian independence, as well as determining the perspectives and vitality of the
idea of Scottish independence. I concentrate on three major components of their
sovereignty – political, economic, and cultural. My main hypothesis is that Ukrainian
political nationalism has been stronger and more successful than Scottish due to the
political independence of Ukraine. At the same time, despite lacking political
sovereignty, I argue that Scotland is better off from an economic perspective as well as
more culturally independent from Westminster1 than Ukraine from Moscow, even though
Ukraine is politically independent. Additionally, I investigate the effectiveness of the
leading nationalist political parties in both nations as the main agents of the nationalist
ideology, juxtaposing Scottish National Party, founded in 1934, and a string of
developments in the Ukrainian nationalist spectrum with a focus on Rukh – the major
pro-independence force founded in 1989 and Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union founded in
1991 (“Rukh” is translated as “Movement” and was a disambiguation of its official name
– the National Movement for Perebudova or Reconstruction, while “Svoboda” is
Ukrainian for “freedom” and is sometimes referred to as the Freedom party).

1

Here and after, Westminster stands for the UK central government located in London’s Westminster –
*both Houses of Parliament and the Cabinet as opposed to the regional powers of Scotland, and since 1999
– to Holyrood – the place of the restored Scottish Parliament.

1
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My focus is on the development of the nationalist agenda in both countries, and
the role of politics and culture in its pursuit. I will contrast Ukrainian nationalism with the
similar movements and processes on the Scottish political arena, and economic and
cultural spheres differentiating its two main types – ethnic and civic nationalist
approaches, their correlation and presence in each of the case studies. Also, I will pay
attention to the historic developments, as well as current distinct positioning of the
Scottish National Party on the left of the political spectrum, contrasting this tendency of
mostly conservative right-wing nationalist movements and parties in Ukraine which
developed in opposition to over seventy years of Soviet communism.
This topic is timely as European nationalist movements are gaining more political
power in many countries across the continent, albeit with different degrees of intensity.
This is happening due to, amongst other issues, debates about immigration and severe
economy austerity. Recent parliamentary elections include those in Finland (2011; True
Finns increased their representation by 34 Members of Parliament), Sweden (2010;
Sweden Democrats managed to enter the Parliament for the first time with 20 members),
Austria (2008; center-right ÖVP – 51 seats with far-right FPÖ and BZÖ getting another
55 seats between them), Hungary (2010; ruling Fidesz – overall majority and far-right
Jobbik – debuted in the Parliament with 47 members), France (2012; Front National
increased its vote percentage, which granted them two seats), Netherlands (2010; rightwing PVV gained 24 seats in addition to center-right VVD’s 31 members), Belgium
(2010; two nationalist parties – NVA and VB obtained 39 seats of the federal lower
house in addition to the center-right CD&V’s 17 seats), whereas the most recent June
2012 ‘anti-austerity’ general election in Greece returned not only a stronger ruling center-
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right New Democracy party, but also two smaller nationalist factions – the Independent
Greeks (20) and Golden Dawn (18). In addition to the above-mentioned victories,
Shekhovtsov (2011, 204) also emphasized that:
in 2006, the far right Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families), which polled 7.97% in the
2005 elections, joined the government of Jarosław Kaczynski as a minor coalition partner…in Slovakia
the Slovenska´ na´rodna´ strana (Slovak National Party) failed to bring its representatives to the
parliament of Slovakia only once during the period 1990–2006. In the 2006 parliamentary elections, the
party won 11.6% of the votes and became a minor coalition partner of Prime Minister Robert Fico. In
Romania the Partidul Romaˆnia Mare (Greater Romania Party) has never had deputies in the Romanian
government, but the party’s participation in the 2000 and 2004 parliamentary elections was successful to
a considerable degree, as it won 19.48 and 12.99% of the votes respectively.”

As far as Ukraine is concerned, on the regional level, in 2009 “the Freedom Party
obtained 34.69% of the votes and 50 seats out of 120 in the Ternopil regional council,
while its nearest competitor, the Yedynyi Tsentr (United Centre), gained only 14.20%.”
(Shekhovtsov 2011, 206)
Later, nationalists outperformed their opponents in the whole of Ukraine’s Halychyna2
and since the 2011 local election Svoboda controls three oblast3 councils and has
increased its support in most opinion polls during the 2012 parliamentary election
campaigning throughout Ukraine. Of special interest to this thesis is the success of the
Scottish National Party in all the election campaigns: the 2009 European Parliament,
2011 Scottish Parliament, and 2012 local Scottish elections. In all those European
democracies, nationalist political parties gained their additional political weight by either
greatly increasing the number of parliamentarians, or by getting into legislatures for the
first time. There are many differences between the political processes in a given country,
which derive from both internal disagreements (like the secessionist ideas in Belgium, or
2

Sometimes written in the English sources as Galicia (identically to the westernmost historic province in
Spain). In this thesis the Ukrainian version will be used for consistency and to avoid any confusion. The
region incorporates three westernmost Ukrainian provinces: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil – the
center of all major pro-independence movements in the Ukrainian history.
3
Oblast – is a Ukrainian administrative unit; province or region. Currently, there are 24 oblasts and the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
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proposed 2014 independence referendum in Scotland), or an uncompromising position
towards the cultural and economic influences of former or current metropoles, as in the
case of Ukraine. Further, unlike elsewhere, in both Ukraine and Scotland, the issue of
immigration is not central to the political agenda of Svoboda or the SNP.
Among the issues that I will focus on, is language. This will focus on the
dichotomy of the native tongue and the language of the metropole, showing the role of
the preservation of Ukrainian as a national language for the whole nationalist agenda and
state-building process, as opposed to either Scottish Gaelic, or Scots language, which
failed to play a similar role in Scottish nationalism.
Similarly, religion is another important factor in the national unification of a
people. In both countries the church is unique: in Scotland, the Presbyterian Kirk (Church
of Scotland) is no longer in danger of being Anglicized; in Ukraine the Orthodox Church
is still in danger of being further Russified and amalgamated. There are some historic
similarities between the division into the followers of the Kirk and Catholics in Scotland
and Ukraine’s Eastern Catholics and the Orthodox. Additionally, there is another variable
– that of a regional divide in both Scotland and Ukraine – Scottish Highlands and
Lowlands versus Ukraine’s East and West – visible in a variety of areas from electoral
performance, devotion to the national culture and traditions to a somewhat different
attitude towards the nationalist agenda and the historic metropole.
Lastly, I will examine the role of the politically mobilized diaspora, which in both
cases remains an important player on the nationalist arena. Finally, separate attention
must be paid to the economic dependence or independence. Here the main controversy
will lie in the comparison of the oil-rich Scotland that being part of the UK cannot fully
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benefit from it on one hand, and Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas in the officially
independent economy on the other.
1.1.Outline of the Thesis
The thesis is divided into six chapters: the introduction and a literature review on
nationalism and theories pertinent to my comparative study. The third and fourth chapters
will focus on the separate developments of nationalist movements in Scotland and
Ukraine within the political processes in both countries, and will include sections on the
political situation and electoral performance, economic influences, and culture, including
the role of the language preservation and religious independence, diasporas, and regional
divisions, as well as the role of a living memory of the Ukrainian genocide – the
Holodomor (“mass killing by hunger”) of 1932-33. The similarities and differences in
both national movements will be scrutinized in chapter five, with the sixth chapter being
overall conclusions.

CHAPTER TWO. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 th of Theories
Nationalism is one of the most debated topics in the social sciences. For the
purpose of this thesis, my particular interest in nationalism lies in its relation to the
current political situation in Scotland and Ukraine. Therefore, my assessment of the
literature helps determine the similarities and differences in the nationalist movements of
the two countries. Consequently, I discuss theories of nationalism that pertain to my
thesis subject, and may be used as tools for further understanding of the role of political,
economic and cultural factors.
There is an undoubted connection between nationalism and the nation-state itself,
as “nations and nationalist groups enhance political statements by adding imagery and
history, creating a national image people can relate to.” (Hague 1994, 140) Edwin Muir
(1935, 128-129) commented on the element of negativity that the term ‘nationalism’
sometimes implies, saying that “to some people the very name of Nationalism is hateful;
it is over-weening and dangerous in a great nation, and niggling in a small one; trying
either to set up a world empire, or to establish a provincial caucus.” In his turn, Scottish
nationalist and historian Paul Scott (1992, 57) dismisses negative meaning towards
nationalism in general, fairly stating that “to blame nationalism for its excesses is like
condemning all religion for the Inquisition or sectarian killing in Belfast,” later hinting
specifically at the Scottish nationalism, associating it with liberation – “it would be less
confusing if we could all agree to call the oppressors the imperialists and the liberators
nationalists.”

6
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Widely discussed in academia is the role of nationalism in the contemporary
world, ranging from suggesting its decline related to the supposed downfall of the nationstate, to the opposite insistence on increasing nationalism, as suggested by recent election
results all over Europe. Nairn (1981, 94) assures that “nationalism did not come to a stop
in Europe in 1922 after the Versailles agreements [but] is still extremely alive,” and,
according to Anderson (1996, 3), who wrote in the 1980s that “the ‘end of the era of
nationalism’, so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight.” Hobsbawm (1992, 169)
contradicting Anderson, argues that “nationalism, however inescapable, is simply no
longer the historical force it was in the era between the French Revolution and the end of
imperialist colonialism after World War II.” Indubitably, due to certain extreme forms of
the ideology, as noticed by John Hall, “nationalism is neglected by academics, possibly
because it is associated with many wars and much conflict in the twentieth century.”
(quoted in McCrone 1992, 203)
There are also different approaches towards studying nationalism in general.
Interestingly enough, Ernest Gellner, who according to John Breuilly (2006, xxi), author
of the introduction to the revised edition of Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism (1983) –
“was at odds with existing approaches to nationalism.” Gellner (1997, 102) himself
suggested that “[it] is not just a phenomenon, it is also a problem…[as] one must be
perturbed by the havoc, suffering, cruelty and injustice often brought by nationalism.”
Anthony Smith (1992, 1) in his Ethnicity and Nationalism emphasizes that “in the
study of nationalism, [there] is the growing convergence of two fields, which had been
formerly treated as separate: the study of ethnicity and ethnic community, and the
analysis of national identity and nationalism.” Meanwhile, Peter Alter (1989, 4-5) writes
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that “the plethora of phenomena which may be subsumed under the term nationalism
suggests that it is one of the most ambiguous concepts,” later concluding that “it is more
appropriate to speak of nationalisms in the plural form than of nationalism in the
singular.”
Important to the understanding of nationalism is also a duality of primordial and
constructivist (sometimes called instrumentalist, as in Thomas Eriksen’s (2002) Ethnicity
and Nationalism) perspectives towards this ideology. Also, Eriksen (2002, 53) suggests
that Abner Cohen was branding the primordialist position as one that “defines ethnic
identity as an imperative status, as a more or less immutable aspect of the social person.”
Constructivist ideas are central to Hobsbawm and Ranger’s Invention of Tradition, being
the basis of Anderson’s Imagined Communities – both originally published in 1983. In
the same decade, Ernest Gellner also stated that “nationalism, which sometimes takes
pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often
obliterates pre-existing cultures; that is reality.” (summarized by Spencer and Wollman
2002, 34) Craig Calhoun (1997, 30) calls this theoretical duality “one of the biggest
tensions in the literature on nationalism.” He analyzes the peculiarities of each
perspective, stating that instrumentalists “emphasize the historical and sociological
processes by which nations are created”, while “only nationalist ideologues tend to assert
primordialist positions so strong that they imply that the nations have existed in anything
close to their modern form since the beginnings of history.” (Calhoun 1997, 30-1)
The trend of rather skeptical constructivism in analysis of nationalism was set by
Marx and Engels, who pursued a goal of “forceful internationalism” and claimed that
“nationality was an irrelevance or an illusion…[as] the working men have no country,”
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but in the same time, Marks and Engels argued for differentiating between “the
nationalism of oppressor and that of the oppressed.” (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 9-11)
In retrospect, Calhoun argues that Marx and Engels underestimate nationalism,
suggesting that they “were wrong to think that workers of the world…would agree to
place [class] membership…ahead of membership of their individual nations, religions,
and other cultural or ethnic groupings.” (1997, 23) A Marxist and well-known writer on
nationalism, Tom Nairn, has noticed that “the theory of nationalism represents Marxism’s
great historical failure.” (quoted in Anderson, 1996, 3). Benedict Anderson (ibid)
proceeded further in that debate, stating that “it would be more exact to say that
nationalism has proved an uncomfortable anomaly for Marxist theory and, precisely for
that reason, has been largely elided, rather than confronted.”
Nation-State. Ethnic vs. Civic Nationalism
The concept of nation-state is one of the main constituents of the discourse on
nationalism. Similar to the analysis of the ideology as a whole, this concept is challenged
by the theories of the declining role of the Westphalian state, which is popularly
illustrated by trends such as greater pan-European integration, and implementations of
contemporary confederal developments. Analyzed by Douglas Holmes (2000, 38) who
claims, in the context of European federalism, that “the first principle of the EU is the
rejection of the nation-state as the preeminent institutional vehicle,” this belief is echoed
by Guibernau ([and Berdun] 1996, 102) who agrees that “nation-states have lost aspects
of their sovereignty and are forced to face patterns of increasing global interconnections.”
Walker Connor (1994, 96) by contrast is primarily concerned that term “nation-state has
come to be applied indiscriminately to all states,” adding also that as a result of “a survey
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of the 132 entities generally considered to be states as of 1971…only twelve states can
justifiably be described as nation-states.” Analyzing primarily ethnic nationalism, Connor
suggests that in the 1970s most of the world states were made up on largely civic basis
rather than ethnic or ‘national’, which essentially brings up a contradiction, in his
understanding, as they are not ethnically pure ‘nation-states’.
Many modern authors concerned with nationalist discourse often elaborate a
typological binary of nationalism, juxtaposing ethnic and civic nationalisms. The former
is based on the titular ethnicity as the main agent, while the latter is carried by the civic
society of a specific nation of multiple ethnicities. Many authors prefer to concentrate on
ethnic nationalism, which is vividly seen from the names of their books. For instance,
Ethnicity and Nationalism, as a name, unites the works of Thomas Eriksen and Anthony
Smith, while Walker Connor named his monograph Ethnonationalism. Ethnic
nationalism could be defined as “based on a belief in common descent and identity.”
(Smith 1992, 66)
At the same time, the Canadian politician and theorist Michael Ignatieff, calling
himself a “civic nationalist” insists that “civic nationalism is a political creed, which
defines common citizenship and which emerged from the universalist philosophies of the
Enlightenment…the nationalism of established European democracies at their best.”
(quoted in Billig 1995, 47)
Culture
John Armstrong (1982, 241 & 282) contends “that language was more often the
product than the cause of polity formation; but cause and effect were rarely
unidirectional”, while also discussing the importance of linguistic codes, especially in
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bilingual societies, and “European linguistic barriers.” E. J. Hobsbawm discusses
language and religion as indicative components of Proto-Nationalism (a reference to
ethnically-based nationalism), stating that “nationalism of a later period may have
genuinely popular linguistic proto-national roots.” (Hobsbawm 1992, 53) Discussing
Herder’s cultural nationalism, Edwards acknowledged that “language has been perceived
by many to be the very embodiment of the national character and its genius, the main
marker of national identity,” while linguist Joshua Fishman labeled it “a link with the
glorious past and with authentic nature of a people.” (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 76)
Ernest Gellner (2006, 42-3 & 152) conceptualizes language as “at least
provisionally acceptable criterion of culture…at least a sufficient, if not a necessary
touchstone of it”, providing numerical approximations for potential nationalisms based
on the number of national languages worldwide, also paying attention to the cases where
“potential nationalisms [are generated] by analogies invoking factors other than
language,” as an example with Scotland and Ireland.
Like language, religion is a crucial component of many nationalist worldviews.
John Armstrong’s Nations Before Nationalism (1982, 203) explores the role of religion
and its influence on ethnicity, and, consequently, nationalist ideology, arguing that “the
penetrative power of religious organizations has important implications for formation of
ethnic identity.” Hobsbawm (1992, 68) believes that religion “is a paradoxical cement for
proto-nationalism, and indeed for modern nationalism, which has usually (at least in its
more crusading phases) treated it with considerable reserve as a force which could
challenge the nation’s monopoly claim to its members’ loyalty.” Lisa Wedeen (2008) in
her narrative on Yemeni nationalism emphasizes that it is of great importance for the
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political scientists to decouple nationalism and secularism, while discussing the role of
religion in nationalist mobilization.
For Ukraine and Scotland, the issue of language is debated differently in the
context of nationalism. While in Ukraine, the Ukrainian language became one of the
unifying factors for the nationalist movement throughout its modern history, in Scotland,
though, the failure of both Gaelic and Scots to gain nationwide popularity are often
mentioned among the nationalist mobilization. Some see this primarily as negligence in
the education system (at least, as evident in the 1960s – at the time of publication), as “in
Scotland itself, in our schools and universities, little or no place is accorded to Scottish
literature or to our two native tongues, Scots and Gaelic.” (MacDiarmid 1968, 3) But in
the same time there are many activists that participate in the nationwide movements
which address the language issue, as described by H.J. Hanham (1969, 15) about a
Scottish equivalent of the Irish Gaelic movement with a slogan ‘No language, no nation!’
Nevertheless, the number of Gaelic-speakers kept declining “since the first Census was
taken in 1891”, and, as Macdonald suggests (1997, 221), “there is, of course an
irony…that Gaelic has seen such decline in its heartlands for it is in the same period [of]
introduction of policies and institutions designed to promote Gaelic.”
In Imagined Communities (1996, 150 & 67-8), Anderson puts language at the
center of his monograph. He states that “‘national print-languages’ were of central
ideological and political importance”, discussing “European conception of nation-ness as
linked to a private-property language,” as well as indicating the role of Russia in the
language domain as “colonial empire, with its rapidly expanding bureaucratic apparatus
and its ‘Russifying’ policies.” Yuri Slezkine was also quoted as discussing “the central
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role played by the manipulation of language in the Soviet nationalities policies of the
1920s.” (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 78) Walker Connor, referring to pre-independent
Ukraine, focused mostly on the importance of the issue for the nation itself, underlining
that “Ukrainians, as a method of asserting their non-Russian identity, wage their
campaign for national survival largely in terms of their right to employ the Ukrainian…
tongue in all oral and written matters… maintaining that their continued existence as a
separate nation is at stake.” (Connor 1994, 43-4; 153)
Many academic sources refer to the importance of national poets and writers to
the overall development of the nationalist movement. Trumpener (1997, 73) points to the
fact that “neoclassically trained poets such as Robert Fergusson and Robert Burns selfconsciously turned back to the Scottish vernacular [while] many [of Scotland’s]
Enlightenment intellectuals…labored to anglicize their own pronunciation and to develop
a stately prose style in a language not fully their own.” Anderson (1996, 74) links the
creation “of the first Ukrainian nationalist organization” with “[Shevchenko’s use of the
Ukrainian literary language in the mid-19th century, as] the decisive stage in the
formation of the Ukrainian national consciousness.”
Calhoun (1997, 52) focuses on the attempt of revival of Gaelic in the 21st century
as linked to nationalism, suggesting that “the international wave of nationalism which
also brought the revitalization (if not outright reinvention) of Catalan, Gaelic, and other
relatively small languages linked to separatist political ambitions elsewhere in Europe.”
While discussing the importance of the language in Celtic nationalism, Scottish
nationalist and poet Hugh MacDiarmid (1968, 301) acknowledges the interconnection of
both: “[Celtic Nationalism] is precisely a phenomenon …in Wales, Scotland, Ireland,
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Britanny and – confined for practical purposes to the language question – in Cornwall
and the Isle of Man.”
Some historic similarity could be seen between religions in Scotland and Ukraine,
not only in terms of their opposition to the historic Anglicizing and Russifying policies
and provoking nationalist aspirations, but also in their historic binary division –
Presbyterian (the Kirk) and Catholic in the former, and Orthodox and Greek Catholic in
the latter.
MacDiarmid recalls the historic event that shows the political role of the Kirk,
when in May 1966 it officially pleaded for “an elected national authority in Scotland.”
(Hobsbawm 1992, 312) Andrew Wilson (1997, 86) discusses the important role of the
Ukrainian church, calling its suppression “depriving…of a crucial cultural marker with
which to distinguish themselves from other East Slavs.” In presenting religious
distinction of Ukrainians and the neighbors as part of his topic of proto-nationalism,
Hobsbawm (1992, 68) also refers to it as another ethnic badge, “as Russians, Ukrainians
and Poles could differentiate themselves as Orthodox, Uniate and Roman Catholic
believers.”
Diaspora
In the times of closer global integration, the issues of international migration and
diaspora are of growing importance to nationalist debates. Scholars have tried to
determine if ethnic groups in specific host countries can be classified as diasporas, or if
they are rather sojourners and only temporarily visit the more developed states out of
economic reasons with a clear pattern of returning home on seasonal basis. Milton Esman
(2009, 4-5) suggests that only a third of those sojourners eventually return back home,
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while the rest of them remain in the host countries, “hoping to retain their inherited
culture and to reproduce…the familiar environment of their former homeland”. Other
questions can be asked about different groups or waves within one diasporic community
based on the time frame and specific circumstances of their arrival.
As far as the term is concerned, according to Safran (quoted in Satzewich 2002,
14) “by the 1990s, any group that had a history of migration and community formation
was termed a diaspora.” The most widely cited framework for diaspora studies was
presented by Robin Cohen (1997, 177-180) in Global Diasporas: An Introduction, where
he clarifies theoretical guidelines of whether to consider a specific ethnic group as such.
Both Scottish and Ukrainian émigré groups are widely accepted as ‘diasporas’, as seen in
Satzewich (2002) and Sim (2011) among other authors, discussing also their political
affiliations and nationalism as a dynamo for the long-awaited Ukrainian independence
and still expected Scottish political sovereignty.
Especially relevant in this regard is Anderson’s “concept of 'long-distance
nationalism' refers to the nation-state of departure (Anderson 1992, 6), Turkey, which
acts on its exiled population by way of language, religion and dual nationality,” where
“this nation-state tries to reinforce as much as possible the loyalty of its nationals residing
outside its frontiers.” (quoted in Bauböck 2010, 44)

Globalization
The issue of globalization and its place in the nationalist agenda is also important
as nationalism is often understood as a counter-globalization force. For example, Peter
Evans (2008, 271) draws on “Polanyi’s concept of the ‘double-movement’…to challenge
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the hegemony of neo-liberal globalization”. Saul Newman (2000, 25) quotes Michael
Keating who sees in the late-20th century situation some political challenge for
nationalists, claiming that “globalization is providing the opportunities for nationalists to
transform state authority.” Another problem sometimes raised in relation to globalization
is whether it could possibly endanger the existence of nationalism in general, which was
answered by Spencer and Wollman (2005, 238): “By itself, globalization does not seem
to guarantee any particular outcome to nationalism or its antitheses…as the local and the
global seem to interact in ways than can produce quite contradictory circumstances.”
Some may argue that one of the reasons why nationalism opposes globalization is
a degree of cultural threat that the latter can raise against a national culture of a given
nation. One of the most popular and widely quoted assertions is Benjamin Barber’s
(Holton 2000, 146) passage on “global cultural polarization in terms of conflict between
McWorld and jihad,” where “these powerful metaphors stand for global consumer
capitalism, on the one side, and the fundamentalist struggle for justice for the
downtrodden, on the other .” Even though global culture is primarily influenced by
Western and American way of life, “cultural threats in many countries are often
perceived in terms other than Americanization… as Japanization may be for Koreans,
Indianization for Sri Lankans, Vietnamization for Cambodians,…so cultural power is, in
other words, multicentered rather than organized within a unitary core-periphery relations
system centered on the United States.” (Holton 2000, 144) Contrariwise to the popular
belief is Riggs’ (2002, 41) claim that “ethnic nationalism is a more recent phenomenon”
and that “globalization has accelerated the emergence of these ethnic nations.” A similar
assertion is raised by Catarina Kinnvall (2004, 763) who claims that “the prominence of
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religion and nationalism, in novel interpretations, thus may engender the growth of new
local identities in response to the destabilizing effects of globalization.”

2.2 The Case Study
Theories of nationalism can help position a case study: from this review the most
compelling is the opposition of ethnic and civic nationalism.This is one of the
fundamental differences between the Ukrainian and Scottish nationalist movements. The
former is clearly ethnic and on the political right; the latter – is of a leftist civic nature.
The role of culture is important for both Scottish and Ukrainian nationalisms, but
with differing degrees of intensity and in different historic time periods. Language and
religion are more acute in nationalist terms for the Ukraine’s Svoboda, as they are
considered as primary ethnic markers of the Ukrainian statehood. On the contrary,
language does not take such an important place on the SNP’s agenda, and the Kirk was
granted autonomy by the 1707 Treaty of the Union4. What is common for both
nationalisms in cultural terms, is the role of the national writers and poets who express
patriotic and nationalist ideas sometimes more efficiently than the political parties. The
subsection on diaspora will contrast émigré groups and the final section will explore the
discourse on globalization and the economic peculiarities of dependence of the politically
independent Ukraine on Russian energy supplies and the economic benefits and
disadvantages of Scotland in the United Kingdom.

4

The historic treaty passed by both English and Scottish Parliaments, ratifying the union between the two
independent nations, successfully passed in 1707.
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Why Compare?
One of the purposes of this thesis is to demonstrate the multiple commonalities
and differences in these two nationalist movements, a topic that is not widely addressed
in academia. One example of an academic work comparing the two countries is
Velychenko’s (1997) article Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism in Great Britain
and Imperial Russia, 1707 to 1914: Institutions, Law, and Nationality in Scotland and
Ukraine, which primarily covered the period before the First World War. Velychenko
(1997) targeted a few important areas of intersection between the two nationalisms:
a. “In Scotland and Cossack-Ukraine, dissatisfaction over incorporation lingered for
decades afterwards” (ibid, 414) – which supposedly encouraged various forms of
the pro-independence nationalist movements in both polities;
b. “Until 1914, unlike the Poles or Irish, the Ukrainians and Scots staged no
nationally inspired armed uprisings or terrorism” (ibid);
c. “The majority of the elite were loyalist in both countries, and there was no
Scottish nor Ukrainian state in the nineteenth century” (ibid).
He also pinpointed such differences as:
a. “Although loyalists condemned it in the mid-eighteenth century as the language
of treason, Gaelic was never formally proscribed” (Velychenko 1997, 417)
b. “Scotland …was annexed by a negotiated compromise in the Treaty of Union
(1707).”
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c. “[Scottish autonomous] institutions generated judges, lawyers, clerks, teachers,
and ministers who effectively erected an invisible border with England and
ensured that Scots remained Scots behind it.” (ibid)
d. “Scotland may have become a “north Britain” – its official title in the Act of
Union – but it never became a “Little England” or a shire” (ibid).
What Is Needed?
Velychenko’s article serves as a good source of historic reference, and the only
academic piece covering the same case study, but it only explores developments before
WWI. This thesis concentrates on the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries. Many
lines of comparison are still valid although, as I show, there are other similarities and
differences between the two nationalisms and countries. This thesis will mostly focus
therefore on the post-WWI evolution of Scottish and Ukrainian nationalism, taking into
consideration the change of status of both polities – Ukraine’s brief independence of the
1918-21, colonial status of the Soviet period and the independence since 1991, as well as
Scottish devolution process that ended up with the restoration of the Scottish Parliament
in 1999 with, devolved powers. As a result, I will analyze the role and agenda of the
Ukrainian nationalists (Rukh of the 1990s and Svoboda), comparing their agenda and
manifestos with their Scottish counterparts from the SNP.

CHAPTER THREE: SCOTTISH NATIONALISM
3.1. Historic Background
Since the 1707 Treaty of Union, the whole concept of the United Kingdom was
relatively uncontested until the 1979 referendum on devolution, with an exception of the
self-government movement of the late 1880s. Never before the late 1970s was the
Scottish nation so close to the autonomous government, but due to the technicalities (and
specifically the low turnout and the required disproportionally high percentage of vote)
the results were not satisfactory for the protagonist camp, and it took another two decades
until the successful 1997 referendum for the devolution to be implemented. As a result, in
1999 Scotland reestablished its own Parliament and devolved Government, which since
2007 is led by the pro-independence Scottish National Party. The SNP leader and
Scotland’s First Minister, Alex Salmond has declared that the Scots will have a chance to
restore their historic independence in yet another Scottish referendum in the fall of 2014.
The authors of the Claim of Right for Scotland – members of the 1988
Constitutional Steering Committee (1988, 1), one of the many advocates of Scottish
Home Rule, emphasized the concept of a Scottish nation, stating that “much ink [is]
wasted on the question whether the Scots are a nation. Of course they are. They were
both a nation and a state until 1707.” According to novelist Alasdair Gray (1992, 17),
“the [1314] Bannockburn victory5 made Scotland the first European nation state – the
first to have territorial unity under one king.” Paul Scott (1992, 15) takes this idea even
further, suggesting that “possibly the idea [of self-determination] first appeared in

5

The 1314 Battle of Bannockburn secured Scotland’s independence from England.
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Scotland, since the 1320 Declaration of Arbroath6 may be the earliest, as well as one of
the most eloquent, statements of it.” Later, as it is known from history, Scotland’s
political independence was lost to a Union with England in 1707, even though “during
the long debate on this Treaty of Union an English government spy judged that the
Scottish people were fifty-to-one against. Churchmen denounced it; burghs petitioned
against it; Glasgow, Dumfries and Edinburgh mobs rioted against it.” (Gray 1992, 36)
Popular disagreements were seen in the first decades of United Kingdom’s existence,
with later eventual disappearance and a new resurgence in a form of a string of Home
Rule movements in the late 19th century and unsuccessful Scotland bills of the early 20th
century. In Gordon Donaldson’s (1969, 4) view, the history of Scottish attitudes to the
Union of 1707 falls into three clearly-defined phases:
There was, first of all, a period of some forty or fifty years during which there was considerable
discontent with the Union. Then came, secondly, a period of roughly a century, 1750-1850, during
which the Union was all but invariably accepted as part of the established and unalterable order of
things. Thirdly, there has been a period of now a little more than a hundred years during which the
Union has been the object of intermittent or recurrent criticism: ever since 1853 there has been a
series of waves of unrest in which the Union has been…attacked and challenged.

Additionally, many of the Treaty of Union’s “major provisions have been
violated, and its spirit has never affected the huge areas of government which have
evolved since,” (Constitutional Steering Committee 1988, 2) despite Nairn’s (1981, 129)
consideration of Scotland “a nationality which resigned statehood but preserved an
extraordinary amount of the institutional and psychological baggage normally associated
with independence – a decapitated national state, as it were, rather than an ordinary
‘assimilated’ nationality.”In opposition to these developments, according to Scott’s
(1992, 50) calculations, “since 1889 no fewer than 34 Scottish Home Rule Bills have

6

Declaration of Independence – an important Scottish document, known as the in the form of a letter to the
Roman Pope.
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been presented to the House of Commons,” but “all have been lapsed in spite of the
support, in nearly every case, of a majority of the Scottish MPs.” The issue of Scottish
political sovereignty “after 1928 [was] … never again raised in parliament for almost
forty years.” (Donaldson and others 1969, 10) The proposed laws ranged from the
Scotland Bills offering an assembly with limited powers to the idea of Scottish National
Convention in 1926 “designed to go further than its predecessors, for it was now
proposed to abandon representation at Westminster and give Scotland virtually Dominion
status” (Donaldson and others 1969, 11) – a concept of independence similar in style to
Canada or Australia, which eventually became known as a Commonwealth realm – full
statehood with the preservation of the British monarch as a formal head of state.
Consequently, “the Scottish National Party started life in 1934 with a well-established
base and a Home Rule policy,” unlike its predecessor – the National Party – which
“emphasized the independence,” as its primary political target. (Hanham 1969, 163) The
role of the Scottish National Party has been central to the Scottish nationalist movement.
The SNP, as a party, came a long way from almost a marginal organization of the 1930s
and 40s to winning a landslide election to the Scottish parliament in 2011, and
dominating both local and European polls.
Scottish nationalism is one of the most widely debated illustrations of the
ideology in Europe, often compared to similar political movements in Canada’s Quebec,
Spain’s Catalonia and the Basque Country, France’s Brittany, or its UK’s co-partner in
devolution developments – Wales. Gwynfor Evans, alongside other participants in this
academic debate emphasizes independence as the primary target of Scottish nationalism,
insisting that “Brittany, Scotland and Wales are three of the oldest nations in the world
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[and] each of the three countries should have a place in the United Nations.” (quoted in
MacDiarmid 1968, 342) Hechter (1999, 5 & 22) dedicates a large portion of his
monograph to the relation between the “core”, which is London, and the “periphery”,
which are primarily Scotland and Wales, later coming up with the model, which equates
“periphery” with the “internal colony”, as the theoretical base of his analysis. In contrast,
Tom Nairn (1981) disagrees that the Scottish type of nationalism is just another example
of the ideology. Referring to it as “neo-nationalism” in the 1970s, Nairn finds
resemblance to it only in the comparable Occitan movement of the same period. The core
reason of the emergence of “neo-nationalism” for Nairn (1981, 127) is relative “overdevelopment” due to a discovery, in Scotland’s case, of North Sea oil, contending that
“the new Scottish separatism of the 70s is in some ways comparable to trends in Brittany,
Catalonia, Wales, and other regions of Western Europe, in certain respects it remains
unique [as] nowhere else has the transformation been so abrupt, or so extensive.”
There may be different approximations on when nationalism became a seriously
debated issue in the international relations or political science in general, but many
authors on the subject agree that it was boosted, in Nairn’s terms (1981, 94), by “the
major nationalist settlement of 1918-22,” where the author refers to the consequences of
the Treaty of Versailles. These years, coincidentally or not, became rather important for
Scottish nationalism, as two significant events happened in the 1920s: “the emergence of
a permanent political movement with the formation of the National Party of Scotland
(direct ancestor of the SNP) in 1928” and “the appearance of the epic poem of modern
Scottish nationalism…MacDiarmid’s A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle, in 1926.” (Nairn
1981, 95) However, contradicting Nairn’s argument, McCrone (1992, 197) underlines
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that “in crucial respects…Scottish nationalism is a phenomenon of the late twentieth, not
the nineteenth century,” referring to the rise of the SNP’s popularity and electoral
successes in the 1970s and then later in the 1990s, also dismissing the particular
importance of the ‘Home Rule’ movements of the 19th century.
Proposals for greater Scottish self-government were used as a leitmotif in the UKwide electoral campaigns, by the Westminster-based parties in order to gain a larger
percentage of the Scottish electorate – firstly by the Liberals between the 1880s and
1940s, to whom “Scottish Home Rule might have a very special and practical attraction,
because…they might reasonably have expected to enjoy a permanent majority in a
Scottish Parliament.” (Donaldson and others 1969, 9) Since the 1960s, it was also picked
up by the Labour Party who “followed very much the Liberal pattern – approval of Home
Rule when out of office, inaction when in office.” (Donaldson and others 1969, 4-16) In
other words, “so far as the Scots vote for the United Kingdom parties, these parties will
themselves regard Scottish issues as subsidiary to the winning of British votes.”
(Constitutional Steering Committee 1988, 3) As a result, many Scottish voters felt a need
for a new force in the Scottish political system dedicated to Scottish interests, and ideally
not biased by the peculiarities of the Westminster politics. Such a “failure to gain
effective support from any existing party had led in 1928 to the formation of the National
Party of Scotland, formed from an amalgamation of some existing small bodies,
possessing a left-wing bias and aiming at complete separation from England.”
(Donaldson and others 1969, 12)
The state of the British Union and the increasing support for nationalism requires
deeper analysis of the nature of the Union itself. Tom Nairn (1981, 129) underlines that
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“Scotland’s real peculiarity lies …in the lateness [and] the manner of the fusion: there are
many stateless nationalities in history, but only one Act of Union – a peculiarly patrician
bargain between two ruling classes, which would have been unthinkable earlier, under
absolute monarchy, and impossible later, when the age of democratic nationalism had
arrived.” His description of uniqueness of the United Kingdom is challenged by Hanham
(1969, 10 & 66) who compares the Union of Scotland and England to other dynastic
alliances: Holland and Belgium, Sweden and Norway, and the Habsburg Empire,
eventually revisiting the question later in his monograph pondering if “Texas got better
terms when it joined the United States than Scotland got when it joined Great Britain.”
Another important aspect of the 1707 Union is the question of benefits from the
Union and unionist support in the Scottish society as opposed to the historic processes of
hostility. Nairn (1981, 12) weighs those two views on the same issue, trying to emphasize
the presence and coexistence of both: “There were episodes of conquest in the histories of
Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland, true enough [but] these were followed or
accompanied by episodes of assimilation and voluntary integration.” At the same time,
Hanham (1969, 34) recognizes that “pressure for Anglicization began to be felt in
Scotland about the middle of the eighteenth century.” This position is supported by the
Scottish historian Rosalind Mitchison, as quoted by Nairn (1981, 135-6): “A foreign,
much stronger State and political system was imposed on Scotland by the Union.
Through it the country was ‘managed…by a set of monarchs chosen by English
politicians for English political purposes’ ”. McCrone debates on a different, although
interrelated issue of British nationalism as an opposition to the peripheral Scottish and
Welsh nationalism, insisting that “[British nationalism] has depended historically upon
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the British Empire, the monarchy, and institutions such as the BBC.” (McCrone 1992,
209) Nairn in a similar fashion draws readers’ attention to the fact that the long awaited
political changes in the form of proposed Scottish self-government in the 1970s were
minimal in nature: “The changes were at heart ways of preserving the old state – minor
alterations to conserve the antique essence of English hegemony,” (Nairn 1981, 63) and
later, revisiting the problem of widely anticipated administrative changes, states that
“pious, somewhat sleekit7 debates about ‘Home Rule’ for Scotland and Wales have
appeared and reappeared in imperial politics since the 1880s…[as] a modest degree of
self-government in order to strengthen the Union, and Great-British nationalism.” (ibid,
130) In his analysis of the Union’s success, Harvie (1994, 207) singles out the style of its
containment and economic advantages by claiming that “the Union had survived by
balancing nationalism and assimilation, first as a type of elitist federation, then as a
bargain in which the Scottish elite gave up much…of its political autonomy for proper
representation, industrial growth and imperial development.”
Christopher Harvie (1994, 179) in his Scotland and Nationalism, provides an
essential overview of the Scottish political, cultural and economic history since 1707’s
Act of Union, and, among other issues, compares two events in the UK’s history of
equally anti-Scottish nature – “pseudo-endorsement” of the all-Scottish Covenant of 1950
by the Conservative Churchill government and a Labour government’s establishment of
‘Constitutional Committee’ in response to Winnie Ewing’s victory as the first SNP MP in
1967 (and its eventual dismantling). Both episodes in the history of Scotland illustrated
Westminster’s negativity to any concessions in terms of administrative devolution and
underlined the opportunist position of both Westminster parties.
7

According to Dictionary.com, “Chiefly Scot. sly; sneaky.” (Dictionary 2012)
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Widely discussed is also an issue of Union’s parliamentary mechanism, which
MacDiarmid (1968, 322) considered “especially absurd …when in the Westminster
Parliament the Scottish representation is in a permanent minority which can be – and is –
continually overruled in purely Scottish matters by an English majority.” This is still
relevant for the Scotland’s influence on the Westminster Parliament in terms of
macroeconomy, defense, and international affairs, while the electoral system for the
Scottish Parliament since 1999 is much more inclusive. McCrone (1992, 121) looks into
the question of relations with Westminster with similar amount of enthusiasm stating that
“political incorporation of Scotland seems complete.” Meantime, Nairn (1981, 53)
studies the peculiarity of the formation of the system of parliamentary participation
concluding that “the two-party equilibrium, with its antique non-proportional elective
method and its great bedrock of tacit agreement on central issues, was formed to promote
stability at the expense of adventure.” Many Scots were also dissatisfied with the
situation with the local government, which seemed as a reserved autonomous element of
Scottish governance, but yet it was constantly revisited and modified, and sometimes
stirred political consequences. “The abolition of parish councils in 1929,” Harvie (1994,
141) maintains, “boosted the National Party, as local government was assumed by the
Act of Union.” Similarly unpopular was another proposal – Churchill’s idea of
devolution by “counterbalancing regional legislatures” creating ten areas with local
bodies (Hanham 1969, 97), considered by Harvie (1994, 142) to be “seen as a ‘rational’
alternative to nationalism.”
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3.2. Scottish Politics
Scottish National Party
The SNP was neither the first, nor the only force in the nationalist spectrum of
Scottish politics, but definitely became the major player in that segment, being “in the
right place at the right time, making explicit the ‘national’ dimension of the post-war
consensus, and providing a political alternative when the British settlement began to fail.”
(McCrone 1992, 164) In a similar manner, Harvie (1994, 117) sees that “the rise of SNP
was not itself inevitable. The other parties could have pre-empted it. They failed to do so
partly because they regarded Scotland as ‘marginal’.”
The Scottish National Party, or the SNP, was created in 1934, as a merger
between the National Party of Scotland, and “a separate Scottish party, with a more
moderate political tone” (Donaldson and others 1969, 12). From its outset, therefore the
SNP contained two internal groups – a gradualist and a stridently pro-independence one.
According to Taylor (1999, 165-6), “the early years of the party were spectacularly
unsuccessful on the fringe of Scottish politics.” The Second World War and its aftermath
boosted Unionist feelings and had no positive electoral effect on the Scottish
independence or, for that matter, any self-government movement, or the SNP in
particular, except for Robert McIntyre’s unexpected victory in the by-election in
Motherwell “in 1945 during the electoral wartime truce between the main British
parties.” (Young and Murison 1977, 23) During the Second World War, there were
multiple instances of political ignorance and misunderstandings. On one occasion “with
the Germans overrunning Norway, the British Secret Service momentarily panicked and
early one morning descended on several prominent Nationalists in various to raid their
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homes for seditious or treasonable articles.” (Young and Murison 1977, 16) One of the
SNP’s leaders, scholar Douglas Young (1950, 72), was twice imprisoned during World
War II for his “views on Scottish conscription and the Act of Union,” and specifically the
SNP’s decision made in 1937, stating that in “the eventuality of another world war …
members of military age should not serve in British Forces unless and until Scotland had
her own government.” Young (1950, 72-4) based his argument on the text of the 1707
Treaty of Union, the fact that in the First World War “Scotland had suffered
disproportionally heavy casualties as compared with any other part of the British
Empire”, and that in WWII Westminster “had not applied … [conscription] to Northern
Ireland,” creating double-standard within the UK. Disregarding the validity of Young’s
concerns, and with popular approval for British involvement in WWII, these policies
diminished the SNP’s chances and support. Moreover, as described by Hanham (1969,
166), this issue became an additional point of difference within the SNP’s membership,
with the party eventually supporting the war. One of the explanations for this may be “the
place of Highland regiments in national identity…based on this age-old tradition of the
Scots as martial people,” whereas these “were imperial units but their soldiers…were
recognizably and unambiguously Scottish.” (Devine 2011, 225)
Another problem that internally divided the SNP were “tensions between
moderate and extreme elements,” which ultimately in the mid-1940s caused “the
withdrawal of the moderates to form a body called Scottish Convention, aiming at a
federal system within the United Kingdom,” (Young and Murison 1977, 13), and
opposed to the SNP’s independence aim. In addition, the Scottish National Party was also
divided on rules of membership – as an exclusive political party, or as, in Young’s ([and
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Murison] 1977, 23) view “an all-party coalition, presumably a coalition against the
Conservative party, which was uncompromisingly unionist.” But that latter view was in
reality preventing the SNP candidates from full participation in the election campaigns,
as they might have been members of other parties, their possible opponents. This duality
was later reviewed by the party conference, and “in 1948 they succeeded in getting the
SNP to change its constitution to exclude from its own membership members of any
other party…on the general grounds that divided allegiances had got and would continue
to get the Scottish cause nowhere.” (Young and Murison 1977, 23)
Furthermore, this historic period was also significant in terms of coinage of the
party’s goal of Scottish self-government, hence letting Scott (1997, 137) insist that “the
Scottish National Party has been equally consistent and has not deviated in aims from a
statement which it adopted in 1946.” In terms of electoral performance, “from foundation
to the early 1960s, it hovered around 1 per cent in overall support…it presented relatively
few candidates: only two, for example, in each of the general elections of 1951 and 1955”
(Taylor 1999, 166), so as a result “the great achievement of the SNP from 1942 to 1964
was simply to have survived,” (Hanham 1969, 179).
The SNP in the 1950s was largely invisible in terms of electoral performance. The
1960s became the period when the Scottish National Party made a transformation into an
all-Scottish political force able to contest Westminster seats, successfully positioning
itself on the Scottish electoral map. As suggested by Gordon Donaldson ([and others]
1969, 15), “until 1967, once only had a Scottish Nationalist candidate, Dr. Robert
McIntyre, been returned to Westminster…The second victory, that of Mrs. Ewing at
Hamilton in November 1967, was again at a by-election,” whose accomplishment was
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boosted even further by “remarkable successes of Nationalists in local authority
elections.” Scott (1997, 144) also attributes the successes to “the discovery of oil in
Scottish waters” in the 1960s, which in turn “encouraged further support for the SNP
which doubled its share of the vote in each successive General Election between 1966
and 1974.” Another well-known writer on Scotland, Tom Nairn paid attention to the
interrelation of culture and economy in the SNP’s campaigning: “Beneath hegemonic
British culture is a Scottish subculture, reinvigorated by the 1970s discovery of North Sea
Oil, a (sub-)culture around which the SNP rallies” (quoted in Hague 1994, 140), adding
also that “the SNP won its startling victories in 1974 on the slogan ‘It’s Scotland’s Oil’!
If taken seriously, there can be no doubt that this and other nationalist rhetoric portends a
real battle.” (Nairn 1981, 191) The best illustration of the rise of the SNP vote was
definitely when “at a General Election in October 1974 the SNP won 30 per cent of the
vote and eleven seats and was in second place in forty-two others” (Scott 1997, 147),
making it the best result in a Westminster election to this day.
The discovery of the North Sea oil in the 1960s, and a subsequent rise in SNP’s
popularity resulted in formation in 1969 of the Kilbrandon Commission on Scottish and
Welsh devolution, which discussed different options for proposed future devolved
national assemblies. Nevertheless, there was no mention of a referendum in the original
1977 Scotland (and Wales) Bill. (Bochel, Denver and Macartney 1981, 3) The successful
addition of that option became possible only because “the Parliamentary progress of the
Scotland and Wales Bill…showed how little discipline the Government was able, or
wished, to exert over the rebels in its ranks, such as, George Cunnigham, who first forced
a Referendum on the government and then the notorious “40 per cent rule”. (Bochel,
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Denver and Macartney 1981, 149) The whole Bill was originally planned to be discussed
and voted for in the Parliament without any referendum, while the 40 per cent rule – the
requirement to obtain forty per cent from the total electorate instead of a simple majority
– all but doomed the referendum on Scottish devolution before a vote was cast. It meant
that even if over a half of the voters were to support self-government, it was not enough,
as 40 per cent of the overall electorate was needed.
The 1970s became not only the historic period of the best electoral performance
of Scottish nationalists, but also the time of a change in attitudes towards the SNP, and
especially from the opponents. According to one of the former SNP leaders, Billy Wolfe
(1973, 66) “there were three stages in the change in the climate of opinion which opposed
[SNP’s] struggle: 1, Ridicule; 2, Toleration and friendly banter; and 3, Gloves off, savage
and dirty.”
The same decade witnessed the controversy about the opinions of Scots towards
independence or devolution. According to the Kilbrandon Report (1973, 147) of 1969-73,
“in neither Scotland nor Wales has the nationalist cause attracted support anything like
sufficient to constitute a general vote for independence; but it has provided a means
for…changes in the system of government which would acknowledge their separate
identities and special interests,” referring to devolution. At the same time, to many Scots
in the 1970s saw successful independence movements in the former British empire set an
example to follow, as the SNP’s leader Billy Wolfe (1973, 53) explained: “Nyasaland
[now known as Malawi] had just been granted independence, so [SNP’s] advertisement
read: “Nyasaland now has independence – what about Scotland – but of course Scotland
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is a profitable colony. So long as we are a nation of labourers in our own land we will
remain England’s last satellite.”
John MacKintosh (1974, 153-4) considers the popularity of nationalists in the
1970s interrelated with a complicated notion of “dual nationality,” more precisely that a
string of events both worldwide and nationwide “made the British side of the dual
nationality less and less attractive till finally considerable numbers, for the first time for
200 years, began to doubt whether it was worth preserving at all.”
A referendum on Scottish devolution was held in March 1979. It was the first
major effort to reform the constitutional status of Scotland as one of the constituent
countries of the United Kingdom since 1707 and introduce a proposed Scottish assembly.
Eventually, the referendum was conducted with multiple irregularities if compared with
the sole previous experience of such a plebiscite – the nationwide vote on EEC
participation four years earlier, in 1975. Among vividly acknowledged downsides of the
1979 Referendum in contrast with the EEC vote, Bochel, Denver and Macartney (1981,
5-7) emphasize the absence of official leaflets, a ban on political broadcasts, setting of a
rather inappropriate time for the vote, absence of the information on campaign
expenditures (as guide to the amounts and sources of financing of both camps), and the
forty percent threshold. All these details were far from just slight drawbacks, and might
have influenced the final result. Meanwhile, one of the most celebrated constitution and
devolution experts, Vernon Bogdanor (quoted in Bochel, Denver and Macartney 1981, 7)
in his 1980 analysis was more puzzled with the mysterious shift from the regular
parliamentary passage of the Bill (according to the British constitutional tradition) to the
referendum, acknowledging the deceit of the Scottish electorate:
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The genesis and constitutional status of this provision are of great interest for a number of
reasons. Resulting from an amendment by a backbench MP on the Government side of the
House, it has some claim to be the most significant backbench initiative in British politics since
the war since it played a crucial part in securing the repeal of the Scotland Act, depriving the
Scots of an Assembly for which a majority had voted.

Scottish politician Jim Sillars further suggests that there was no proper
cooperation between different political parties on the issue, as “all the parties who
mounted their own campaigns were “fishing for post-referendum credits.” (quoted in
Bochel, Denver and Macartney 1981, 18)
As a result of the above-mentioned shortcomings in organization, the 1979
referendum was marked by a controversy, as almost fifty-two per cent voted in favor of
self-government. On the other hand, the ‘forty-per cent rule’ prohibited it from being
recognized as a successful ‘Yes’ vote, as the total number of electors fell short from the
required percentage. The consequences of the referendum brought to an end a decade of
victorious performances by the SNP and, after a vote of no-confidence in the Labour
government in 1979, the next two decades of the UK politics were dominated by the proUnionist Conservatives. It so happened that “the dilemma for the SNP was that, if the
issue was not brought to a head, the Party was in danger of losing all credibility as the
party which “spoke for Scotland”. Instead, as things turned out, the SNP could be blamed
for causing the downfall of the [1974-79 Labour] Government and with it the [Scotland
and Wales] Act.” (Bochel, Denver and Macartney 1981, 148)
Disregarding the outcome, Nairn (1981, 376 & 399) in his postscript written in
the early 1980s, suggested that “1979 opened an era of disintegration at the UK political
level,” even though “separatism had been exorcized by the March referenda.” This
episode in the Scottish history found its logical and consistent continuation in the
referendum of 1997.
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The idea of self-government was on the agenda of Scottish politics since the
second half of the 19th century with its multiple downturns and achievements, but it has
never got that close to realization as in the late 1970s. Many nationalists had hopes for
the 1979 referendum as one of the steps to future independence, even though “most trace
Labour’s adoption of devolution to the rise of the SNP in the 1970s, when the
Nationalists gained first seven and then eleven seats in the two general elections of
1974.” (Taylor 1999, 147) Unfortunately, due to many last-minute obstacles, including,
but not limited to, the infamous forty percent rule, the 1979 referendum failed, triggering
the collapse of the Labour government with it.
Many SNP voters never forgave the party’s vote of no confidence that helped oust
the Labour government in 1979, and eventually brought in the Conservatives for almost
two decades. At the 1979 Westminster election, SNP’s representation went down from
eleven seats to just two, with Scott (1997, 164) commenting that the failed 1979
devolution referendum “was a Labour measure, but the SNP took the blame.”
The SNP’s key new political idea of the 1980s, which got implemented in the
SNP manifesto at the 1992 election campaign, was a U-turn in the SNP’s European
perspective. Largely attributed to Jim Sillars (1988, 179), the SNP’s shift of policy on
EEC, underlined that if the party maintained its anti-European stance, then “next time the
charge will be that we are ‘double separatists’, seeking to break away from not only our
large English market, but from the 323 million European market offered by the
Community.” Referring to his newly envisioned type of Scottish statehood as “internal
independence”, Sillars (1988, 180-1) insisted in 1988 that EEC “member status, should
become a priority objective of the whole Scottish nation, and the centerpiece of SNP
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policy,” accusing “both the British unionists and the Scottish withdrawal group,” that is
the Euro-skeptic SNP members, as both taking anti-Scottish positions. “While advancing
different views”, Sillars (ibid) maintained than both perspectives, “would leave us in the
same dangerously exposed position.” Popular support for the pro-European agenda soon
materialized, when “two months later [after his pamphlet’s publication] in 1988 Sillars
overturned a Labour majority of 19,000 to win by-election for the SNP in Govan,” with
Scott (1997, 182) also seeing this victory and the SNP’s possible future menace as the
reason “why Labour, usually suspicious of cooperation with other parties, decided to
participate in the Constitutional Convention.”
The Labour, Liberal-Democrats and a number of smaller parties and
organizations, united in a “cross-party organization, the Campaign for a Scottish
Assembly…and reported in July 1988 in a Claim of Right for Scotland, a deliberate
reference to the previous claims of 1689 and 1841 which were earlier responses to
misgovernment.” (Scott 1997, 164) As it was noted in the 1989 Scottish Constitutional
Convention’s report – Towards Scotland’s Parliament – “it became clear that the Scottish
National Party had reservations, and they subsequently indicated that they will not be
taking part.” (Scottish Constitutional Convention 1990, 4) Even though the document did
not specify the SNP’s skepticism, it was quite apparent from the following passage:
“Although the Claim of Right clearly acknowledges the right of the people of Scotland to
opt for a wholly independent state, the Convention believes that this does not have
majority support,” later in the text generically referring to nationalist ideology in a
dismissive manner – “this is no narrow nationalism: no desire for some nostalgic “little
Scotland.” (Scottish Constitutional Convention 1990, 7 & 18) Along these lines, Scott
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(1997, 182) agreed that the SNP “in any case…could hardly support an organization
which said that its object was not to annul the Union, but to strengthen it.”
The Westminster electoral campaigns of 1983 and 1987 provided no substantial
change to the SNP’s 1979 results, with the same low level of SNP support at around 1214 per cent. The hope was for the new decade’s election of 1992, especially after the
revision of the party’s policy on European issues. On the other hand, the electoral gap
between the North and the South was becoming wider with every new victory of the
Conservatives, as “this South of England view contrasts sharply with the working class
image of Scotland, a division reasserted in 1980’s elections.” (Hague 1994, 140).
In the 1990s voters in Scotland came back to the SNP, with a percentage of
support going solidly up. As noted by Scott (1997, 188), between 1987 and 1992 “the
SNP share of the vote went up from 14 per cent to 21.5 per cent, but such are the vagaries
of the electoral system that this gave them only three seats”, which became “another
disappointment for the supporters of Scottish self-government.”
Most analysts agree that in the 1990s due to the disproportionate overrepresentation of the unpopular Conservative party in Scotland (“that won only 25% of
the Scottish vote”, yet received “11 out of 72 Scottish Members of Parliament” in 1992)
(Scott 1997, 189), the Scots “should have the government which [they] elected, not the
one elected by…larger neighbor to the south.” (Scott 1992, 16) It became quite clear, as
Scott (1997, 193) noted, that “since the 1992 Election, Labour and the SNP have been so
far ahead in the opinion polls and in European and local elections that Scottish politics
seemed to be resolving into a straight fight between them, which means between
devolution and independence,” as “both opposition parties demand a Parliament –
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Labour’s would be devolved from Westminster, the Nationalists would govern an
independent Scotland.” Another key feature in that duality of possible scenarios was the
European question, which Alex Salmond, the SNP leader and a guest in the 1995 TV
program The Great Debate described as the following: “There is a stark contrast between
the SNP’s open vision of the new Europe and Labour’s narrow view of regional Scotland
cowering behind the walls of fortress Britain.” (quoted in Scott 1992, 194)

Devolution as a Way Out
By the 1970s many people in Scottish society, not just nationalists, were not
satisfied with the situation where “absorption, not federation, had always been the
principle of [UK’s] development.” (Nairn 1981, 12) As a result, even though the main
focus of Scottish nationalists was independence, in the short run many supported some
sort of devolution as the first step.
This idea was not new, and was successfully exploited by different political
parties in various historical circumstances – at first in the 19th century, mainly by the
Liberal Party in opposition to the Conservatives as to acquire as much support from the
Scottish electorate as possible, and later, following its formation in 1900, by the Labour
Party on similar principles. That support also differed depending on the political
environment, and it is important to keep in mind that “until the secession of southern
Ireland in 1922, a general formula of ‘Home Rule’ for all three countries was widely
discussed and approved of.” (Nairn 1981, 13)
Two decades after the failed 1979 referendum, with the devolution in the air after
the Labour Party’s victory in the 1997 Westminster election, there suddenly reinvigorated
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an old issue, known from the 1979 experience, of the appropriate referendum. The
Labour “party line was that the referendum would make devolution ‘stable and durable’.”
(Taylor 1999, 76) This was seen as a surprise to many as the Labour party majority as
Bogdanor recalled for the 1979 experience could have easily served as an unconditional
right to implement it in the parliament.
Many saw these 1997 devolution developments as just another instrument to stop
the increase of the SNP’s popularity, especially if to take into consideration SNP leader
Alex Salmond’s claim that “Labour supports Scotland when Scotland supports the SNP.”
(quoted in Scott 1992, 195) For the SNP itself, devolution was just a big step in the right
direction, as they still considered that “there is all the difference in the world between a
country free to take its own decisions and participate fully in international relations, and a
province, even if it has some degree of internal self-government.” (Scott 1992, 52)
Another peculiarity, similar to the last-minute 40%-arrangement with the 1979
plebiscite, was a second question on the ballot in the 1997 devolution referendum
regarding tax powers. Even though of great importance to the future parliament and its
potential fiscal authority, the question on delegation of more tax powers to Holyrood, due
to its complexity, could stimulate a negative outcome for the whole devolution process. It
was even seen by many top Labour politicians “as a ‘wrecking device’, who warned
against ‘the men in the dark’…who, allegedly, wanted to dump the tax power” (Taylor
1999, 77), as well as probably influence the overall result on devolution.
One of the central tasks of the post-1999 Scottish Parliament (the year when the
Scottish Parliament first met after almost three centuries break) was to overcome
centuries-old political disagreements, while “in both countries it is probably the result of
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the Westminster style of confrontational politics, encouraged by the old two-party, firstpast-the-post system and even by the design of the House. In Scotland there is a wide
measure of consensus on what needs to be done.” (Scott 1992, 39) To help with that, it
was decided to amend the election rules, as to avoid scenarios when under “the ‘first past
the post’ electoral system…a party with less than a majority of the votes quite often wins
a large majority of the seats.” (Scott 1992, 19)
Unlike the 1970s, or maybe because of the unsuccessful 1979 referendum, the
Scots were much more active and “some 1 775 045 or 74.3 per cent voted Yes to a
Parliament while 614 400 or 25.7 per cent were against. That left Scotland three to one in
favor of devolution,” and consequently “that clearly empowered the [UK] Government to
introduce its Bill, the Scotland Bill, to legislate for a Scottish parliament.” (Taylor 1999,
138) Also successful was the question on the tax powers, even though with the slightly
smaller margin. As a result, Scotland was rewarded with the long-awaited restored
parliament in Edinburgh, finalizing an over-a-century-long debate on “Home Rule”, and
opening, albeit not consciously at that time, a Pandora’s box of looming new
independence argument, as “the mandate for independence is now defined in terms of
support within the Edinburgh Parliament.” (Taylor 1999, 170).

Scottish National Party’s Platform and Key Issues
As far as the SNP’s nationalism is concerned,
It is not, and never has been at any time in history, aggressive, but wants only good relations
and cooperation with other countries. It is entirely on the side of democracy and
emancipation… Scottish nationalism is liberal and civic, not…intolerant. The SNP would
welcome everyone living in Scotland to Scottish citizenship, if they want it. (Scott 1992, 589)
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In terms of historic development, “the Party did not grow without stresses and
strains resulting from tension between persons of different ideologies whose meeting
ground was self-government for Scotland” (Wolfe 1973, 114), even Alex Salmond was
“briefly thrown out of the SNP in the early 1980s as a leading light of the ’79 Group
which attempted, after the 1979 general election, to reshape the SNP as a party of the
Left.” (Taylor 1999, 164) Eventually, and not without Salmond’s endeavors, the SNP was
clearly positioned as a left-wing political party, while he himself is sometimes seen as
“something of a paradox: an undoubted Nationalist who nevertheless displays few of the
customary characteristics of cultural Nationalism. He dutifully attends the party’s
Bannockburn rallies – but appears more at home expounding the alleged economic
benefits of independence.” (Taylor 1999, 163)
The main line of all the SNP manifestos (e.g. 1997, 9-10) is definitely: “A vote
for the SNP is a vote for Independence,” accompanied and reinforced by multiple
economic, political and social issues, as for instance, “an independent Scotland will have
a written constitution and Bill of Rights. This means that Scots will be citizens, not
subjects.” The future constitutional status is widely debated, and the form of government
is also sometimes challenged, as the party itself shifted from proposing a republican form
of government towards the preservation of a symbolic monarchy: “The SNP propose the
reform of the Monarchy…allowing the Queen and her successors to remain Head of
State…In the absence of the Queen from Scotland the elected Chancellor (Speaker) of the
Scottish Parliament will act as Head of State.” (SNP 1999, 10) This is a uniquely Scottish
solution, as within the British Commonwealth, the Queen is usually represented by a
Governor-general. Scott fully agrees with the party’s clause on keeping the Queen: “The
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monarchy will be no more of an obstacle to Scottish independence than it was for
Canada, New Zealand and all the others. After independence it will be for the Scottish
people to decide whether they wish to regard the Queen as Head of State.” (Scott 1992,
62-3)
Scottish National Party’s manifesto (e.g. 1997, 22 & 27) pays attention to the
issues of cultural heritage, as in the proposal that “Gaelic and Scots must be given equal
status with English, both legally and in broadcasting and the arts,” as well as to the issues
of economic prosperity, insisting that “an Independent Scotland will secure a division of
North Sea oil assets based upon the latitude of 55°50’ north or the international legal
principle of equidistance.”
Since the SNP’s 1980s U-turn, independence in Europe became a key issue of all
the campaigns since 1992, as, in Scott’s terms (1992, 44), “better a small voice than no
voice at all…The fact is that international organizations are of more benefit to small
countries than to larger ones.” Scott (1992, 40-1) also dismisses the anti-EU propaganda
that argues an independent Scotland would need to re-apply for EU membership: “Under
the international law they would both [independent Scotland and the rest of the UK]
inherit the other treaty rights and obligations of the former United Kingdom and that
includes membership of the European Community.”
With independence in Europe as a key idea, the SNP clearly does not want to lose
Scottish voters who, according to Michael Lynch in his New History of Scotland,
“embraced not Britain, but the British Empire,” (Scott 1992, 7 & 25) and their manifesto
(SNP 1997, 31) correspondingly assures that “only political union will end – our social
union will be as strong as ever, and indeed improved by our new equal status as good
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neighbours,”as well as that “Scotland will seek to assist in the establishment of an
Association of States of the British Isles which will include England, Wales and Ireland.”
Wolfe (1973, 137) agreed with such a possibility and even clarified possible formats of
this cooperation: “There is no reason why an independent Scotland managing her own
affairs and in control of her own finances should not have a customs and passport union
with the other states of the British Isles and have other forms of cooperation also.”
Among the SNP’s historic disadvantages, Wolfe (1973, 107) underlines the
following: “we suffered, and still suffer, from two handicaps – lack of a daily newspaper,
radio and television station with a wholly sympathetic outlook on self-government; and
insufficient funds.” Taylor (1999, 170) also comments on his observations in 1999 that
“nationalists will say, with some justification, that one reason for that disparity in
treatment is that Scotland’s newspapers are generally hostile to the SNP.” That is why
during debates on jurisdiction of the newly established legislature, “the Nationalists
wanted further powers devolved in the fields of broadcasting, finance and relations with
Europe.” (Taylor 1999, 140) In the same time we should not forget that, especially
before the Westminster elections, “many people read London newspapers and take most
of their political information from network television which hardly mentions Scottish
issues.” (Scott 1992, xiii) Since 2007, the situation in Scottish media has changed in
terms of impossibility of ignoring the nationalists, as the SNP has been in power with its
leader, Alex Salmond as the First Minister.
As far as major problems inside the SNP, Hanham is quoted as analyzing “the
chronic division between ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ wings of the movement – a division far
deeper and more irreconcilable, one should add at once, than the customary quarrels
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between idealists and ‘practical men’ which dog all national parties.” (quoted in Nairn
1981, 175) Some ideological differences include the conflicts between the proponents
and opponents of the EEC integration in the mid-70s, as well as the party is sometimes
torn between those who see independence as the only solution, and those who support
“the concept of an Association of British States as the successor to the United Kingdom,
to preserve what is indeed functional and ‘viable’ in the union.” (Nairn 1981, 77) This
situation pertains to the early 21st century as well, when we witness a debate between the
supporters of both the full Scottish independence and “devolution max” – a term for the
maximum autonomy but within the United Kingdom.
In his characterization of the SNP’s political agenda, Nairn (1981, 71) emphasizes
that it operates “overwhelmingly a politically-oriented separatism, rather exaggeratedly
concerned with problems of state and power, and [is] frequently indifferent to the themes
of race and cultural ancestry.” While scrutinizing party’s election broadcasts of 1992,
Euan Hague in a way agrees with Nairn (1994, 147), elaborating further on its future
agenda, stating that the “[SNP] need to move beyond the fragmented image of Scotland
to create a genuine, not just emotional following…For the SNP, revisiting a Scotland past
of kitsch stereotypes, is not an option. Their broadcasts disregard the past and concentrate
on the freedom and glory of future separatism.”
Among the key issues on the SNP’s current political agenda is the 2014
independence referendum, which is mentioned in a separate “Independence” section of
the most recent manifesto (SNP 2011, 28), where the SNP states that the party “think[s]
the people of Scotland should decide our nation’s future in a democratic referendum and
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opinion polls suggest that most Scots agree. We will, therefore, bring forward our
Referendum Bill in this next Parliament.”

3.3. Scottish Society and Culture
Often mentioned by authors on Scotland and its nationalism, is a difference
between the current ‘stateless’ political position of previously independent old European
states and ‘civil society’. Famed 19th century Scottish novelist Robert Louis Stevenson
was quoted as saying “that no two neighbor peoples were so utterly – and unalterably –
different as the Scots and the English.” (quoted in MacDiarmid 1968, 344) At the same
time there is a classic scenario for the nation-state laid out by Max Weber, who insisted
that “[a nation is] a community of sentiment which would find its adequate expression
only in a state of its own, and which thus normally strives to create one.” (quoted in
McCrone 1992, 204)
One of the reasons that so many people in Scottish politics, as well as Scots of
different social groups and origins, demand more rights for their nation is the
abovementioned fact that “the Union of the Crowns in 1603 and of Parliaments in 1707
have transferred cultural as well as political power to England.” (McCrone 1992, 122)
Even when trying to present the nation to the outsider, the united ‘British’ face is often
understood, and sometimes misrepresented, as solely English, but according to Hague
(1994, 141) the images of England and Scotland are distinct:
England’s national image, masquerading as British, is a fabricated, nostalgic, rurality, an idyllic nation at ease
with itself. Scotland’s image, similarly nostalgic and contrived, is very different. Scottish history, landscape and
subsequently culture create an image of Scotland independent of British or English influence.
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Civil Society
Nairn (1981, 135) subtly depicted the situation of Scottish civil society while
juxtaposing “standard European (and later world) pattern of one political State and its
society, or one distinguishable ethnic society and its own State” versus the fact that
“Scotland was a hippogriff: a manifest bastard, in the world of nationalist wedlock”. This
idea is strongly supported by James Kellas who stated: “While possessing neither a
government nor a parliament of its own, it has a strong constitutional identity and a large
number of political and social institutions…These became the transmitters of Scottish
national identity from one generation to the next.” (quoted in Nairn 1981, 171) McCrone
(1992, 211) defines these as “the old institutional trinity of law, education and religion,”
while Harvie (1994, 138) recalls one other important element of societal autonomy, also
underlining constant fear of being assimilated, claiming that back in time “Kirk, law,
local government and education had traditionally protected the nation…but the estates
were at risk through secularization, collective intervention, and doctrinaire educational
prescriptions.” The fact of menace to those “estates”, to use Harvie’s term (1994, 137-8),
is supported by the famed nationalist poet and author MacDiarmid (1968, 344) who
relates that in the past “the English have persistently encroached on the remaining
vestiges of difference … and sought complete assimilation of Scotland to England,” later
linking this to the situation in Scottish literature by saying that “the Union with England,
and the abandonment of Scottish subjects in Scottish schools and colleges, threw the
independent Scottish literary tradition into the discard.” (ibid, 347) On the contrary at the
end of twentieth century, Christopher Whyte (quoted in Schoene-Harwood 2007, 1)
suggested that “in the absence of an elected political authority [in Scotland], the task of
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representing the nation has repeatedly devolved to its writers” – proving not only the
overall importance, but also the positive developments in the Scottish literature.

Regional Divide
When discussing Scottish society, it is hard not to mention the historic regional
divide between the Highlands and Lowlands, and the Shetlands. This is accepted by
overwhelming consensus by most of the authors on Scotland, although typically
interpreted in different ways. While Nairn (1981, 147) himself contrasts the two parts of
the country in the past by stating that “Gaelic-speaking Scotland had remained
predominately pre-feudal, while the Lowlands had evolved into a bourgeois society,” he
also cites A.J. Youngson who reiterates the fact by saying that “there were still obviously
two worlds in Scotland, a poor highland world and a comparatively prosperous lowland
world.” McCrone (1992, 31) describes the multiple “competing versions of Scotland...
Scotland of the past and the present; Scotland of the Highlands and the Lowlands; smalltown east-coast Scotland versus Scotland of the west-coast conurbation.” Hechter (1999,
310) reminds us of a third, though smaller, cultural region as opposed to a common
binary by claiming that “for centuries Scotland has contained three separate cultural
groups, Celts in the Highlands, Norwegians in the northern counties, and Englishspeaking groups in the Lowlands and Border counties.” It is also hard not to notice the
changing demographics in the Highlands versus the rest of the country: “Scotland is
divided into Highland and Lowland regions. Between 1755 and 1911, the total population
rose from roughly 1.3 million to 4.8 million, while the percentage of Highlanders fell
from 20 percent to 8 percent.” (Velychenko 1997, 416)
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Hague (1994, 142) lays out a theoretical framework of popular interpretation of
Scotland by singling out three major stereotypical perceptions of the country – through
the prism of Tartanry, Kailyard and Clydesidism, which he calls “images and idylls”:
Clydesidism has stretched to cover urban Scotland, Tartanry has elevated rural Highland
Scotland to globally recognized kitsch (and an image very different from the English rural
idyll). The Kailyard, a literary genre nostalgic for a non-industrial ‘golden age’ of parish gossip,
shows Scotland’s numerous small towns as different from the four cities.

Tartanry is probably the most recognizable of all, as it is associated with the
Highlands and “the Scottish face presented to the outside world was increasingly a
Highland face.” (McCrone 1992, 117) Nairn (1981, 165) explains this phenomenon in his
own terms: “Tartanry will not wither away, if only because it possesses the force of its
own vulgarity – immunity from doubt and higher culture.”

Language
In the beginning of the 21st century the question of language is not as crucial in
Scottish society nor on the nationalist agenda, as it might have been in the past. But
historically there are areas of Scotland, where Scottish Gaelic and the Scots language are
spoken. Although there are other views on the cultural aspects of nationalism, Nairn
(1981, 144) considers that “in every superficial respect except one – language – Scotland
was quite exceptionally well equipped for the usual nationalist struggles”. McCrone
(1992, 29) says that “it is not necessary for nations to be linguistically distinct, but there
are plenty of examples – not simply the Scottish one – of nations … reconstructing
‘national languages’ for political purposes: Hebrew, Norwegian, and even Irish.”
As far as the history of Scottish languages is concerned, Colley (2009, 12)
suggests that “long before the Act of Union, a cognate language with English called Scots
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had spread throughout the Scottish Lowlands and beyond,” while MacDiarmid (1968,
352-3) claims that in the late 1960s there were positive developments in Scots and Gaelic
literature. Similarly to Irish nationalism, Hanham (1969, 125) recalls that the short-lived
Scottish Party8 of 1907 even suggested “a compulsory qualification in Gaelic for every
person in Scotland holding state office.” Nairn (1981, 106), on the contrary, believes that
“the Scots did not have a really separate majority language.”
A good explanation of the decline of the regional languages of Scotland is
provided by Hechter (1999, 302) who thinks that “peripheral groups, like those in the
Celtic fringe, were…substantially culturally differentiated from the dominant
groups…As industrialization proceeded much of this peripheral cultural distinctiveness,
especially linguistic distinctiveness, began to be muted.” The question of linguistic
Anglicization is also raised by Hanham (1969, 34-42), who argues that England intended
to downplay and assimilate the Scottish elements in the language and educational system.
Nevertheless, since the 1999 devolution and the Scottish National Party gained
more political (and since 2007 – administrative) powers in the Parliament and
Government, some legislation on language has been successfully implemented in
cooperation with our parties in Scottish Parliament. Despite the fact that “the total
number of people recorded as being able to speak and/or read and/or write and/or
understand Gaelic in the 2001 census was 92,400 (1.9 per cent of the Scottish
Population)” (The Scottish Government 2011), Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005
was adopted, which is
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An Act of the Scottish Parliament to establish a body having functions exercisable with a view to
securing the status of the Gaelic language as an official language of Scotland commanding equal
respect to the English language, including the functions of preparing a national Gaelic language plan,
of requiring certain public authorities to prepare and publish Gaelic language plans in connection with
the exercise of their functions and to maintain and implement such plans, and of issuing guidance in
relation to Gaelic education. (Legislation.gov.uk 2005)

The adoption of the Act followed “some initial attempts by SNP MSPs Mike
Russell and Alex Neil to introduce legislation.” (Sim 2011, 173) This fits along the lines
of past Scottish National Party’s manifestos (e.g. 1999, 30), which suggested that
“English, Gaelic and Scots must co-exist on an equal basis in Scotland, and we will grant
Scots and Gaelic “secure status” in the Parliament and national life.” The most recent
SNP Holyrood election manifesto (2011, 33) is equally concerned with the nation’s other
language – Scots, while laying out its party’s language priorities:
We will develop a national Scots language policy, with increased support for Scots in education,
encouragement of a greater profile for Scots in the media, and the establishment of a network of Scots
co-ordinators. We will promote the acquisition, use and status of Gaelic through the implementation of
the Gaelic Action Plan with the aim of ensuring that by 2021 the proportion of Gaelic speakers is back
up to 2001 levels. We will continue to raise the profile of the Gaelic language across Scotland.

Literature
Literature often plays an important role in promotion certain aspects of the
nationalist vision, or national identity in general. Poets and writers often played a role in
popularization of the Scottish culture, as it is impossible to imagine the overview of
Scottish culture and society without mentioning Robert Burns and Walter Scott. Although
Scott’s works are considered by many as nationalist, Hanham (1969, 70) argues that “The
Waverley novels are full of Scottish propaganda but they are not directed against the
status quo.”
Worth mentioning is also the part that the Scots (alongside the Irish and
Welshmen) played in the overall English-language literature, which “would be very
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diminished if we eliminated from its roster such figures from the so-called ‘Celtic fringe’
as W.B. Yeats, Dylan Thomas, James Joyce, George Bernard Shaw, Gerard Manley
Hopkins, Samuel Beckett and Sean O’Casey, to mention but a few.” (MacDiarmid 1968,
308) Nairn (1981, 156) was critical of the outflow of some Scottish poets and writers in
the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, suggesting that “among the numerous
strands in the neurosis, two are especially prominent: cultural emigration, and the
Kailyard School.”
In many instances literary developments are more important for the nationalist
aspirations than unsuccessful politics, as in the example with “the 1980s, a decade which,
politically and economically, Scotland could have done without, [which] turned out
intellectually and culturally remarkable.” (Harvie 1994, 199)
Some literary traditions are inseparably combined with other cultural processes,
sharing the same name, as seen from the abovementioned example of tartanry, considered
by Nairn (1981, 168) “a borrowing… not in the name of ‘nationalism’ but in order to
enrich a sub-nationalist culture.” At the same time, “the Kailyard was – and still is – very
much the reverse of the coin of emigration. Its lack of ‘human and political dignity’ does
not express some collective fault in the Scots psyche, but the ‘historical fact’ of the
relationship between the intelligentsia and the people.” (ibid, 161)
Schoene-Harwood (2007, 2), however, analyzing the late 20th and early 21st
centuries’ Scottish literature, states that “it is imperative that post-devolution Scotland
cease once and for all to identify itself in opposition to all things English,” adding that
“while discussions of Scottish nationalism and nationhood feature prominently…they are
conducted invariably with reference to other [contemporary] debates.” The author also
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mentioned “the fundamental contribution Scottish literature has made to national
identity,” which according to him “was conspicuously celebrated in the Opening
Ceremony of the Scottish Parliament on 1July 1999,” providing a list of the famous
Scottish contemporary and classic authors who were “featured prominently in the
ceremony.” (Ibid, 17)

Religion
In many societies, religion plays an important role in nationalist mobilization, as it
“can identify a community but it can also inhibit the sort of imaginative political
commitment that progressive nationalism requires” (Harvie 1994, 145). For Scottish
nationalism, the Church of Scotland or Kirk, or other Scottish churches for that matter, do
not play the same role in the current stage of nationalist agenda. The major reason for that
is the preservation of Kirk’s autonomy under the provisions of the 1707 Treaty of Union,
as it was known that “religion has never been the opium of the Scottish masses. The
politics of the Kirk had been closer to most people than those of Parliament or town
council.” (Harvie 1994, 147) Although if compared with the neighboring English, “[the
Scots] had…the enormously important factor of a clear religious difference” (Nairn 1981,
106), “the Kirk tradition is both irrelevant to SNP Scotland and responsible for every one
of the country’s numberless unacceptable faces!” (ibid, 164).
One of the most difficult events for the Kirk was the 1843 Disruption, “a major
split which saw about one third of the Kirk break away to form what came to be the Free
Kirk,” although in 1929 a “process of reunion gave the Church of Scotland an
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opportunity to resolve once and for all how it wanted to govern itself and how it wanted
to relate to the state.” (The Church of Scotland 2012)
In terms of its cooperation with the government it is important to mention that,
unlike the Scandinavian countries and England, “the Church of Scotland (the Kirk) is not
State-controlled, and neither the Scottish nor the Westminster Parliaments are involved in
Kirk appointments”, but it does have a “status as the national Church in Scotland [which]
dates from 1690, when Parliament restored Scottish Presbyterianism, and is guaranteed
under the Act of Union of Scotland and England of 1707,” (The Church of Scotland
2012) with over 42 per cent of Scots reported to be its members. (The Scottish
Government 2001)
Important among other churches in Scotland is also the Catholic Church, being
prevalent in the areas of compact historic resettlement of the Irish, and according to the
2001 Census is followed by almost 16 per cent of the population. (The Scottish
Government 2001) The same results suggest of the increase of the Scots who follow no
religion (around 28 per cent), as well as presence of many immigrant religions, as
Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. (The Scottish Government 2001)

Diaspora and Emigration
Emigration is substantial in contemporary Scotland, as it has been historically.
MacDiarmid (1968, 345) complains that in the late 1960s “the rate of emigration from
Scotland is without parallel in any other advanced industrialized nation…[Scotland] has
lost more than half a million in the last ten years,” with Hanham (1969, 18) concentrating
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on the issue of diasporic communities, as “emigration also led to the creation of new
Scotlands across the world.”
“Between 1951 and 2006 net migration loss, defined as the difference in the
number of people moving to and leaving a country, was about 825,000, described by one
authority as ‘a staggering amount’ from a nation of little more than 5 million.” (Devine
2011, 271).
There has been many examples of participation of foreign Scots in the nationalist
struggle of the homeland, and as an example MacDiarmid (1968, 349) describes a new
wave of pro-independence support by people who came back from abroad in the late
1960s, while Hanham (1969, 121-2) notes the importance of Australian diaspora in Home
Rule movement, which is echoing Anderson’s idea of “long-distance nationalism”
(Bauböck 2010, 44).
According to Sim (2011, xiii) émigré communities are sometimes especially
important nationalists, as “many nationalist movements…may look to their diasporas for
support.” Detailing Scottish immigration and community formation in North America, to
the formation of heritage organizations and associated festivities, Sim emphasizes the
changing fortunes of Scottish identity in recent US history. Unpopular until the 1990s,
Sim suggests the recent increase in American adoration for a distinctly Scottish culture
with a Celtic flavour as being largely due to the success of Hollywood blockbusters such
as Braveheart (1995). Among the most popular heritage activities for American Scots
are Highland Games, clan society events, Gaelic language courses, St. Andrew’s balls,
Burns Nights, and Tartan Day celebrations. Given this upsurge in Scottish-identifying
American residents, Sim examines the increasingly complicated issues of how Scottish
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identity is understood in North America. Sim’s interviews demonstrate a clear disconnect
within the American Scottish community between those identifying as Scottish American
by ancestry and those that were Scotland-born on a variety of issues, including the
perception of Scotland itself. Quoting one of his interviewees, Sim notes that some
American Scots feel that rather than being Americanized, they are more Scottish than
those “people who lived in Scotland went on and became far more anglicised in some
ways” (C11, p. 140). Another respondent argues for subdividing American-born Scots
into “Scottish Americans” and “Americans of Scottish descent” depending on the degree
of assimilation (N6, p. 122).
As far as the type of identity of Scots in diaspora is concerned, Devine (2011,
279) claims that “the Scottish identity embraced by American descendants of Highland
Scots, Lowland Scots or Ulster Scots is a Highland Gaelic identity which was formed in
the nineteenth century,” namely “Tartanry”.
This “disjunction between the activities and traditions of American Scots and
homeland Scots”, argues Sim (2011, 128), is pervasive and he describes major
differences between these two subgroups in their interpretations of, amongst other things,
the ‘invented traditions’, largely unobserved in Scotland, of the Kirkin’ o’ the Tartan – “a
prayer service that generally begins with a local pipe band leading a procession of
officers and members of the St. Andrew’s Society” (ibid, 126), Tartan Day – a Scottish
American festival established by U.S. Congress in 1998 (Hague 2001), and even dispute
over traditional Scottish dancing styles. Sim also records Canadian examples, such as that
of Nova Scotia where, between 1933 and 1954, the “impact of a single individual in
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promoting a personal vision of ‘Scottishness’” (ibid, 57), saw premier Angus Macdonald
build a Scotland-themed provincial identity.
Devine (2011, 277) insists that “the recent evolution and popularity of Scottish
heritage in the United States is an indigenous American development, managed and
directed by the transatlantic diaspora and often containing elements which native Scots
find risible or even offensive.”
Since its inception in 2009, the Scottish Government’s Homecoming event
strengthens Scottish American ties to Scotland. Devine (2011, 286-7) also informs that
“in September 2010 the Scottish government announced a ‘Diaspora Engagement Plan’,
proclaiming that Scotland was the first European nation ‘to develop a formal approach to
motivating and engaging its diaspora’,” and, furthermore, “the Scots have also taken note
of Ireland’s economic success in developing rewarding relationships and networks with
elite members of its diaspora.”

3.4. Scottish Economy & Globalization
Economic Overview
When discussing the issue of Scottish sovereignty, it is crucial to mention the
economic situation of the country. Economic policy plays an important role in SNP
manifestos and its governing agenda, and it is an integral part of the country’s everyday
policy-making. Control over the economy is also an important issue for the secessionist
movements and parties in their pro-independence agenda. In a similar way, Scottish
nationalists stress a central role for an Edinburgh-controlled economy, especially after the
discovery of the North Sea oil in the 1960s. The most common SNP accusation was that
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Westminster is subsidized at the expense of Scottish economy. Moreover, it is widely
understood that the revival of Scottish nationalism was interrelated with these economic
developments, which underlines the indivisibility of economy from politics.
Currently, taking the most important economic parameters into consideration,
Scotland is definitely a developed European economy. According to the The Scottish
Government (2012), based on GDP quarterly growth rates, Scottish economy is
recovering from the effects of the Euro crisis (as in Figure 1). Despite the fact that,
according to the same sources (ibid), “Scottish Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in
constant basic prices fell by 0.1 per cent during the first quarter of 2012,” in the same
time, as seen from Figure 2, the “output in the services sector grew by 0.2 per cent, total
output in the production sector grew by 1.2 per cent, within which manufacturing output
grew by 0.9 per cent.” In terms of inflation, it “remained at 2.7% for the fourth month
running in January 2013” (The Scottish Government, 2013) – which is quite acceptable in
the light of the recovery from the Euro crisis.
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Figure 1. GDP Quaterly Growth Rates (The Scottish Government, 2012)

Figure 2: GDP at Constant Basic Prices (The Scottish Government, 2012)

Percentage Change: latest quarter on previous quarter
(seasonally adjusted)
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+0.3

-0.8
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+0.8

2011 Q4

-0.1

+0.2

-2.8

+0.1
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-0.1

+1.2

-6.9

+0.2
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Among Scotland’s major trading partners, “the rest of the UK accounts for almost
70% of Scotland’s [trade] and the EU is the largest overseas export partner. During 2008,
an estimated £9.5 billion of Scottish exports were to the EU, 46% of the total. In terms of
individual countries, the USA is Scotland’s largest overseas export destination, receiving
an estimated £3.1 billion in exports during 2008 [while the] Netherlands is the second
largest export destination.” (Scottish Enterprise, 2010)
The question of public debt is an important component of the future debate on the
viability of Scottish independent economy, as well as in analysis of the requirements for
the possible entry to the Eurozone. This calculation for Scotland as part of the UK is
possible due to the fact that “Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland (GERS)
assigns Scotland a population share of UK debt interest payments, irrespective of the
relative strength or otherwise of Scotland’s fiscal position,” while it is also important to
emphasize that “the recent deterioration in the UK public finances has increased the
expenditure on debt interest payments assigned to Scotland in GERS from £1.8 billion in
2002-03 to £4.1 billion in 2011-12 in cash terms” (The Scottish Government, 2013). As a
result of the Scottish Government’s (2013) economic research on that topic, it was
discovered that:
UK public sector net debt at the end of 2011-12 stood at £1.1 trillion. Scotland’s per capita share is
estimated to have been equivalent to £92 billion (62% of GDP). This would represent a lower debt to
GDP ratio than for the UK as a whole (72%), reflecting the fact that Scotland has a higher level of
GDP per capita (including North Sea oil) than the UK.

Another criterion taken into consideration in analysis a potential Eurozone
candidate or viability of the economy in general, is budget deficit or surplus. From that
perspective “over the period 1980-81 to 2011-12 as a whole, Scotland is estimated to
have run an average annual net fiscal surplus equivalent to 0.2% of GDP. The UK is
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estimated to have run an average annual net fiscal deficit worth 3.2% of GDP.” (Scottish
Government, 2013) This comparison definitely helps the whole independence debate, as
it was primarily “driven by the significant growth in North Sea revenues.” (ibid)
Oftentimes we may come across comparisons of what Ireland has reached in
economic terms (at least before the Euro crisis of 2000s) with political sovereignty as
opposed to what Scotland is losing lacking full independence and control over its
economy. Hechter (1999, xiv-xv) argues that historically, “the lack of sovereignty had
different economic consequences in Ireland than in Scotland and Wales. In Ireland, it
encouraged agricultural specialization; in Wales and Scotland, however, it promoted
economic stagnation.” MacDiarmid (1968, 317) in Scottish Nationalism provides
statistical information for the year of 1964 on sufficient difference between
unemployment rates in the UK in general and Scotland in particular, where the latter is
much higher, and interestingly, this statistical data is somewhat different now. The period
of deindustrialization was followed by the SNP success. The Scottish Government (2012)
statistics suggests that as of February 2012, “Scotland has the highest employment rate of
the four countries in the United Kingdom.” As a result, it may be considered as a
successful implementation of some effective socio-economic policies of the devolved
Scottish Government.
At the same time, absence of full sovereignty prevents the Scots from overall
control over their economy, as the macroeconomic policies are managed by the
Westminster government, including the key elements of fiscal and monetary policy. The
latest key document that regulates Westminster-Holyrood spheres of control is the 2012
Scotland Act (Legislation.gov.uk 2012) – “an Act to amend the Scotland Act 1998 and
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make provision about the functions of the Scottish Ministers. It has the following passage
– known as Schedule 5 – on the economic jurisdiction reserved by the Union in
accordance with the amended Scotland Act 1998” (Legislation.gov.uk 1998), claiming
that Westminster has control over “fiscal, economic and monetary policy, including the
issue and circulation of money, taxes and excise duties, government borrowing and
lending, control over United Kingdom public expenditure, the exchange rate and the
Bank of England.” This reality contradicts the ideas of MacDiarmid (1968, 327) from the
late 1960s, as well as many contemporary nationalists that “the key sectors of Scottish
industry, essential of a buoyant Scottish economy, must be controlled by the Scottish
people.” Reserved for the Scottish Government (Legislation.gov.uk 2012) are “local
taxes to fund local authority expenditure (for example, council tax and non-domestic
rates),” as successfully voted for in the second question of the 1997 devolution
referendum.
Another important economic question is potentially sovereign Scotland’s future
economic cooperation and a degree of integration into the European economic institutes
in the increasingly globalized world economy. The most recent debate before the future
referendum, given that Scotland becomes politically and economically independent, is the
status of a new British state in the contemporary European Union: will it automatically
preserve its status as part of an existing member-state or does Scotland need to re-apply
as a newly proclaimed independent country?
If Scotland remains in the European Union, equally debated is the issue of
hypothetic economic sovereignty of Scotland in case of a successful 2014 independence
referendum, as well as at has been analyzed by the SNP in the latest manifestos. One of
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the major questions is definitely the euro versus pound sterling choice, which in the
recent time (following the European and world crisis) is no longer a serious controversy.
The SNP’s change of policy towards potential adaptation of the euro is well motivated
due to the vulnerability of the current EU monetary union, as at the time of creation of the
Eurozone some important economic components of some of the prospective members
were overlooked. Before joining the euro area, each member state was expected to meet
all five Maastricht criteria – low inflation, ≤ 3% of the budget deficit, ≤ 60 % of public
debt in relation to the GDP, low long-term interest rates, and successful entry to the preeuro ERM II system of exchange rates (Reuters Financial Glossary 2012), but in reality
many of them did not perform accordingly, which eventually led to a crisis due to a
highly globalized Eurozone financial sector.
After the European crisis and during the 2014 independence debate, Alex
Salmond and his fellow ministers express their interest in preserving the pound sterling as
a more viable currency option. But this also creates the same problem, which has been
already seen in the Eurozone – the perspective of regulating a common monetary policy
with the existence of two (or over a dozen in the case of Europe) separate fiscal policies.

3.5. Conclusion
From the above-mentioned chapter, it is clear that Scotland is not a fully
sovereign state in the political sense, but at the same time it possesses a considerable
degree of cultural, religious and administrative autonomy due to the articles of the 1707
Treaty of Union, reinforced by the 1999 devolution implementation following the allScottish referendum of 1997. Historically, Scottish type of nationalism has been
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predominantly inclusive and civic in nature, as is also recently seen in the Scottish
National Party’s manifestos, which include multiple references to the “civic society” and
“civic Scotland”. (e.g. 1999, 29) Additionally, diaspora Scots actively engage themselves
in Scottish customs and traditions, and follow events in their historic homeland, although
without any financial or legal mechanism to influence politics in general, or elections in
particular, in their homeland. In terms of economy, based on its major components, there
is a strong tendency to recovery from the European crisis, and Scotland as a potentially
independent country in 2014 clearly meets the required Maastricht criteria, if it decides to
join the euro, or peg its potential future currency to it. Additionally, the future economy,
if the electorate chooses independence, will be boosted by the revenues from Scottish oil,
which are currently benefiting the entire UK economy.

CHAPTER FOUR: UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM
Eastern European nationalist movements, according to Miroslav Hroch (quoted in
Wilson 1997, 26), “typically developed in three phases”: “scholarly interest”, “patriotic
agitation”, and “the rise of a mass national movement.” Ukrainian nationalism developed
through a series of historic forms, many of them cultural, with the prevalence of distinctly
political, and furthermore, pro-independence movement in two historic periods – 19181921 and 1989-91. It was undeniably related to the fact that:
the only part of the Tsarist Russia which contained a genuine national movement before 1917,
though not a separatist one, was Ukraine. Yet Ukraine remained relatively quiet while Baltic and
Caucasian republics demanded secession, remained under the control of the local Communist
party leadership, and did not resign itself to separation until after the failed coup of August 1991
destroyed the USSR. (Hobsbawm 1992, 166)

4.1. Historic Background
Forced Union
The colonial dependence of Ukraine within the Russian Empire can be traced
back to 1654, when military protectorate treaty between the Cossack Hetmanate under
Bohdan Khmelnytskyy was later interpreted by Muscovy as ‘the union’– event known as
the Pereyaslav Rada9.
As a result, a large part of today’s Ukraine eventually ended up being a colony of
Muscovy. This forced incorporation was challenged multiple times by uprisings in the
17th and 18th centuries, as well as by the abundant nationalist literature of the 18th-20th
centuries, which helped to educate Ukrainians under imperial rule about national origins
and culture, and mobilized many to rebel against tsarist power. One of the reasons why

9

‘Rada’ is Ukrainian for ‘council’, while Pereyaslav is the city where it took place. Later in the text, the
term “rada” is used in a number of parliaments in Ukraine, as in Central Rada in 1917-19 and in present
Parliament – the Verkhovna Rada or Supreme Council.
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Russia could not sustain the loss of Ukraine was and still is the element of local
nationalist mythology of linking its history to the period of the Ukrainian state Kyivan
Rus, which would be challenged after disintegration, as “for several centuries prior to the
union with Ukraine, official Muscovy had a very dim sense, if indeed any at all, of being
the direct heir of Kyiv… [and] the idea that…the Muscovites were really "Russians"
performed a significant integrating function in the eighteenth century and afterwards.”
(Szporluk 1997, 95)
Similar stateless political situation was common for the rest of the Ukrainian
territories under Poland, and later – Austro-Hungarian rule between 1772 and 1918, while
other smaller segments being absorbed by Romania, Hungary and, briefly, former
Czechoslovakia, and were only reunited with the rest of Ukraine during Soviet rule. At
the forefront of the Ukrainian nationalist struggle for a separate state and reunification
with the rest of the ethnic territory were numerous literary and public organizations and
groups, which especially flourished under relatively moderate Austro-Hungarian colonial
power prior to the WWI.

Nationalist Agenda and the brief Independence of 1918-21 and 1941
The first short-lived period of Ukrainian political sovereignty of 1918-21
followed the Bolshevik Revolution and loosening of the grip of power of Petersburg over
many territories. As a result, many ethnic communities used that chance to proclaim their
national independence, most notedly the countries of the Baltic region, Poland and
Finland. In a similar fashion, Ukraine also chose the path of sovereignty, but with the coexistence of two distinct groups – autonomists (who fought for more rights within ‘new
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democratic Russia’) and separatist one on the political arena. Also, historians agree that
“Ukrainian nationalists had no strong political organizations before 1914, nor any links
with foreign powers.” (Velychenko 1997, 422) These circumstances prevented an
effective functioning of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) proclaimed in 1918 by a
document called ‘Fourth Universal’ of the Central Rada – a self-governing legislative
body created a year earlier on behalf of the Ukrainian people. Unlike the first three
documents – ‘Universals’ – of the Central Rada, the fourth no longer recognized any
formal federal relation to the ‘future democratic Russia’, but instead created an
independent state: the Ukrainian National Republic. This historic step was implemented
despite the opposition of the autonomists and was advocated strongly by the writings and
ideas of “the two most influential Ukrainian nationalist thinkers of the twentieth century”
(Wilson 1997, 41) – Dmytro Dontsov and V’iacheslav Lypyns’kyi, as well as Mykola
Mikhnovsky’s famous manifesto, Independent Ukraine (1900).
Due to numerous disagreements on the issues of cooperation with Russia, the
West and internal development, and constant pressure from Russia, instead of a
functioning independent state, “Ukrainian nationalists formed three short-lived
governments in the period [of 1917-1920]: the Ukrainian People’s Republic (November
1917 to April 1918), the Hetmanate (April to December 1918) and the Directorate
(December 1918 to December 1919).” (Wilson 1997, 11) The Central Rada was
overthrown by the Hetmanate in cooperation with Germany in April 1918 – Ukrainian
State headed by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, who, nevertheless, continued the statebuilding initiatives, and many would argue, even more successfully, as his state was
recognized by a number of countries.
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In 1919, Hetman Skoropadsky was deposed by the third Ukrainian entity, the
Directorate of Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, the latter becoming one of
the iconic figures of Ukrainian statehood, with Ukrainians often referred to as the
Petliurites or ‘petliurivtsi’. Among the shortcomings of this stage of Ukrainian statebuilding, which essentially ended with a loss of sovereignty, “V’iacheslav Lypyns’kyi
identified the key weakness as the failure to win over elements from the old imperial elite
to the national cause.” (Wilson 1997, 14). In addition to internal and external
disagreements, there was military presence of a number of mutually hostile foreign
armies on Ukrainian territory: the Reds, the Whites, the Central powers (specifically, the
German army), the Poles, and local anarchists with a relatively small presence of the
UNR’s own army. The underdevelopment of the national army under UNR was seen by
many as the main reason of the state-building failure, with Stephen Horak stating that
“the UNR’s idealistic leaders paid too little attention to the task of building up proper
armed forces” (quoted in Wilson 1997, 12). On the other hand, “as with Mikhnovs’kyi,
Dontsov’s starting point was a violent critique of the alleged provincialism, inferiority
complex and Little Russian mentality of the Ukrainian intelligentsia”, which added up to
the explanation of possible reasons. (Wilson 1997, 42)
The beginning of the twentieth century became the time of formation of active
political life in Ukraine, as during the tsarist times of Russian Empire any type of
political activity – and more so an ethnically Ukrainian one – was strictly banned.
Another important development to keep in mind when analyzing the political processes in
early 20th-century Ukraine, is the division of Ukrainian intelligentsia after 1848 (the year
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of all-European revolutions that effectively outlawed the serfdom in Halychyna10 and
boosted the nationalist agitation) into three groups: “the Old Ruthenians, the
Ukrainophiles, and the Russophiles.” (Magocsi 2002, 22) Accordingly, “the first stirrings
of separatist sentiment were amongst the Brotherhood of Taras [secretly established in
1891]…Several of its members were instrumental in forming the RUP (the first political
party in Ukraine established in February 1900 in Kharkiv), and in 1902 broke away to
form the Ukrainian People’s Party (UPP), the first truly nationalist political group in
tsarist Ukraine.” (Wilson 1997, 33)
While most of the Ukrainian territory was incorporated into the USSR, western
part of it – Halychyna – constituted the Eastern Galician region of Poland, Bukovyna was
part of Romania, while Transcarpathia was occupied by Czechoslovakia, and the
Crimean peninsula – was part of Russia. In all those territories between the two world
wars there were distinct Ukrainian nationalist organizations fighting for self-government
and eventual reunion into one Ukraine. Due to the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime
there was no possibility to partake in the parliamentary process, which was totally
marginalized and pre-arranged, the only way to fight the system and the unfair Union
arrangements was through illegal underground activity, where the Organization of
Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was actively operating.
In terms of comparison of the two occupied portions of the Ukrainian territory,
Shekhovtsov (2011, 207) underlines: “both Western and Eastern parts of Ukraine had
their nationalist movements. The Soviet authorities successfully suppressed the Ukrainian

10

Historic region of Ukraine, comprised by contemporary Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil oblasts, and
territories now in Poland.
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nationalists, either moderate or radical, but in Poland there existed different political
nationalist parties that tried to normalise relations with the Polish state.”
In Halychyna, after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918
another Ukrainian state, the Western Ukrainian National Republic (WUNR) was
proclaimed. This proclamation, as well as the establishment of the UNR was then
followed by the formal union of two republics into one UNR, in January 1919 – an event
known as Unity Day. Eventually, Western Halychyna was absorbed by Poland and
remained occupied as part of its territory until the beginning of the World War II.
According to Shekhovtsov (2011, 207), “in the course of the 1920s, the most radical
nationalist organisation in Western Ukraine was the Ukrayins’ka viis’kova orhanizatsiya
(Ukrainian Military Organisation, UVO) led by Colonel Yevhen Konovalets.” Wilson
(1997, 45) differentiates three tendencies in national movement in Western Ukraine “after
the international recognition of Polish administration (1923)”: there was a movement for
Ukrainian autonomy within Poland, “pro-Soviet or pro-Russian” bloc and finally, an
“ultra-nationalist current, and its call for an independent Ukraine,” which eventually
became associated with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The real turn
in Ukrainian nationalist thought took place when “in 1926, Dontsov published his
magnum opus, Nationalism, in which he expounded the ideology of Ukrainian
nationalism.” (Shekhovtsov 2011, 208) Consequently, OUN was formed “in 1929 [in
Vienna, when] radical Ukrainian activists in Poland completed the process of uniting all
their forces into a single organization… led by Evhen Konovalets, who was also the
leader of the Ukrainian Military Organization.” (Marples 2006, 559). Along the lines
with the vision of other nationalist groups in Europe of the early 20th century, “the
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OUN…declared that a future independent ‘Ukrainian state would be a national
dictatorship [natsikratiia]’, defined as ‘the power of the nation in the state’.” (Wilson
1997, 47) According to Shekhovtsov (2011, 208), “in terms of doctrine, the OUN was
indebted to the works of Dmytro Dontsov (who, however, never joined the organisation),
as well as some ideologues within the OUN, in particular Mykola Stsibors’kyi,
Volodymyr Martynets and Yuliyan Vassyyan.”
Most sources depict the disagreement as one that developed on generational lines,
as “the designated leader Andrii Melnyk failed to gain the support of the more radical
members, who gradually broke away into a separate faction under Bandera... the new
revolutionary wing of the OUN” (Marples 2006, 560). David Marples (2006, 555)
captured the controversy between the two attitudes towards the Ukrainian national leader
of the mid-20th century – Stepan Bandera – that of the Soviet propaganda, anti-Ukrainian
in its contents, and contemporary Ukrainian in the country’s spiritual ‘heart’ –
Halychyna, the westernmost region of Ukraine: “In the Soviet period, his name was
associated with evil, terrorism, and treachery by Soviet authorities and propagandists. In
various towns and villages of western Ukraine, on the other hand, statues have been
erected and streets named after him, including a prominent avenue in the largest city of
L'viv.”
Another attempt to recreate the Ukrainian state occurred in Lviv after “the
formation of the two units and the event that followed after the German invasion of the
Soviet Union – the declaration of a sovereign Ukrainian state on 30 June 1941 by
Yaroslav Stets'ko on Bandera's behalf.” (Marples 2006, 560) “However, the Nazis did not
support the idea of Ukraine’s independence and arrested both Bandera and Stets’ko. They
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were sent to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp and released only in 1944.”
(Shekhovtsov 2011, 209).

Soviet Union and the Genocide of Ukrainians
At the time of the unsuccessful state-building attempts in 1918-21, before Ukraine
was absorbed into the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks simultaneously fought for the
territory of Ukraine, having created their own puppet government in the city of Kharkiv
in Eastern Ukraine, which became the center of the occupied Soviet Ukraine and, since
1922, part of the USSR. The creation of the Soviet Union was far from democratic, as the
citizens of Ukraine did not have any say in that decision (similarly to the Pereyaslav Rada
of 1654), which was largely made by the Communist party functionaries. Aware of the
nationalist aspirations of Ukrainians (as well as other nations), Moscow laid out a policy
of ‘korenization’ (translated as ‘going to roots’) with its Ukrainian equivalent in the form
of ‘Ukrainianization’. This policy was not only designed to pacify the nationalists and to
“legitimize [Communist] rule in Soviet Ukraine by attracting to its ranks a broader
spectrum of the local population” (Magocsi 2010, 569) but, more importantly, to detect
them in order to neutralize or exterminate them later.
As a result, the next stage in Stalin’s policies in 1930s was oppression in the form
of mass murders, detentions in Siberian concentration camps, and, horrifically, mass
killing by hunger, a widely recognized genocide, the Holodomor of 1932-33, which
“caused the death of up to 10 million Ukrainians due to starvation” (Semotiuk [n.d.]).
This tragedy of the Ukrainian nation was promulgated by the order to confiscate the grain
yields and reserves targeted villagers, those living on the land, with “roadblocks set up by
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the authorities [which] prevented Ukrainian peasants from entering the cities, where food
was sometimes available, though far from plentiful.” (Naimark 2010, 73) This was a
logical continuation of oppressive anti-Ukrainian policies and, as noted by Wilson (1997,
151), “three centuries of Russian rule have supposedly been a demographic catastrophe
for Ukraine. In 1654, it is claimed there were more Ukrainians than Russians, six million
as opposed to five, whereas today the population of Russia outnumbers that of Ukraine
by almost three to one.”
The instrument of Holodomor greatly changed the demography of Ukraine.
Deserted villages were subsequently settled with Russians from all over the Soviet
Union, largely continuing the imperial policies of Russification of Ukraine, which
effectively ended the transitional Ukrainianization stage in the late 1920s, with its
“ultimate aim…to foster the elimination of national distinctions within Soviet society and
to create a new Soviet man (Homo Sovieticus11), whose primary concern would be loyalty
to the [USSR] through the medium of the world’s only “true revolutionary” language,
Russian.” (Magocsi 2010, 695)

The World War II and Ukraine
During the Second World War, similarly to the First one in 1914-18, Ukraine had
no statehood, being part of the USSR with most citizens formally fighting on the side of
its yesterday’s conqueror – the Red Army. This predicament did not satisfy many
freedom-minded Ukrainians who dreamed of an independent state, and envisioned the
war as a chance to materialize their plans. This latter group of Ukrainian nationalists in
large numbers secretly belonged to the OUN, which decided to create “the Ukrainian
11

Original emphasis
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Insurgent Army (UPA) in October 1942 though in active form only from the spring of
1943 […which] was a large and well organised military and later guerrilla army under
Roman Shukhevych,” (Marples 2006, 562) which “fought against the Nazi and Soviet
forces,” and even later the war “the UPA continued its struggle against Soviet law
enforcement up until the early 1950s but then was suppressed [and] fighters of the UPA
and Bandera’s OUN were sent to Gulag prison camps, while other members of these
organisations had to emigrate to Western Europe, Canada and the USA.” (Shekhovtsov
2011, 209) The UPA was so highly organized and efficient that former French President
Charles De Gaulle noticed the following: “If I had an army such as the OUN has, the
German jackboot would never have trampled the French soil.” (quoted in Lypovetsky
2009, 1)
With the decade of 1950s – the time of latest mention of the UPA fighters and
their dugout bunkers – which was mainly characterized by a newer wave of oppressions,
the 1960s were also marked by another distinct cultural nationalist wave – the “60iers” or
the “Sixties group” – “no part of a deliberately organized movement, these [were]
writers, together with a few theatrical directors, film directors, composers, and artists
[whose literary forms] both implicitly and explicitly sought to renew traditional
Ukrainian cultural values and to restore the Ukrainian language, which had suffered
sovietization and russification during the Stalinist era.” (Magocsi 2010, 704) All of them
were either murdered or sentenced based on “flirting with “decadent Western artistic
notions” and, even worse, with Ukrainian “bourgeois nationalism”.” (Ibid, 710)
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4.2. Ukrainian Politics
It is often believed that independence of Ukraine just happened due to the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Some may even question if “Ukraine and Ukrainians
suddenly appeared deus ex machina in 1991?” (Magocsi 2002, ix), but it is far from
reality, as it was a distinct nationalist movement, I argue, that did the most to reinforce
the idea of national statehood for the Ukrainians after centuries of colonial rule, and
united millions in the fight for the independence. According to Hobsbawm (1992, 164),
“the eggs of Versailles and Brest Litowsk are still hatching…The explosive issues of
1988-92 were those created in 1918-21…The simplest way to describe the apparent
explosion of separatism in 1988-92 is thus as ‘unfinished business of 1918-21.’.”
After proclamation of independence on 24 August 1991, many Ukrainians believed there
would be immediate changes in their country’s political and economic development but,
similar to other states in the region, the transition appeared to take longer than expected.
In the period of ‘Perebudova’12, with the elements of democratization in place, there
appeared the first political organizations like the Ukrainian Helsinki Group – human
rights movement, organized by many former dissidents, with majority of its members
eventually belonging to newly established Ukrainian Republican Party of Levko
Lukyanenko, a prominent dissident himself. Historic organizations were also revived,
like Prosvita – a famous educational society founded in the 19th century. As Kuzio
(quoted in Shekhovtsov 2011, 209) states that “although small Ukrainian nationalist
groups, such as the Natsional’nyi front (National Front) or Ukrayins’ka helsins’ka hrupa
(Ukrainian Helsinki Group), did appear in the Ukrainian SSR in the 1960s and

12

‘Reconstruction’ – in English, or ‘perestroika’ – in Russian
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afterwards, they were generally national democratic in their ideological orientation ‘with
a concentration upon cultural and linguistic issues, human rights and national
oppression’.”
The most important event occurred “on 8-10 September 1989 the founding
congress of the Popular Movement of […] Ukraine for Perestroika,” (Paniotto 1991, 177)
which gave birth to the Ukrainian banner of the pro-independence movement, commonly
known as Rukh13. The establishment of Rukh was comparable to the formation of the
Polish Solidarnost, both in time and importance, as it instrumentally opposed the
communists in cultural and political domains of Ukrainian life, attracting millions of
people into support of independence, and then sustainable political and economic
development. In its evolution, Rukh was on the center-right of the political spectrum has
effectively changed its priority from just cultural and political autonomy to a clearly proindependence stance in 1990 (Narodnyi Rukh of Ukraine). Adopting the name Narodnyi
Rukh of Ukraine (People’s Movement of Ukraine), Rukh formalized into a political party
to participate in the 1994 election campaign as the main opponent to still powerful
Communists, having “transformed itself from a movement for perestroika into a
movement for the state independence of Ukraine.” (Wilson 1997, 68)
Ukrainian independence, proclaimed in August 1991, was confirmed by a
nationwide referendum on 1 December 1991. After centuries of foreign rule and different
assimilations, Ukrainians voted for independence: “According to the Central Electoral
Commission, out of a total of 37,885,555 eligible voters, some 31,891,742 (84.18
percent) took part in the Referendum.

13

'Rukh' is Ukrainian for 'movement'
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Of those, 90.32 percent or 28,804,071 voted for independence; 2,417,554 or 7.58 percent
voted against.” (Potichnyj 1991, 129)
In its twenty years of independence, Ukraine has been governed by four
presidents: Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994), Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004), Viktor
Yushchenko (2005-2010) and the incumbent Viktor Yanukovych, elected in 2010. Major
problems that divert Ukraine from further development and implementation of effective
economic and political reforms are corruption, cronyism, and the omnipresent Russian
factor – which keeps Ukraine hostage in matters ranging from gas supplies and energy
dependence, to cultural dependence with the expansion of Russian media, entertainment
and publishing through multiple proxies in the Ukrainian establishment. One reaction to
these developments is a nationalist agenda, historically more prevalent in Halychyna and
Western Ukraine. It is also worth mentioning that according to Wilson (1997, 137) the
nationalist parties and movements represented in Ukraine should be divided into
“national-democratic” and “ultra-nationalist”. Many would argue about such division, but
Wilson (1997, 197) provides the historic parallels, claiming that “most nationaldemocrats have taken their ideological inspiration from Hrushevs’kyi and Lypyns’kyi
rather than Mikhnovs’kyi or Dontsov.” Indeed Rukh was initially much more liberal and
centrist in its political nature drawing heavily from Lypynskyi’s teachings, while
Svoboda clearly positions itself as the descendant of the Ukrainian People’s Party (UPP)
of the early 20th century and the OUN of the 1920-40s, favoring the ideology of Dontsov,
Mikhnovsky and Bandera. While Rukh preferred parliamentary activity with electoral
participation, Svoboda (known as SNPU – the Social National Party of Ukraine14 –

14

Not to be confused with national socialist ideology, this social nationalism is based on the traditionally
Ukrainian right nationalism with respect to human and religious virtues.
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before 1991) before the election of 1998 concentrated heavily on extraparliamentary
activities, like protests and education activities. According to Shekhovtsov (2011, 213),
the Sotsial-natsional’na partiya Ukrayiny (Social-National Party of Ukraine, SNPU), which changed
its name to the Freedom Party in 2004, was launched in Lviv on 13 October 1991. Several small
nationalist organisations contributed to the formation of the SNPU, namely the Varta rukhu (Guard
of the Movement) led by Yaroslav Andrushkiv and Yurii Kryvoruchko, Students’ke bratstvo L’vova
(Lviv Student Fellowship) led by Oleh Tyahnybok, and Molodizhna orhanizatsiya ‘Spadshchyna’
(Organisation of Ukrainian Youth ‘Legacy’) led by Andrii Parubii…In terms of ideology, the SNPU
claimed that its social nationalism was founded on the work Two Revolutions [1951], written by
Yaroslav Stets’ko under the pseudonym ‘Z. Karbovych’, who argued that a Ukrainian revolution had
to combine two revolutions, a national and a social one”

Additionally, Shekhovtsov (2011, 209) argues that “in the post-communist but
‘pre-Orange’ period, the radical rightwing milieu in Ukraine was dominated by three
major political organisations, the Vseukrayins’ke politychne ob’’ednannya ‘Derzhavna
samostiinist’ Ukrayiny’ (All-Ukrainian Political Union ‘State Independence of Ukraine’,
DSU), Konhres ukrayins’kykh natsionalistiv (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, KUN)
and Ukrayins’ka natsional’na asambleya (Ukrainian National Assembly, UNA).”
Years of mismanagement and absence of expected political and economic
reforms, invigorated by the repression against opposition leaders and the murder of the
famous journalist Heorhiy Gongadze15 in 2000, and the allegedly rigged 2004
presidential election, precipitated the Orange Revolution, a popular uprising in the
country’s capital, Kyiv, in late 2004 and early 2005. The Orange Revolution reached its
apogee in Kyiv’s Independence Square or Maidan Nezalezhnosti, which gave the
uprising an alternative name: the ‘Maidan’. It became a symbol of nationwide unity and
demand for immediate change, which was seen in the initial success of an opposition
candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, but was deprived of victory in the runoff of the 2004
election, and was allegedly poisoned, having his face transfigured. It was only later
15

Famous Ukrainian journalist allegedly killed by the Kuchma regime as confirmed by the
“Melnychenko’s tapes” (sometimes referred to as Gongadzegate in mass media) – recordings of the former
security head of President Kuchma.
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determined that the Orange Revolution, according to some, had “mobilized the largest
number of participants of any democratic revolution and lasted the longest,” (Kuzio 2010,
285).
Ukraine’s geopolitical situation also plays an important role and, according to
Meyer “with the EU's indifference and Russia's not-so-covert enmity, the danger is that it
will end up stranded between two worlds, neither East nor West.” (Meyer 2005, 78)
Since independence, the Euroatlantic card was regularly played by almost all the
presidents, counterbalancing it with the strategic partnership with Russia. Often this
duality in international relations was used to threaten one of the sides by preferring either
a European, or a Russian vector. As for the nationalist forces, the European cooperation
is a major priority, while Russia – impossible to be totally ignored – needs to recognize
the crimes of the Soviet system, its official predecessor, and primarily the genocidal
Holodomor of 1932-33 before any serious political cooperation. According to Morrison
(1993, 677), “since the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia and
Ukraine have been at odds over a wide range of issues, ranging from the future of the
Black Sea Fleet to the division of former Soviet property, from international debt
repayments to energy deliveries, from the shape of the CIS to the control and ownership
of nuclear weapons.” Additionally, nationalists are among a few political and pressure
groups in contemporary Ukraine that demand ‘lustration’ – a politically motivated
clearance which was successfully conducted in a number of Central and Eastern
European states. “According to the Freedom Party,” claims Shekhovtsov (2011, 221),
“one of the instruments for fighting political corruption would be the implementation of
lustration policies, which would purge the Ukrainian political system and administrative
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machine of ‘komunisty-kadebisty-kuchmisty’ (communists, KGB agents, and adherents
of Kuchma).”
Political System
The current Ukrainian Constitution was adopted in 1996, and has been amended a
number of times. Its Article 1 states that “Ukraine is a sovereign and independent,
democratic, social, law-based state” (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 1996), and by the form
of government is a mixed presidential-parliamentary republic. Even though there was a
tendency to delegate more powers to the VRU – the unicameral parliament, in reality
both Kuchma (1994-2004) and now Yanukovych (2010- ) are trying to adopt additional
amendments to extend their powers over the candidature of the Prime Minister and the
cabinet, simultaneously limiting those of the VRU. Constant changes are also made to the
electoral legal framework, substituting firstly a first-past-the-post system majoritarian
(which is based on voting for specific candidates similar to the British and U.S. systems)
with a mixed model – majoritarian-proportional (reintroduced for the 2012 VRU
election) – and then, transforming into the solely proportional parliamentary election
(common in western Europe), depending on the political environment and on the
opportunity to influence the election. It was more beneficial for the pro-Kuchma parties
to be elected by the old first-past-the-post system, when they had control over local
government, but after the Orange Revolution they insisted on changing the law, realizing
that by the proportional system they still could draw the electorate as Party of Regions in
south-eastern Ukraine, which is their electoral base. Such electoral manipulations are
common and provoke the heated debates over the percentage barrier for the parties to get
into the VRU, with the pro-presidential parties proposing to raise it above the current
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three per cent, while some smaller opposition parties emphasize a lack of democracy with
such a high requirement, which will always leave smaller political parties and blocs
outside the parliamentary participation, marginalizing them.
The reform of 2004 – known as a compromise between the outgoing Kuchma
government and the president-elect Yushchenko – has been considered by many analysts
and political scientists as an unnecessary move by Yushchenko’s team in the midst of the
Orange Revolution, when he had a clear lead over any other possible candidate and
support of millions of Ukrainians. When “most of his key aides believe[d] that the
remaining one-year window of strong presidential power will give him sufficient time to
deal with the legacies of corruption and to shape a broad future parliamentary majority”
(Karatnycky 2005, 46), many of “Yushchenko’s supporters were against these changes,
arguing that it was unfair to change the powers of the presidency during presidential
elections.” (Kubicek 2009, 327)
The contents of the abovementioned reform became a trojan horse of the outgoing
regime for the sake of legitimization of the rerun of the 2004 rigged November election,
leaving the new President and his government with limited powers and possibilities to
facilitate visible changes in the country, as a lot of important powers were now
transferred to the VRU – the national legislature. The President, according to the
amendments, remained only fully responsible for a few key ministries (defense, interior
and foreign affairs), while the other top government departments were dependent
primarily on parliamentary coalition. The greatest loss of that political compromise
between the outgoing and incoming elites was delegation of the power to nominate the
Prime minister from the head of state to the parliamentary majority, which essentially
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both weakened the leader of the Orange Revolution and popularly supported President,
and, simultaneously, necessitated formation of a governing coalition in a still weak
parliamentary democracy in 2005. This development became a matter of bitter
disagreement between the pro-presidential political forces and the Yulia Tymoshenko
Bloc, a political union supporting the other popular figure of the Orange Revolution, who
later became the Prime minister.
Following the 2006 election, these feuds created something similar to a British
hung parliament. As a result, the President Yushchenko had to dissolve the ineffective
legislature and a new election was held in 2007. This became a breakthrough campaign
for the losers of the Orange Revolution, the Party of Regions, who won a majority and,
according to the logic of the creators of the amendments, were eager to nominate their
Prime Minister. Mathematically the Orange parties and blocs could have reunited and
formed their own coalition, but they were not able to agree on a candidate for the Prime
Minister. One of the Orange parties, the Socialist Party of Ukraine switched sides,
building a coalition with the Party of Regions.
One of the most controversial steps during Yushchenko’s presidency, and one of
the reasons for his failure to be reelected, was a memorandum agreed with his former
opponent, the pro-Kuchma and pro-Russian candidate, Yanukovych “in September 2005,
by which Yanukovych delivered the votes of the Party of Regions to approve
Yushchenko’s nominee, Yuri Yekhanurov, as Prime minister.” (Kubicek 2009, 325)
Many considered that move as a betrayal of principles of the Orange Revolution, not only
were the organizers of the alleged electoral falsifications unpunished, they were instead
offered government offices. According to Menon and Motyl (2011, 137) Yanukovych’s
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victory and first years at power only “rolled back democracy and the rule of law,
deepening political, regional, and linguistic divisions in the country.”
The judiciary, despite being the independent branch of government in accordance
with the Constitution, has been heavily influenced by the executive branch through the
mechanism of appointing judges. Following the Orange Revolution, a number of court
orders, including the decision of the highest Constitutional Court, enabled the rerun of the
2004 presidential election. But the whole judicial branch needed according to Kubicek
(2009, 334) encompassing fundamental changes, “a vast reworking of legal codes to take
into account new social, economic, and political realities – needed to take root.” But they
did not: neither before, nor after the Revolution.

Euro-Atlantic Integration
Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, there has been ongoing debate over its
choice between Euro-Atlantic integration and some sort of cooperation with a Euro-Asian
sphere of Russian influence. The governments under Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma
gravitated closer to the Russian geopolitical orbit, formally calling their foreign policies
multi-vector or even non-aligned, despite having advocates in the European Union,
specifically Ukraine’s neighboring countries of the Visegrád Group (Poland, Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) and the Baltic nations, eager to negotiate some EU
preferences on Ukraine’s behalf.
One of the central objectives of the Orange Revolution was to review Ukrainian
foreign policy. Proponents favored integration to both the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the European Union. In 2005, for the first time, Ukrainian authorities
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opened a serious nationwide debate on closer integration into the European organizations.
The West was astonished by these developments in Ukraine, as “by the time victory was
announced – in the form of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko's electoral triumph –
the [O]range Revolution had set a major new landmark in the post-communist history of
eastern Europe, a seismic shift Westward in the geopolitics of the region.” (Karatnycky
2005, 35)
It was an especially uneasy start to the debate on the NATO, as the southeastern
part of the country is greatly affected by the post-Cold War sentiment against any
military cooperation with NATO, while the rest of the country has predominantly seen
possible NATO entry as a move away from the Russian sphere of interest and towards
EU membership. This is primarily dictated by the unwritten practice of other nations, as
most of the post-communist neighbors have walked that same way of the NATO
membership before the EU entry.
After 2010, Ukraine’s bipolar foreign policy was effectively reinforced by the
pro-Russian Yanukovych regime, where similar Kuchma-like rhetoric of strategic
partnership is used to an equal extent in Brussels and in Moscow, while the media
invigorates a debate on whether to strive for the association status with the European
Union, or to simply agree on the warm welcome of the post-Soviet Euro-Asian customs
union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
In terms of European cooperation, Svoboda supports Euro-Atlantic integration as long
as it coincides with the country’s national interests, promoting closer cooperation with
the countries of the Black Sea basin and formerly Soviet Baltic states. As noted by

84

Wilson (1997, 173) “Ukraine’s primary foreign policy tasks should be to secure a ‘return
to Europe’ and build a strong independent state free from pernicious Russian influence.”

Ruling Parties
Between 1922 and 1990, the Communist Party of the USSR and its Ukrainian
branch – the CPU – were the only legal political actors in all the Soviet elections.
Kravchuk, the first post-USSR President in 1991, was not favoring any political party
when in office, the Communist party was briefly banned from political life. Despite this
ban, “former Communist Party officials, recast as national patriots, led the new state,”
(Karatnycky 2005, 38) some disguised as national democrats, while others as reformed
socialists or social democrats.
Ruling parties were a symbol of the Kuchma presidential administrations: during
his second term in office, the President was supported by the highly centralized United
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine led by the head of his administration, and later
ordered the creation of a pro-presidential For the United Ukraine election bloc during the
2002 presidential election. Following the Orange Revolution, the opposition
Yushchenko-led Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko’s Bloc won a sweeping victory
during the 2006 campaign, but eventually internal conflicts led to a new election in 2007,
which brought in the largest parliamentary faction of the former rival – Viktor
Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, and gave him a Prime ministerial post, and after
Yushchenko lost re-election became a new ruling party. As pointed out by Shekhovtsov
(2011, 221), another reason of the failure of the Orange coalition is the fact that “in
September 2008, two ‘Orange’ coalition parliamentary groups, Nasha Ukraina–Narodna
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Samooborona (Our Ukraine—People’s Self-Defence, NU-NS) and the BYuT, started
clashing with each other over the scope of presidential powers, and Prime Minister
Tymoshenko was accused of colluding with the ‘anti-Orange’ Partiya rehioniv (Party of
Regions, PoR).”
The major concern about the whole political participation debate in contemporary
Ukrainian politics is that, as claimed by many independent observers, the presidents in
office usually enact extensive ‘administrative resource’ (corrupt schemes to influence an
election result through control over the election precincts in general and judges), abusing
their positions to promote their own political brands and create an autocratic centralized
system of government. The only exception was the Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc,
which came from opposition and eventually lost its support and dissolved into smaller
constituent parties that originally established it. Since 2010 the ruling Party of Regions
has been building a communist-like highly centralized party structure, successfully
wooing top businessmen and regional politicians to become members for granting
political preferences. In the event of their support of the opposition parties, they might be
prosecuted and under formal charges put in jail. In other words, President Yanukovych
has returned the totalitarian methods, oppressing opposition parties and media, due to the
fact that “Ukraine enjoys a bewildering array of security and law enforcement (the
distinction is blurry) bodies within its government, and an equally remarkable lack of
clear delineation of functions among them.” (Harasymiw 2003, 327) Party of Regions
could be described as “a collection of ex-Soviet functionaries who have amassed wealth
through corruption and have scant understanding
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of democracy and even less appreciation of Ukrainian identity.” (Menon and Motyl 2011,
137)

Nationalist Opposition
The first election after Gorbachev’s ‘perebudova’ in 1990 came as a surprise to
many, as it successfully ended the Communists’ monopoly on power. This provoked a
surprising electoral makeover of the Western Ukrainian oblast councils, which were
dominated by the dissident-led Rukh (People’s Movement). Opposition deputies were
elected among others to the parliament in the first Ukrainian parliamentary election of
1994, even though the number of communists was still disproportionate, and according to
Wilson (1997, 134), who comparing two parliamentary campaigns of 1990 and 1994,
comes to the conclusion that little has changed in the political spectrum, with the
exception of the fact that “from late 1992 onward anti-nationalist forces began to revive.”
Commenting on the results of the 1994 Rada election – the first since independence,
Kubicek (2000, 284) stated that “the national-democrats, endorsing more reform,
withdrawal from the CIS and various aspects of Ukrainianisation, were favoured in the
west and in Kyiv, and communists and their allies backing less reform and closer ties
with Russia won elsewhere.”
Most non-party parliamentarians were ex-Communists and formally independent,
and just waited for a time to form an economically beneficial coalition with the ruling
elite, especially during Kuchma’s presidency (1994-2004), while the first President
Kravchuk (1991-94) had to work with a somewhat remodeled, but still Soviet parliament
which he once headed as a speaker and a leader of the Communists.
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The results of the 1998 Rada election according to many were very similar to the
previous one, and underlined “quite clearly that regionalism has not waned in
Ukraine…national-democrats, led by Rukh, fared well, as usual, in the western regions
(31.4% of the vote there, 48.4% in L'viv) and in the city of Kyiv (24.8%), but only
received 15.6% of the national total.” (Kubicek 2000, 286).
With leftists having been in power for the whole Soviet period and then
reconfigured into the political center, the political opposition was on the nationalist right
flank. As claimed by Wilson (2009, 27), “modern Ukrainian nationalism has its roots in
the national revival of the nineteenth century,” but it was also greatly invigorated by
opposition to the Soviet regime in the dissident movements since 1960s. With
transformation into a political party, Rukh participated in all the post-independence
elections, but always remained in opposition to the existing governments until the Orange
Revolution when, as a member of the Our Ukraine electoral bloc, it received a real
opportunity to take enter the government. After the death of Rukh leader, Vyacheslav
Chornovil in 1999, which by many was seen as an ordered assassination masked by a
traffic accident, Rukh broke up into two separate factions. As a result, its popularity was
affected, as well as it influenced the whole nationalist movement. Interestingly enough,
another smaller nationalist party – the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (CUN), which
claims its roots in the historic OUN, was also part of the Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine
bloc, having a few deputies in the Verkhovna Rada, as well as the chairman of the
NaftoGaz of Ukraine – a state-controlled oil and gas monopoly. After Yushchenko’s lost
re-election both Rukh and CUN were further marginalized, leaving Svoboda at the
forefront of Ukrainian nationalist struggle.
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While in the first SNPU’s (Svoboda’s) election “in 1998, the party formed an
electoral alliance Menshe sliv (Fewer Words) with the DSU” and earned little electoral
support, “in 2006, for the first time, the Freedom Party flexed its renewed organizational
and ideological muscles at parliamentary, regional and city council elections [and]
announced the document ‘Program of the Protection of Ukrainians’ as its political
program for the parliamentary elections.” (Shekhovtsov 2011, 214 and 217) In 2012,
nationalists remain the most effective opposition to the ruling Party of Regions whose
ministers have “spent most of their professional lives in the Donbas, where entrenched
communist rule was replaced with entrenched oligarchic rule,” while the leftist parties are
cooperating with the Yanukovych regime on the basis of the common business interests
and pro-Russian rhetoric. In 2012, the most popular opposition party on the nationalist
flank is Svoboda, and among its electoral gains is the 2010 victory in the heartland of the
Ukrainian nationalism – Halychyna, controlling the three oblast councils, repeating the
same electoral result as the Rukh victory in 1990. Furthermore, Svoboda has increased its
nationwide support with each election since 2006 to reach the required 5 per cent to get
into the 2012 Parliament. In the 2000s, nationalists increased their support in the Central
and Eastern Ukraine unlike in the 1990s, when “nationalists took control of the three
oblast councils in Galicia (with between 60 and 80 per cent of the seats) and performed
strongly in Volhynia and Kyiv (40 per cent), but made little progress elsewhere.” (Wilson
1997, 124)
Yanukovych’s regime allegedly uses its possible influence via the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and the supposedly independent Office of the Prosecutor General to
imprison the opposition leaders on formal allegations, similar to those in the Soviet times.
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Among the most high-profile arrests is the capture of the former Interior Minister Yuriy
Lutsenko and the former Prime Minister Tymoshenko herself, and “from the start western
observers thought that the charges were politically motivated,” (The UK Parliament
2011, 3) as well as “the trial has only galvanized the opposition and discredited Ukraine
just as it has sought to move toward the West by signing a free-trade agreement with the
European Union.” (Menon and Motyl 2011, 137) Similar prosecutions are common
against opposition journalists. The nation’s second President Kuchma, for example, has a
marred “reputation after scandals concerning the Gongadze murder case,” (Pavlyuk 2005,
308), which prompted a Ukraine Without Kuchma rally in the capital Kyiv in 2001,
considered by many as a rehearsal of the 2004 Orange Revolution.

Svoboda’s Main Goals
Svoboda’s political agenda and goals are best illustrated in the party’s main
document, Program of the Protection of Ukrainians (The Program of the Svoboda AllUkrainian Union 2011), where the preamble reads that “the main goal of the Svoboda
All-Ukrainian Union is the creation of the powerful Ukrainian state on the basis of social
and national justice…the state, which will take its decent place among the world nations
and will guarantee uninterrupted development of the Ukrainian nation.” This document
alongside Svoboda’s own Constitution Bill is the major document complemented by the
party’s manifestos during each election campaign. It consists of eight chapters dedicated
to the specific area of country’s life – system of power and lustration (mentioned earlier),
national economy (economic independence and social justice), nation’s health and
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overcoming the demographic crisis, citizenship and immigration, information and
education, historic legacy, foreign policy and defense, Crimea and Sevastopol.
Shekhovtsov (2011, 221), similar to other political scientists and analysts of
contemporary Ukrainian politics, insists that “anti-establishment strategies plays a crucial
role in [Svoboda’s] voter mobilization.” It is important to emphasize that Svoboda’s
ideologists do not solely concentrate on the cultural side of the revival of modern
Ukraine, but also plan to modify its political system and “adopt a special anti-corruption
law”, design transparent economic policies and mechanisms, modify the system of
education, regulate the status of Crimean autonomy and Sevastopol through the
nationwide referendum (The Program of the Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union 2011). In
terms of historic legacy, Svoboda insists on the formulation of the historic continuity
between the major stages of Ukrainian statehood with in all constitutional matters with
the emphasis on renewal of the Ukrainian political independence in 1991 rather than
proclamation, referring to the period between the existence of the UNR and Ukrainian
State of the 1918-21 and 1991 as “occupation”, similarly to the Baltic states or Georgia;
also paying special attention to the present-day matters of foreign cooperation and
defense referring to the ideal national foreign strategy as “European Ukraine-centrism,
based on which Ukraine must become not only a geographical, but also a geopolitical
center of Europe.” (ibid) Additionally, Svoboda maintains cooperation with other
nationalist parties in Europe, jointly coining their position in the contemporary
continental political arena within the Euronat, a right-wing pan-European alliance.
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4.3. Ukrainian Society and Culture
As with many other European nationalist movements, Ukrainian culture played an
important role throughout the centuries of oppression, being one of the major components
on the agenda of nationalists. Of most importance are the questions of language and
religion, but also relevant are the poems and writings of Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko
and Lesya Ukrainka, and other authors who were the frontrunners of the Ukrainian
nationalist idea of independent homeland. As an example, Taras Shevchenko, “the son of
a serf who was eventually to be canonized as Ukraine’s national bard…wrote in
Ukrainian, where his very talent

validated the use of the language and constructed its

modern form,” writes Wilson (2009, 90) and, as he continues, “according to the writer
Oksana Zabuzhko, he was therefore the first true ‘national intellectual’.” According to
Subtelny, one of the leading Ukrainian historians, Shevchenko’s “poetry became in effect
a literary and intellectual declaration of Ukrainian independence.” (Wilson 1997, 29)
For Ukraine’s nationalists defense of the national culture is a primary concern, as
noted by The Program of the Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union (2011), where both of the
chapters – on information and education, and on historical legacy and continuity are
dedicated to a variety of cultural matters on both international and internal level, such as
“to gain recognition by the VRU [and of the world organizations] of the Ukrainian
Genocide of the 20th century,” “revive traditionally Ukrainian holidays”, “establish a state
museum of the Ukrainian fight for independence”, as well as “facilitate a return to
Ukraine of the national, cultural and historic treasures, removed abroad during the
periods of occupation.”
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Religious conflicts
In terms of Ukraine’s religious identity, since the times of Kyivan Rus and Prince
Volodymyr’s Christening of 988, Ukraine has followed the Byzantine or Orthodox
tradition of the Christian faith, which found its logical continuation in the formation of
the Kyivan metropolis. Its existence was interrupted by the illegal “subordination of the
Kyiv Metropolitanate to the Moscow Patriarchate in 1686" (RISU, 2012). With Ukraine’s
independence in 1991, the four largest churches were the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
(UOC) of Kyiv Patriarchate, UOC of Moscow Patriarchate, Ukrainian Orthodox
Autocephalous Church, and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church – formed in 1596 as
the Byzantine church in communion with Rome. Moscow Patriarchate is supported
financially and politically from Moscow and pro-Russian groups in Ukraine, as it “had
been part of the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church, and only in 1990 was granted
autonomy and given its current name though it remained administratively subordinate to
the patriarch of Moscow.” (Hentosh and Sorokowski 2000, 193) The other three
churches are supported by a larger number of Ukrainian adherents, but have less political
power. Being affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, the Moscow Patriarchate still
possesses church property from other religious denominations as a result of the Soviet
confiscations, which greatly impedes the positive intercommunal dialog of the Ukrainian
churches in opposition. As a solution, the other three major Ukrainian churches, with the
exception of the Russian patriarchate, are eager to negotiate further union to form an
independent Ukrainian Autocephalous Church of its own right without jurisdiction of
Moscow or Rome. This idea was present among the unifying slogans in the ideological
framework of the Orange Revolution, in accordance with the Christian Orthodox
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practices, each independent nation has a right for their own autocephalous church in full
communion with other Orthodox churches. This was not implemented due to fierce
opposition from Moscow that heavily depends on its Ukrainian adherents, especially in
financial and property terms, as “since approximately half of all Orthodox parishes in the
former Soviet Union were [and still are] located in Ukraine.” (Harasymiw 2002, 212) At
the same time, “a very prominent feature of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow
Patriarchate remains its Russianness, [as] the sermons are usually in Russian and the
entire religious culture of the Moscow Patriarchal parishes is Russian…and is often
accompanied by a dismissive attitude toward Ukraine and the Ukrainian language as
inappropriate for serious and sacred church matters.” (Magosci 2010, 743)
Nevertheless, the issue was raised as a legitimate one, because of the outgoing
Kuchma regime’s politics of supporting the anti-Ukrainian agenda of the Russian church
for their own political, and specifically electoral dividends, whereas Magosci (2010, 743)
juxtaposes two of the first Ukrainian presidents – President Kravchuk who “favored the
Kyiv Patriarchate” and President Kuchma with his support of the Moscow-oriented
jurisdiction. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union (2004,
13) in their review even suggested that “the Kuchma election appeared to represent a full
victory for the east and south of Ukraine, the Russian-speaking population, and the
Moscow Patriarchate.”
During the Orange Revolution rallies, the church question played a unifying role,
as Ukrainians of all parts of the country expressed their desire to obtain a fully
independent and recognized national church, although realizing that the widely supported
Orange government cannot do much in exercising this popular will as according to the
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Ukrainian Constitution the church is separated from the state. Many political scientists
agree that “Ukraine’s Orthodoxy has a pro-Western orientation and a majority of its
believers supported the Orange Revolution and Yushchenko’s candidacy”. (Kuzio 2010
a, 287) As a result, throughout his term in office, Yushchenko firmly supported the idea
of a unified Ukrainian church with its historic center in Kyiv was mentioned in all his
public addresses and official protocols. This stance of a new President added to the
existing conflict with the Russian establishment, but Yushchenko was adamant that this
issue could never be a matter of any debate, especially between the two officially secular
countries.
Since Yanukovych took power in 2010, there started an extensive implementation
of the Russian strategic interests through a charade of its proxies. Yanukovych’s regime
is manipulating the church question in a similar fashion to Kuchma, officially
recognizing and supporting only the Russian affiliate, the Moscow patriarchate. This
tendency becomes even more persistent now, after the Russian government’s official
policy of sponsoring the ‘Russian world’ – strategically constructed new regional
expansion covered by the interests of the church and promoted by the Russian patriarch
Cyril during his multiple official visits to Ukraine.
Ukrainian nationalists in general, and the Svoboda party in particular support the
idea of an independent or autocephalous Ukrainian church with its center in Kyiv, which
will unite all the Ukrainian Orthodox churches of Kyivan tradition. Section 29 of the fifth
article of Svoboda’s Program (2011) is specifically dedicated to this cause, as the creation
of a totally recognized worldwide, or canonical, in the words of the world Orthodoxy,
church will strengthen the cultural and political independence of Ukraine.
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Language issue
Another greatly politicized issue in the Ukrainian everyday life is language. The
best illustration of anti-Ukrainian linguistic policies were the two tsarist prohibitions
which “proscribed that language from schools in 1804 and, in 1863 and 1876, prohibited
publishing in it” (Velychenko 1997, 420), known as Ems and Valuev Ukaz “during
Russian tsarist rule in the mid to late nineteenth century…overtly banning any
publications or public uses of Ukrainian.” (Bilaniuk 2003, 51) With an exception of a
brief official status for the Ukrainian language during the short-lived independence in
1918-21, as well as the policies of Ukrainianization of the early 1920s, in the later
periods “soviet linguistic policies were usually more covert, carried out under the banner
of internationalism, they generally continued to suppress the Ukrainian language (and
other non-Russian languages) in favor of Russian.” (Bilaniuk 2003, 51)
“Under the Soviet regime”, writes Bilaniuk (2003, 51), “Russian was imposed
forcefully and also attracted people by the privileges associated with it [while] Ukrainian
was publicly held in low regard.” Under the Soviet system, Russification became an
official policy in the 1930s, and resulted in a tremendous change towards decline of the
use of Ukrainian: “from 1959 to 1989 the number of Ukrainians speaking Russian as their
mother tongue rose from 2 million to 4.6 million, while the proportion of the republic’s
population citing Ukrainian as their mother tongue fell from 73 per cent to under 65 per
cent.” (Wilson 1997, 22)
In 1989, Ukrainian became the official language of the country as “one of the first
legal steps towards de-Sovietization and independence of the country in 1991.” (Bilaniuk
2003, 50). Although official support for Ukrainian occurred during the Kravchuk
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government, this was reversed by the pro-Russian Kuchma regime. Most Ukrainians
consider Ukrainian as their native language. According to the latest census of 2001 (
Ukrainian Census 2001) “the part of those whose mother tongue is Ukrainian totals
67.5% of the population of Ukraine, this is by 2.8 percentage points more than in 1989.”
In reality, the situation is rather different with a disproportional prevalence of the Russian
language in southeastern Ukraine, and ineffectiveness of the language laws. There are
nationwide irregularities in the language distribution in the media, schooling,
entertainment, business and local government official use. Wilson (1997, 153) suggests
that “as Ukrainian is the only true indigenous language…for nationalists Ukrainianization
is more accurately described as ‘de-Russification’, that is the reversion to a more natural
status quo ante.” Language is a critical question in every presidential or parliamentary
election, where pro-Russian political parties and blocs oftentimes use the issue for
attracting voters in the oblasts along the Russian border. The issue of the Russian
language was central to the presidential campaigns of Kuchma and Yanukovych, and, to
date, Yushchenko is the only President who advocated the protection by the state for the
Ukrainian language. As noted by Bilaniuk (2003, 51 & 61),
Russian is still a politically powerful presence, a lingua franca of the post-Soviet regions, and
its cultural prestige remains strong - a situation that the Russian government is trying to
maintain [and] although Russian is not the official language of the state of Ukraine, it is still
used by many officials, and it is the official language of Ukraine's large and powerful
neighbor to the north.

The Orange Revolution as a symbol of national consciousness led many people
from the Russified southeastern parts of the country to switch to Ukrainian in their
everyday use, similar to the post-independence developments in 1991. Maidan became a
symbol of national unity, and the Ukrainian language was one of its elements, with
almost all the speeches made in the country’s official language.
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Yanukovych’s government is promoting the opposite agenda. Most of his
government’s officials come from the predominantly Russian-speaking far-eastern
industrial Donbas region and typically ignore the constitutional norm of the mandatory
knowledge of Ukrainian, as the single state language. As noted by Menon and Motyl
(2011, 139), “Yanukovych reversed Yushchenko's pro-Ukrainian cultural initiatives by
appointing the notoriously anti-Ukrainian official Dmytro Tabachnyk as minister of
education and science and permitting him to roll back a variety of state-funded programs
aimed at fostering Ukrainian language and culture,” which legitimately united people
around Svoboda’s nationalist agenda, as it “provoked outrage within significant segments
of the Ukrainian public, especially the pro-democratic, Ukrainian-speaking electorate
based largely in central and western Ukraine.”
Another language issue, debated in Ukraine since the 1994 ascension of Kuchma
is the interpretation of the European Charter. Its emphasis on the protection of minority
regional languages has been reversed by some in Ukraine to refer to the regional
languages of minorities. Such an assessment specifically prioritizes the Russian language,
which is both far from being endangered, and prevails in the Ukrainian regions
neighboring Russia. This Kuchma-government approach was widely critiqued by the
Orange governments, which rejected the pro-Russian interpretation.
However, with the victory of Yanukovych in 2010, the issue was revisited. Party
of Regions emphasizes protection of the Russian language, and as in previous electoral
campaigns, “incitement of regional and inter-ethnic tensions was a major strategy
adopted by the Yanukovych shadow campaign and Russian political technologists…it
drew on the success of Kuchma’s 1994 election campaign.” (Kuzio 2010 b, 384)
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The question of the language has always been among the main ones on the agenda
of all the historic and contemporary nationalist parties and movements in Ukraine, as
losing the language is often compared to losing the national statehood.

Regional Divide
There is a historic territorial division of Ukraine, as for many centuries the
western and eastern regions of the country were ruled by the neighboring powers – the
former by Poland, Austro-Hungary, Romania and Hungary, while the latter by Russian
and then Soviet Empires. This post-colonial legacy not only influenced the differences in
some cultural elements, but also produced an electoral predicament for the contemporary
Ukraine, where politicians sometimes go as far as to threaten the territorial integrity of
the country. While they draw heavy support from only one of its two opposing parts,
primarily the south-eastern Ukraine, those politicians lament the possible breakup of the
country due to extreme political and supposedly cultural differences.
Roman Szporluk (1997, 87-88), the Ukrainian American historian provides a
perfect overview of the Ukrainian regions and their historic evolution starting his analysis
by introducing that “before 1648, virtually all Ukrainians lived within the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth, whose eastern frontier extended to the east of the Dnieper
River,” proceeding with the details of each region: “southern Ukraine, including the
Crimea, conquered by the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century from the
Ottoman Turks,” “the region of Transcarpathia… uninterruptedly a part of Hungary from
the Middle Ages until 1919,” “the Chernivtsi region – the northern part of the former
Austrian province of Bukovina – was Romanian from 1918 to 1940,” while also
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analyzing the past of Halychyna, from the times of Polish domination through AustroHungarian rule, brief independence as WUNR, and then Soviet times.
Having this history in mind, and knowing similar unification processes in the
history of Germany and Italy in the late 19th century, many authors agree that the center
of national and state-building unification for Ukraine was Halychyna, while Magocsi
even called his book The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont
(2002), comparing Ukraine’s Halychyna (using its Western name variant) with Italy’s
leading nationalist unification region of Piedmont. The author also suggests that one of
the reasons for this is the fact that “Habsburg rule […] was from the standpoint of
Ukrainian nationalism quite positive.” (Magocsi 2002, 57) Ukrainian National
Committee of the United States (1919, 40) also refers to Halychyna as “‘intellectual
Piedmont’ for the Ukrainian movement,” while Zales’ka Onyshkevych and Revakovych
(2009, 225) agree that “many view Galicia as the center of the Ukrainian national
revival, both past and present.”
In the same time, the issue of regionalism of Ukraine is really politicized, both
culturally and electorally, which are two intertwined and interdependent aspects of the
division. Also, it is important to mention that despite the fact that many regions of
Ukraine were occupied by different former colonial powers, the real duality since the
beginning of the 20th century and the period of the first independence of 1918-21 was and
still is between the “Ukrainian differentiation from Russia and Poland respectively
[which] did not necessarily guarantee the unity of those Ukrainians who refused to be
Russian with those Ukrainians who refused to be Polish.” (Szporluk 1997, 109) Even
though it is a simplified perception and mostly relevant to the early statehood attempts,
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conceptually the differences are still on the West and Center versus South-East line.
Heavy industrialized regions, artificially vacated from Ukrainians by the genocidal
Holodomor in South-eastern Ukraine were settled with Russians, which provoked that
duality between them and the rest of Ukraine, which is more Western-oriented and
Ukrainian–speaking. Kubicek (2000, 273) provided a detailed overview to the regional
distinction of Ukraine, calling it a state,
In which regional and ethnic divisions and the uncertain loyalties of a substantial body of citizens have
been the source of numerous troubles and worries since independence was achieved in
1991…Generally, analysts draw a line along the Dniepr river, dividing the country into a Russified and
heavily industrialised East, and a more ethnically Ukrainian, Western-oriented West. The former
harbours conservative communists who are ardently against market reforms and desire closer links
with Moscow. The latter is the home to Ukrainian nationalists and assorted national-democrats who
seek more rapid political and economic reforms and integration of their country with the West.

Diaspora and Nationalism
Discussing the question of Ukrainian émigré communities, Magocsi (2010, 457)
differentiates ‘Ukrainian diaspora’ – “which almost always refers to communities of
ethnic Ukrainians and their descendants living in various places outside Ukraine” – and
‘Ukraine’s Other Diasporas’, “since Ukraine was – and is – home to many different
peoples.” Similarly, in this thesis I refer to the ethnic ‘Ukrainian diaspora,’ not at the
least because other ethnic communities stemming historically from the territory of
Ukraine do not regard themselves as such, preferring their own ethnic markers, as the
Poles, Jews or Romanians etc.
The phenomenon of Ukrainian nationalism is almost impossible to imagine
without an important role of its numerous diaspora. Similarly to other émigré groups,
there are multiple discourses within and about the diaspora regarding the use and
applicability of the term as such, as well as differentiation of the diasporic communities
based on the wave of arrival to a host country and its geographic location. Important to
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my debate in this thesis is also the role played by nationalism as the main ideology of the
diaspora in the struggle of the Ukrainian nation for its independence, and, more recently,
in the fight to preserve Ukraine’s political and cultural sovereignty from the geopolitical
and interventionist economic influences of its northern neighbor – the Russian
Federation.
While most historians agree that the first wave of Ukrainian immigrants was the
least politically active, the next waves came to play more important roles in the
community’s political life, expressing their various ideological preferences. With smaller
socialist and monarchist groups, nationalists were the most numerous, and benefited in
membership with each new wave, especially the ideologically strongest third immigration
stage of DP immigrants. From that perspective, the members of the interwar and post-war
(pre-1991) diaspora were also the strongest actors on the Ukrainian nationalist arena, and
a substantial part of the émigré Ukrainians belonged to the OUN, as well as UPA, which
fought both the Nazi Germany and Soviet Union. This event became possible after
“Ukrainians in Europe came to realize that their political effectiveness was diminished by
the divisions that had formed earlier in the decade...[and together with] the subsequent
split within it had a profound effect on the Ukrainian diaspora .” (Satzewich 2002, 64)
Similarly to the situation in the western Ukraine from where most of the immigrants
historically migrated or the circumstances of the interwar diasporic community (with its
fragmentation between the monarchists-hetmanists and supporters of the republic), the
division into Banderites and Melnykites – two nationalist factions – was clearly present
and influenced the everyday life of the diaspora, as “the differences between the…wings
of the OUN, along with other nationalist-oriented groups, split many Ukrainian diaspora
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communities .” (Satzewich 2002, 115) In the same time, Luciuk in his article is referring
to the Ukrainian DP camps as “Little Ukraines” or “Ukrainian villages”:
Since most Ukrainian refugees were to spend two or more years in these centers many eventually
came to share the worldview of the militants among them. They came to believe that only through
militant struggle would they return to a Ukraine freed from the powers which occupied this nation.
They would, in the meantime, place all their resources at the disposal of the nationalist movement, no
matter where they resettled (Luciuk 1986, 474).

As a consequence, nationalism has become a common ideology for the prevalent
part of the Ukrainian diaspora, being the only acceptable instrument in their struggle
against the formally leftist Soviet system, stemming back from the first part of the
twentieth century and being the integral part of the diasporic community until the
proclamation or rather rebirth of the Ukrainian independent state in 1991. It is still
playing its role when the recent developments in already independent Ukraine go the
unexpected way, in an openly pro-Russian pattern, which is immediately implemented in
the form of protests and boycotts.

4.4. Ukrainian Economy and Globalization
Economic Overview
One of the major problems facing Ukraine in 2012 is overwhelming
unemployment, a result of the bankruptcies or closures of the former heavy machinery
enterprises, which were primarily involved in the cold-war military industry, and poorly
managed agriculture that has hardly recovered from the transition from collective to
private farming. As a result, many Ukrainians are emigrating in search of better
employment opportunities, forming a new, primarily economy-driven, diasporic wave.
One of the possible positive developments in the country’s economy depend on
investment, but corruption and lack of effective liberalism, and overwhelming crony
protectionism make the country an economy with an unstable financial climate.
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In terms of major economic characteristics, we can see from Figures 3 and 4 that
Ukraine’s economy is recovering from the worldwide crisis. According to the Trading
Economics (2013), the GDP “in Ukraine contracted 2.50 percent in the fourth quarter of
2012 over the same quarter of the previous year,” while “historically, from 2000 until
2012, Ukraine’s GDP annual growth rate averaged 4.43 percent reaching an all-time high
of 14.30 percent in September of 2004 and a record low of -19.60 percent in March of
2009,” with the Economist (as in Figure 3) putting these figures at 12.1 for 2004 and 14.8 in 2009, following the global crisis. At the same time, according to Figure 3, the
2002 GDP Growth is the lowest in the three recent years while these negative markers are
very similar to the same developments elsewhere in Europe or the rest of the world.
Figure 3. Overview of the Ukrainian Economy (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012).
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Figure 4. Ukrainian GDP Annual Growth Rate (Trading Economics, 2013 – from the
State Statistics Committee of Ukraine).

Important in the analysis of economic independence is also an overview of the
main trading partners. For Ukraine in 2011, according the influential report “Ukraine: EU
Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World” (European Commission, 2012) the main
trading partners were on one side Russia with an average summary of exports and
imports at about 32.4%, and the European Union partners (based on percentage from all
27 member states) with about 29.1% and China with 5.6% on the other side. This means
that Ukrainian economy successfully diversifies its markets, but Russia still remains a
major economic partner, with energy supplies accounting for the major stake of the
overall Ukraine’s imports.
At the same time, another criterion important to the future consideration of
Ukraine’s readiness for the EU application and further economic independence from the
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northern neighbor, Russian Federation, is public debt as a percentage to the national
GDP, and in 2011, “Ukraine recorded a government debt to GDP of 36.50 percent of the
country's Gross Domestic Product,” whereas “historically, from 1997 until 2011,
Ukraine’s government debt to GDP averaged 32.40 percent, reaching an all-time high of
61 Percent in December of 1999 and a record low of 12.30 percent in December of
2007.” (Trading Economics, 2013) These figures mean that Ukraine’s public debt is quite
acceptable with the EU requirement of >60 percent. Current inflation rate seems also
applicable to the above-mentioned Maastricht criteria, and according to the State
Statistics Committee of Ukraine, it “was recorded at -0.80 percent in March of 2013” and
in the same time “historically, from 1995 until 2013, Ukraine’s inflation rate averaged
38.99 percent, reaching an all-time high of 530.30 percent in September of 1995 and a
record low of -1.20 percent in June of 2012.” (ibid)
One other important component of economic analysis of any potential EU
candidate is

≤ 3% of the budget deficit, based on which Ukraine needs to improve the

current “government budget deficit equal to 1.80 percent of the country's Gross Domestic
Product in 2012.” (Trading Economics, 2013) According to the same source (ibid),
“historically, from 1997 until 2011, Ukraine government budget averaged -2.33 percent
of GDP, reaching an all-time high of 5.10 percent of GDP in December of 1999 and a
record low of -6 percent of GDP in December of 2010.”
In post-socialist transition economies, a central issue is privatization of the
formerly vast public sector, which in many instances was not properly controlled and
sometimes lacked an appropriate legal framework. Ordinary citizens often claim no real
benefits except for almost worthless share certificates, while “wide-ranging privatization
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also enabled government insiders and cronies to buy state enterprises at bargain-basement
prices…steel mills, today worth several billion dollars, were bought for a few million.”
(Karatnycky 2005, 39) It is also sometimes referred to as “nomenklatura privatization”,
under which members of the old Soviet-era elite used their positions to obtain ownership
in economic enterprises.” (Kubicek 2009, 331)
Ukraine’s tax system has been widely used as another element of corrupt
persecution, “as the government manipulated it to gain financial and political advantages:
competitors could be harassed or forced out of business by inspections and fines, and
oligarchs could easily evade paying taxes.” (Kubicek 2009, 339) Oligarchy16 is a very
widespread phenomenon in Ukrainian everyday life, which basically controls its politics,
economy and mass media, and, according to Petrunya (2008, quoted in Shekhovtsov
2011, 220), “the [Svoboda] party leaders consider their radical right-wing project a
political alternative to ‘the crisis of parliamentarianism and seizure of power by the
oligarchic clans, who deprived the people of any possibility to influence the processes in
the country.”
A rather disturbing illustration can be found in the book and print media market,
where the major role is played by the Russian publishing houses that have lower taxes
and better opportunities for the authors and editorial boards, while in the same time
Ukrainian domestic laws remain fiscally austere, which is explained by the close ties
between the publishers in Russia and their business lobbyists in the Ukrainian parliament
who support the neighbor’s market with proper legislation, in the same time bringing the
local book market to a decay.

16

A Greek borrowing which, according to the Dicitonary.com, means: “a form of government in which all
power is vested in a few persons or in a dominant class or clique; government by the few.”
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The issue of solution of all those multiple economic problems was on the to-do
list of the most urgent plans of the protesters at Maidan in 2004-5. They hoped that under
an effective and transparent management of a new government these goals could be
easily achieved, and they were assured accordingly by Yushchenko and Tymoshenko.
What kept protesters’ expectations high were Yushchenko’s specialization in finances
and his effective and positively regarded terms in office as National Bank chief and
Prime Minister, when he managed to eradicate the post-Soviet tendency of severe salary
distribution delays in the public sector. His team was also eloquent in making abundant
promises during their addresses from multiple revolutionary tribunes, boasting many
famous reformers from the previous governments, and those who yet never had a chance
to demonstrate their economic skills. As the only possible way to implement the desire of
people of Maidan, “Yushchenko needed to crack down on Ukraine's crony capitalism.”
(Karatnycky 2005, 41)
Unfortunately once in office, no serious reforms were introduced, and
Yushchenko’s once highly regarded team of professionals became known for their own
new type of cronyism, employing and supporting their close allies, and paying less
attention to urgent economic problems. This then was coupled with severe in-fighting
between the former allies, primarily Yushchenko’s and Tymoshenko’s parliamentary and
executive factions, which was followed by the latter’s disastrous gas negotiations with
Russia, which were partially classified. Mutual disagreements and accusations ended in
government reshuffles and revival of Yanukovych, firstly as Prime minister following the
memorandum, and then as the new President in 2010.
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Russian Gas and Ukraine’s Dependence
One of the major problems of the post-independence Ukrainian development is
definitely the issue of sustainability, especially in the context of natural resources. But
instead of exploration of nationally owned gas fields, Ukraine’s governments overconcentrated on negotiating the gas deals with the Russian federation, which have usually
ended up in strategic losses for the Ukrainian government.
Russia continuously uses the issue of gas supplies in promoting its expansive
policies bargaining the implementation of favorable projects, while Ukraine has so far
failed to respond respectfully by protecting their own national interests. That is why this
question was also urgently stressed at the times of the Orange Revolution, whereas
Maidan favorites assured the supporters that new Ukrainian governments will work much
harder in protecting Ukraine’s own national priorities, specifically in renegotiating the
deal on the rent of the port of Sevastopol by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, making it
dependent on possible raises in gas prices.
After he was sworn into the office in 2005, Russian authorities continued to play
the gas card with Yushchenko’s government, but the Orange ministers decided to revisit
the gas agreements. The northern neighbor responded by cutting gas supplies to all of
Europe, which made other European states think of Ukraine as an unstable economic
player as most of the pipelines are currently laid through Ukrainian territory. By this
maneuver of blackmailing Ukraine, the Russian government at the same time started two
different debates – one on necessity of the takeover of the Ukrainian pipeline system by
the international community with their supervision, and another – on possible alternative
pipeline projects outside Ukraine.
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With Yanukovych’s takeover, the question was debated again, but was solved at
the expense of Ukraine, seen as one of the greatest losses since Ukrainian independence.
The former President Yushchenko suggested that it “would lead to the ‘Russification’ of
Ukraine,” while another opposition leader, Yuliya Tymoshenko “said the agreement
violated part of the Ukrainian constitution, which forbids the country from hosting
foreign military bases after 2017.” (Jeffries 2011, 213) The 2010 Kharkiv agreement
consisted of supposed gas price discounts in exchange of an extension of the lease for the
Russian Black Sea fleet for another twenty years. When this agreement was made public,
it was a great shock for the Ukrainian community both in Ukraine and abroad, and was
considered by many as a severe blow to the country’s sovereignty, comparable to the
rejection of the third largest nuclear potential in the beginning of the nineties. According
to Menon and Motyl (2011, 138), “even Ukrainian government officials admit in private
that it was a bad deal: Ukraine still pays exceptionally high gas prices and failed to
negotiate an adequate rent for the base, whereas Russia has succeeded in ensconcing
itself for the long term in the intensely pro-Russian Crimean Peninsula.” At the same
time, the fiercest opposition to the Kharkiv agreement was expressed by the Svoboda
party, which not only staged mass protests across the nation, but also dedicated a special
point in the part 8 of its Program (2011) – “The Crimea and Sevastopol. Introduction of
the constitutional order and maintenance of the stable development” – demanding “to
denounce the Kharkiv agreement of Yanukovych-Medvedev of 21 April 2010.”

4.5. Conclusion
Having finally gained its political independence in 1991, nonetheless Ukraine
remains vulnerable to Russia’s economic expansion due to heavy dependence on energy
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imports. Through a string of pro-Russian governments, Ukraine failed to distance itself
from numerous cultural and political influences from its northern neighbor and former
metropolis, without implementation of legislation to protect the Ukrainian language,
further develop local book printing business and cinematography. Additionally, Russian
Orthodox church still heavily influences Ukraine’s spiritual life and church politics
through its formally autonomous branch – Moscow patriarchy. Nationalism in Ukraine,
both historic and contemporary remains ethnic in nature and concentrates on the political
right. Ukrainian diaspora, consolidated primarily by its second and third waves, political
in nature, plays an important role in preserving cultural and linguistic identity of Ukraine
abroad, as well as actively supporting democratic processes in the homeland and its EuroAtlantic integration. In order to have a political or legal mechanism to influence
Ukraine’s election or politics, a member of diaspora has to be a citizen of Ukraine. In
terms of Ukrainian economy, it is still transitioning towards fully market processes, being
severely hit by post-Soviet oligarchy and overwhelming corruption that prevent normal
and steady development. The main economic parameters are far from the required
Maastricht criteria with much higher inflation, public debt and only nominal GDP
growth.

CHAPTER FIVE: COMPARISON
5.1. Differences
Of utmost importance is the actual political status of both nations. Having
established that both countries can be considered nations for their culture and religion, it
is also a well-established fact that from the point of view of international diplomatic
relations and their respective status in the United Nations and other international
organizations, Ukraine is politically independent while Scotland is a part of the United
Kingdom with a devolved status due to the unwritten character of the UK Constitution.
Prior to 1980s, Scottish nationalism was stuck in the left-or-right debate with an
eventual predominance of the leftist agenda in the Scottish National Party, especially due
to the leadership of Alex Salmond. There has been little or no such debate in the
Ukrainian nationalist flank, as any leftist ideology was tainted by association with the
USSR and considered deeply anti-Ukrainian. Even though there were a few leftist
political parties in the 1918-1920s, they were far from advocating a nationalist agenda
and mainly relied on their potential federalist ties with the expected democratic Russia.
In a similar fashion, another dichotomy in the nationalist discourse – between
ethnic and civic nationalism – is also a point of dissimilarity between Ukraine and
Scotland: “Tsarist Russian relations with Cossack-Ukraine and English relations with
Scotland provide two valuable examples illustrating the importance of law and civil
institutions in determining whether regional patriotism would evolve into a separatist
"ethnic" nationalism or a "civic nationalism" compatible with an imperial loyalism.”
(Velychenko 1997, 415) And this difference is both historic and contemporary, where
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Scottish ethnic nationalism is as much non-existent as its Ukrainian civic nationalist
counterpart, neither in a form of ideological support, nor as an organized party.
Another dissimilarity lies in the field of language use, as disregarding a somewhat
similar duality between English and Gaelic in Scotland versus Ukrainian and Russian, the
background and historic developments are quite incomparable. With a mutual presence of
the factor of geographic opposition in both countries, it was the oppression in the form of
two prohibitions of the Ukrainian language that primarily caused the eradication of
Ukrainian in some (primarily urban) areas of the south-eastern Ukraine, while Gaelic was
geographically bound, and only later was it the lack of government’s support that caused
its near extinction, not least because of the 18th century government oppression – even in
the area of historic prevalence of the Scottish Gaelic language – in the Highlands and
Western Islands. Also, contrary to Magocsi’s (2002, 83) claim for the importance of
language for stateless peoples, the revival of Scottish national aspiration was mainly
concentrated on the issue of political autonomy through self-government, while for
Ukrainian nationalism language played a major part in the fight against oppression, as
“national revivals in East-Central Europe were led by […] linguists.” (Magosci 2002, 84)
At first sight, religious distribution also seems very much alike, but at closer look
there are multiple peculiarities absent in the opposite case study. Firstly, traditionally
Scottish Church of Scotland or the Kirk was granted autonomy by the 1707 Treaty of
Union and was considered as one of the greatest pillars of the national autonomy of
Scots, especially due to an importance that religion played at that time. At the same time,
in Soviet Ukraine (as well as in Ukrainian territories under Muscovy before) the official
ban on traditional Autocephalous Orthodox and eastern-rite Greek Catholic churches
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outlawed any kind of religious activity unless it was operated under the jurisdiction of
KGB-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (Bourdeaux and Shenk, 1996). Secondly,
despite some similarities between the efforts of Kremlin and Westminster to break down
the churches’ unity, even after the Disruption of 1843, Scotland managed to preserve its
Kirk – as a symbol of its religious freedom. Finally, the opposition of the Kirk (or rather
Presbyterian church) on one hand and the Catholics on the other, is primarily based on
the ethnically motivated dichotomy of Catholic Irish settlers against the autochthonous
Scottish Calvinists, while the geographical division (unlike the Ukrainian Orthodox in the
east versus Eastern or Greek Catholic in the west) has only played a marginal role earlier
in the 20th century and is no longer a major factor in Scotland’s contemporary religious
affairs.
Among the distinctions between Scottish and Ukrainian colonial history, it is
worth mentioning that Ukraine (specifically, its contemporary Western part), unlike
Scotland, was subordinated to more than one foreign power. Among them were Poland,
Czechoslovakia (later - Hungary) and Romania, with all of them being unwilling to
recognize any type of autonomy for the Ukrainians – neither cultural, nor political,
similarly to the developments in the Soviet-controlled east of the Ukrainian territory.
Spencer and Wollman (2002, 143) who, noting the Polish colonial administration over
Ukraine’s Halychyna: “After the First World War, many of the newly-recognized nationstates of Eastern Europe proved intolerant of nationalist movements in their own areas,
Polish treatment of Ukrainians being a case in point.” Seeing a successful example of
self-determination elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe, Ukrainian nationalists were
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unwilling to give up, and according to Wilson (1997, 15), “persecution only contributed
to the rise of radical Ukrainian nationalism.”
As another point of difference between Ukrainian and Scottish nationalisms is the
degree of cultural sovereignty within Russian and British empires accordingly, “whereas
Scottish subordination to England and its commitment to empire did not imply
subservience nor the destruction of Scottish identity, the Ukrainian subordination to
empire almost did erase Ukrainian identity.” (Velychenko 1997, 438)
The role of diaspora is another example of disconnection between the two
nationalisms. There are at least two apparent asymmetries here, where one lies in the
degree of assimilation (more typical of the Scottish émigré community), and the other is
based on the formal opportunities to participate in the homeland’s political life due to the
appropriate legal framework, primarily because there are considerably more current
Ukrainian citizens living in contemporary diasporic communities, than their Scottish
counterparts in their respective groups, which limits the access to electoral process of the
latter community.
Economy is yet one more example of dissimilarity between the two case studies,
even though equally addressed in both major parties’ manifestoes. Scotland’s economy if
counted separately from the rest of the UK could fit the requirements of any European
institution, whereas Ukrainian economy struggles a lot to pursue some economic growth
amongst omnipresent corruption, controlled privatization and rule of oligarchy.

5.2. Similarities
There are many similarities between the circumstances in which developed both
Ukrainian nationalism on one hand, and Scottish one on the other, as it is somewhat
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proven by Benedict Anderson (1996, 2), who said that “the fact that the Soviet Union
shares with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland the rare distinction
of refusing nationality in its naming suggests that it is as much the legatee of the
prenational dynastic states of the nineteenth century.” And in both instances the central
governments were working on creating one nation, whether it is Britons or Soviet people,
through the common practices of assimilating Scots and Ukrainians accordingly. This is
one of the most debated topics in Scottish historiography, which cannot omit nationalist
discourse, as well as in the Ukrainian one.
Similarly to the Scottish case, it was important for Ukraine during its complicated
Soviet history to secure, in Calhoun’s (1997, 63) terms “a modicum of independence
from the Russian-dominated Soviet Union.” USSR continued with a tradition of Russian
Empire in specific abusing the national peculiarities of many ethnic groups, whose
territories they conquered, with a distinct desire to Russify them before the revolution of
1917, or later to build one Soviet nation, which was a disguise for even further neglect of
their rights. In this regard, Craig Calhoun (1997, 25) had skillfully underlined the formal
propaganda rhetoric that “the Soviet Union had long claimed to represent a special kind
of internationalism and to have brought an end to nationalism and historic conflict of
nations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.” While discussing another issue – of
political maps – Calhoun (1997, 16) fairly suggested that “most symbolically, Soviet
Union was in a sense an ‘anti-national state’…[as there was not enough information on]
the status of the separate republics that made it up.”
Scotland and Ukraine share also many common features in terms of components
of nationalist agenda, which may have influenced their respective development of

116

nationalism in the discussed historic time periods. Undoubtedly, the most important
commonality until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was the stateless political
status for both polities, where Scotland (within the UK) and Ukraine (within the USSR)
were considered distinct nations, but without a clear mechanism of leaving a political
union. Moreover, in both situations the union as such was deemed to be a priori
supported by the countries’ populations, even though implemented only by a small group
of people: in 1707 Scotland – by allegedly corrupt members of the Scottish parliament
that preserved basic elements of Scottish autonomy with their eventual, while the events
in Ukraine in 1654 – the treaty of Pereyaslav by which “the Hetmanate became a
protectorate of the Muscovite tsar, a ruler whose powers were tempered by custom rather
than delineated by laws and whose prerogatives, unlike those of European monarchs”
(Velychenko 1997, 420), signed by Hetman Khmelnytsky and his council, were
misinterpreted by Muscovy’s tsars as a union, by assuming more and more power over
Ukrainian territory with every new treaty. Similarly, the 1922 creation of USSR was a
narrow communist party decision later confirmed by a treaty issued by the same
communist leaders. Taking into consideration the reality of the 17th and 18th centuries,
and even the 1920s with the limited electoral powers of citizens, the demands for a fairer
union and independence became popular with a further expansion of voting suffrage. The
major starting point for the rise of nationalist agitation in both countries were the
successful independent movements in a number of European states following the
dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and partially Russian Empires, as well as,
for the Scottish nationalism, proclamation of Irish independence, which all occurred
between 1918 and 1920. Unlike their more successful neighboring states, both Ukraine
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and Scotland have lost their historic chances to either preserve independence (as in the
case of Ukraine after the WWII) or even create a viable independence movement as in
the Scottish example in the first part of the 20th century. Consequently, in a very similar
fashion to the Scottish nationalist sentiment to the pre-Union past, “with the end of the
communist regimes in the USSR and many Eastern European countries, it has become
common to appeal to the pre-communist era as a time of imagined national unity and
normality.” (Calhoun 1997, 52) Velychenko (1997, 438) also noticed that “the fates of
Scotland and Ukraine in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries illustrate the importance
of laws and civil institutions in shaping the national identity of stateless minorities.”
In the 19th century, both the revival of the nationalist struggle for cultural
autonomy in Ukraine and national self-government in Scotland emerged. Magosci (2002,
67-72) identifies the “‘Ukrainian rebirth’ in 1848, a year known as the ‘Spring of
Nations’”, while Hanham (1969, 91-2) refers to the year of 1886 – the foundation of the
Scottish Home Rule Association, stating that “support for Scottish Home Rule within the
United Kingdom was confined to a tiny minority before 1886.” Additional similarity that
prevented both nationalisms from full development and reaching its possible goals was
involvement of both elites in the imperial state-building known as processes of
Anglicization for the Scottish society, and Russification (as well as Polonization) – for
Ukrainian communities within their metropolises. Velychenko (1997, 432) sees the
reason of such developments in the fact that “Ukrainians and Scots had rights and
privileges as members of supranational imperial elites and saw nothing "unpatriotic" in
seeking assimilation into this elite.”
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Another similarity in both countries’ histories is the official policies of
Westminster and the Kremlin respectively to Anglicize Scotland and Russify Ukraine
linguistically. Multiple authors provide examples of both processes as a set of
instruments directed for a further administrative and cultural assimilation, even though
the process in Soviet Ukraine was much more violent and involved millions of lives.
Respectively, both nations at different stages of their history, in the twentieth and
throughout the twenty-first centuries have been making steps to divert these processes.
The successful implementation of the 2005 Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act
(Legislation.gov.uk 2005) and other legislation can be compared with the 1918 Hetman
Skoropads’kyi’s policies who “sought to Ukrainianize education, establishing 150 new
Ukrainian gymnasia and a Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and organizing the printing
of more than a million new Ukrainian-language textbooks,” (Wilson 1997, 13) as well as
the 1989 Language Act providing for the status of Ukrainian as the sole state language,
essentially dismissing the imperial myth of the “long-established diglossic relationship
between Ukrainian as a "low, peasant" language, and Russian as the "high, cultured"
language.” (Bilaniuk 2003, 50)
Formal autonomy granted to both polities by law was never strictly followed –
both within the formally federal Soviet system, and according to the 1707 Treaty clauses
delegated to Scotland. The unique status for Scottish legal system and education was
often challenged and overridden with all-British laws, the role of local government was
regularly reviewed. In Ukraine, all the constitutional vestiges of autonomy were only
guaranteed on paper and, if questioned, punished by murders or concentration camps.
Neither Scotland since 1707, nor Ukraine before 1991, disregarding the quasi-
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autonomous rights, had a guaranteed written clause for independence if chosen by people.
It only became possible for Ukraine to technically proclaim and contain its independence
due to the overall decline of the Soviet system and similar processes in all member
republics, while there are similar legality concerns regarding the possible independent
status in Scotland in the event of a successful 2014 independence referendum.
Additonally, the current rise in popularity of the nationalist parties in both countries
become another shared commonality, with the SNP forming its own majority government
and Svoboda forming its first faction in VRU.
To strengthen the ties within the union, both Kremlin and Westminster often
overemphasized the common victory in the World War II as a sign of symbolic unity,
while at the same time many Ukrainians and Scots disagreed with the role of their
country in the war without an ability to make decisions as an independent state. In
Ukraine, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (or OUN) – politically, and
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (in Ukrainian UPA) – militarily, fought against both the Nazis
and Soviets, while in Scotland the Scottish Nationalist Party under the leadership of
Douglas Young insisted on impossibility of conscription of Scots under the current
political status, as it was against the 1707 Treaty of Union. Another commonality in that
involvement in the WWII is that, to a great disappointment of the Ukrainian and Scottish
nationalists, the majority of both countries’ military age men fought in the unionist
armies of the UK and USSR, despite the fact of the stateless status. In the case of
Ukraine, the Red Army had multiple similarities to the German Wermacht, coming to
occupy, not to liberate. With the overall similarity, the UK did allow the Scots form
solely Scottish regiments essentially to boost support for the draft from local population.
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Nationalist ideas survived despite the historic divisions into different factions
within both nationalist movements – the split of the OUN in 1940 and a split in the SNP
in 1942 led by John MacCormick who favored devolutionist approach over party’s
independence stance.
Figure 5: Differences and Similarities of Scottish and Ukrainian
Nationalist Developments
Differences
SCOTLAND
Devolved status within the United
Kingdom – no formal independence
Prevelance of the civic and leftist
nationalist ideology
Religious autonomy and other cultural
vestiges somewhat respected as proscribed
by the 1707 Treaty
Prevalance of English, with almost nonexisitent Gaelic-speaking and minimal Scotsspeaking communities
Unsuccessful referendum of 1979
England as the only metropole state with
its superiority in the UK
Another rise of pro-independence
movement with the SNP at power
Developed European economy meeting
the Maastricht criteria for potential entry into the
Eurozone and presence of North Sea oil

UKRAINE
Officially independent since 1991, and
previously – in 1918-1921
Prelavance of the ethnic nationalist ideology
on the right of the political spectrum
Religious autonomy totally abolished
(until late 80s), oppression for desire to
express cultural differences
Distinct political issue of language
differences between the West and Central Ukriane
and South-eastern parts by the Ukrainian-speaking
majority and sizeable Russian-speaking minority
Impossibility of any referendums under the
Soviet rule
Multiple historic metropoles: Russia,
Poland, Austro-Hungary etc.
Anti-Ukrainian activity of pro-Russian
Yanukovych regime
Still transitioning to the market economy
with overwhelming presence of corruption with
oligarchs in charge and dependence on Russian gas

Similarities
SCOTLAND
Historic Statehood and
Stateless Status (since 1707)
Object of constant Anglicization
(and Britanization)
Treaty of Union of 1707 – not supported by
people, never properly followed
Lost chance of self-government (1880s1914), unlike Ireland
Formal vestiges of autonomy in the form
of cultural pillars (Kirk, law and education)

UKRAINE
Historic Statehood and
Stateless Status (until 1918, 1921-91)
Object of constant Russification
(and Sovietization)
Treaty of 1654 (Protectorate)- not supported
by people, never properly followed
Lost attempt to preserve independence (191821), unlike Poland and others
Formal vestiges of autonomy (before 1991)
in the form of de-jure federal autonomy status, UN
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Use of WWII as a symbol of Unity by
the official propaganda
The rise of pro-independence (economic)
tendencies in the late 60s
Regional Divide (Highlands vs.
Lowlands)
Rise of popularity of the SNP and
independence agitation in the early 90s
Successful referendum of 1997 and
devolution
SNP’s recent rise in popularity with
some historic decades of poor electoral
performance previously

membership etc.
Use of WWII as a symbol of Unity by the
official propaganda
The rise of pro-independence (cultural) tendencies in
the late 60s and the 60-iers
Regional Divide (West vs East/South-East)
Dissolution of USSR and proclamation of
independence
Successful referendum of 1991 and
Independence
Svoboda’s recent rise in popularity with a
historic decade of poor electoral performance
previously

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis I hypothesized that Ukrainian political nationalism has been stronger
and more successful than Scottish due to the fact of political independence of Ukraine,
while also suggesting that Scotland is better off from an economic perspective as well as
more culturally independent from Westminster than Ukraine from Moscow, despite
political sovereignty. This hypothesis was fully confirmed by the body of this thesis.
These findings were facilitated by the detailed analysis of the theoretical framework of
existing literature on the subject, as well as comprehensive case study of the components
of nationalist agendas in both Ukraine and Scotland, their major nationalist political
parties as agents of the ideology, in addition to the comparison of historic and
contemporary commonalities and differences.
I base my conclusions on the following perspectives: historical, contemporary
political, economic, and cultural (including religion and diaspora). Firstly, the majority of
similarities between the nationalist agendas of both countries lie in the history of
Scotland and Ukraine, with the following important comparisons: failed attempts to
preserve statehood or even functioning autonomy, assimilation policies of Anglicization
and Russification, the unifying role of national church. All those factors emphasize the
commonality of issues that served as basis for nationalist agenda.
Secondly, from the political perspective Ukraine did manage to gain and preserve
its independence in 1991 (unlike the previous unsuccessful try of 1918-21) – the
development which was not fully addressed in Scotland until the start of such debate in
the late 1970s since the discovery of North Sea oil with the first referendum on the issue
scheduled for September 2014. While Ukrainian nationalist political parties have been
122
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supported by a smaller margin than Scotland’s SNP forming the majority Scottish
Government, Rukh of the late 1980s – early 1990s played an important role in
mobilization of the people of Ukraine in nationalist revival and a surprising for the postSoviet society 92% support for the independence in the national referendum in December
1991. Additionally, Scottish National Party’s inclusive leftist (non-Conservative) civic
nationalism attracts broader electorate than Svoboda’s right and ethnic nationalist
variation (even though constantly raising in electoral support), widely downplayed by the
pro-Russian propaganda.
Thirdly, in terms of economy both nations have different degrees of development,
where Scotland is a developed European economy, fully ready to potentially join
European economic and monetary union based on the Maastricht criteria, Ukraine’s
inflation, public debt and budget deficit are currently far from consideration for the EU
membership. Additionally, on the contrary to Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas,
Scotland, if proclaimed independent, could benefit in full from its North Sea oil reserves.
With the devolution in place since 1999, Scotland currently exercises some of its
sovereign powers, with the macroeconomic policies still reserved by Westminster.
Fourthly, from the cultural perspective Scotland managed to reserve some of the
important autonomous points in the 1707 Treaty of Union that guaranteed independence
to its Kirk – national church, education and some areas of legislation. Even if to agree
that some of those agreements might not have been fully exercised in Scotland within the
UK, Ukrainian voice in terms of cultural or religious autonomy within Russia and USSR
was totally unheard, with the current consequences. The role of the Scottish diaspora is to
some degree less efficient due to greater assimilation and relatively smaller number of
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current UK citizens in its ranks, unlike the Ukrainian émigré community with the
abundant fourth economic wave of primarily economic immigrants.
Lastly, in terms of the recent developments, both Ukrainian and Scottish
nationalist movements have reached new highs in their popularity and electoral support.
While the SNP has secured a safe majority in the 2011 Scottish Parliament election and
pursues the independence referendum with the officially announced date of September
18, 2014, Ukrainian Svoboda has successfully conducted the 2012 parliamentary
campaign and for the first time in the Ukrainian history created the nationalist faction in
the Ukrainian Parliament with 37 members.

125

REFERENCE LIST
Alter, Peter. 1989. Nationalism. English Translation. London; New York, NY: Edward
Arnold, a division of Hodder & Stoughton
Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. 1992. Long-distance nationalism: world capitalism and the
rise of identity politics. Amsterdam: Centre for Asian Studies Amsterdam.
Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. 2006. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and
spread of nationalism. Rev. ed. London, New York: Verso.
Armstrong, John Alexander. 1982. Nations before nationalism. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press.
Armstrong, John Alexander. 1990. Ukrainian nationalism. 3rd ed. Englewood, Colo.,
U.S.A.: Ukrainian Academic Press.
Aughey, Arthur. 2001. Nationalism, devolution, and the challenge to the United
Kingdom state. London ; Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press.
Bauböck, Rainer, and Thomas Faist. 2010. Diaspora and transnationalism concepts,
theories and methods. Amsterdam University Press.
Bedriy, Anatol W. 1967. Mykola Mikhnovskyi – First Theoretician of Modern
Ukrainian Nationalism. Ukrainian Review no. 14 (3):70-91.
Bezverkha, Anastasia. 2005. Ukraine's Orange Revolution: a chronicle in PORA
newsletters. Kyiv: PORA.
Bilaniuk, Laada. 2003. "Gender, language attitudes, and language status in Ukraine."
Language in Society no. 32 (1):47-78.
Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal nationalism. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.
Black, J.N. 1969. "On the importance of regions of Scotland." In Government and
nationalism in Scotland: an enquiry by members of the University of Edinburgh,
edited by J.N. Wolfe, 164-166. Edinburgh: Edinburgh U.P.
Bochel, J. M., Denver D. T., and Allan Macartney. 1981. The Referendum experience :
Scotland 1979. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
Boeck, Brian J. 2004. "What's in a Name? Semantic Separation and the Rise of the
Ukrainian National Name." Harvard Ukrainian Studies no. 27 (1/4):33-65.
Boeckh, K. 2006. "Church history of the Ukraine in the 20th century. From the turning
point of the period of the First World War to the beginning in an independent
Ukrainian state." Jahrbucher Fur Geschichte Osteuropas no. 54 (4):601-603.
Bourdeaux, Michael, and Gerald Shenk. 1996. "The Politics of Religion in Russia and
the New States of Eurasia". A Journal of Church and State. 38 (3): 642.
Borysenko, V. K. 2010. A candle in remembrance : an oral history of the Ukrainian
genocide of 1932-1933. New York: Ukrainian National Women's League of
America.
Breuilly, John. in Gellner, Ernest. 2006 [1983]. Nations and Nationalism. 2nd ed.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press
Calhoun, Craig J. 1997. Nationalism: Concepts in social thought. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
The Church of Scotland. 2012. “How we are organised”. Accessed on May 26, 2012.
http://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/about_us/how_we_are_organised/history

126

Clarke, M. G. Drucker H. M. 2010. Our changing Scotland : a yearbook of Scottish
government. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Students Publication Board.
Clayton, T. 2002. "Politics and nationalism in Scotland: a Clydeside case study of
identity construction." Political Geography no. 21 (6):813-843.
Cohen, Robin. 1997. Global diasporas: an introduction. Seattle: University of
Washington Press
Connell, Liam. 2004. "Scottish nationalism and the colonial vision of Scotland."
Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies no. 6 (2):252-263.
Connor, Walker. 1994. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press
Constitutional, Steering Committee. 1988. A Claim of right for Scotland: Towards
Scotland's Parliament. Edinburgh: CSA Pub.
Curtice, John. 2009. Revolution or evolution? The 2007 Scottish elections. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Danylenko, V. M. Kasianov, G. V. and Kulchytskyi, S. V. 1991. Stalinizm na Utkrajini.
20-30-ti roky. Kyiv: Lybid, in association with the Canadian Institute for
Ukrainian Studies.
Derluguian, Georgi M., and Serge Cipko. 1997. "The Politics of Identity in a Russian
Borderland Province: The Kuban Neo-Cossack Movement, 1989-1996." EuropeAsia Studies no. 49 (8):1485-1500.
Devine, T. M. 2011. To the Ends of the Earth: Scotland's Global Diaspora, 1750-2010.
London: Penguin.
Dickinson, H. T. 2000. "Modern Scottish history 1707 to the present, volume 1." History
no. 85 (279):519-520.
Dictionary.com, LLC. Accessed on June 13, 2012. www.dictionary.com
Dixon, K. 2006. "The return of the thistle: Nationalism and devolution in Scotland
(1967-1999)." Etudes Anglaises no. 59 (4):441-452.
Donaldson, Arthur, and Scottish National Party. 1976. Whys of Scottish nationalism.
West Calder: SNP Publications.
Donaldson, Gordon and others. 1969. “Scottish devolution: The historical background.”
In Government and nationalism in Scotland: an enquiry by members of the
University of Edinburgh, edited by e. J.N. Wolfe. Edinburgh: Edinburgh U.P.: 1416
Dontsov, Dmytro. 1957. a ia revoli tsii , Polit c na bibliot e a i v volennia
Ukrainy, ch. 12. Toronto: Liga vyzvolennia Ukrainy.
______________. 1935. Spirit of Ukraine: Ukrainian contributions to world's culture.
New York: United Ukrainian organizations of the United States.
Economist Intelligence Unit. 2012. Accessed on May 26, 2012.http://www.
eiu.com.ezproxy2. lib. depaul.edu/default.aspx?autologin=bulk
Edwards, Owen Dudley. 1968. Celtic nationalism. London: Routledge & K. Paul
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 2002. Ethnicity and nationalism. 2nd ed. Anthropology,
culture, and society. London ; Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press.
Esman, Milton J. 2009. Diasporas in the contemporary world. Cambridge; Malden,
Mass.: Polity
European Commission. 2012. “Ukraine: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World”.
Accessed on May 26, 2012. http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/indicators

127

Evans, Peter. 2008. “Is an alter-globalization possible?” Politics and Society, 36:2
Fink, Susan D. 1997. "From "Chicken Kiev" to Ukrainian Recognition: Domestic
Politics in U.S. Foreign Policy toward Ukraine." Harvard Ukrainian Studies no.
21 (1/2):11-61.
Finlay, R. J. 2001. "Scottish nation: 1700-2000." Journal of Contemporary History no.
36 (2):383-393.
_________ 2001. "Unionist nationalism: Governing urban Scotland." Journal of
Contemporary History no. 36 (2):383-393.
Freeland, Chrystia. 1990. Rukh: the new Ukrainian nationalism. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press
Gallagher, Tom. 2010. The illusion of freedom: Scotland under nationalism. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Gellner, Ernest. 1997. Nationalism. Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University
Press.
_____________2006. Nations and nationalism. 2nd ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
González, Felipe, and Stanley Hoffmann. 1999. “European Union and Globalization.”
Foreign policy (115).
Gray, Alasdair. 1992. Why Scots should rule Scotland. Edinburgh: Canongate Press.
Guibernau i Berdún, M. Montserrat. 1996. Nationalisms : the nation-state and
nationalism in the twentieth century. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
Hague, Euan. 1994. “Scotland as a Place: An Analysis of the SNP’s 1992 Party Political
Broadcasts.” Scottish Geographical Magazine no. 110 (3): 140-149.
Hames, S. 2008. "Culture, nation and the new Scottish parliament." Victorian studies no.
50 (3):519-521.
Hamilton, Paul Hunter. 2002. “The limits and potential of civic nationalism the case of
the Scottish National Party,” PhD diss. Canadian theses =Thèses canadiennes.
Ottawa: National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada.
Hanham, H. J. 1969. Scottish nationalism. London: Faber.
Harasymiw, Bohdan. 2002. Post-Communist Ukraine. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of
Ukrainian Studies Press.
Harris, Erika. 2009. Nationalism: theories and cases. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press.
Harris, Sterling James. 2003. “Scottish nationalism: 1707-2000.” PhD diss., University
of Louisville, Kentucky, United States.
Harvie, Christopher. 1994 [1977]. Scotland and nationalism : Scottish society and
politics, 1707 to the present. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
Hassan, G. 1999. "Scotland and nationalism: Scottish society and politics 1707 to the
present, 3rd edition." Political Quarterly no. 70 (2):231-233.
Hassan, Gerry. 2009. The modern SNP: from protest to power. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.
Hechter, Michael. 1999. Internal colonialism: the Celtic fringe in British national
development. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.
Hentosh, Liliana, and Andrew Sorokowski. 2000. "Rites and Religions: Pages from the
History of Inter-denominational and Inter-ethnic Relations in Twentieth-Century
Lviv." Harvard Ukrainian Studies no. 24:171-203.

128

Hobsbawm, E. J. and Terence Ranger. 1992. The Invention of Tradition. Canto ed.
Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press
Hobsbawm, E. J. 1992. Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality.
2nd ed. Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Holmes, Douglas. 2000. Integral Europe: fast-capitalism, multiculturalism, neofascism.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Holton, Robert. 2000. “Globalization's Cultural Consequences.” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science. 570:140-152
Hrushevs’kyi, Mykhailo. 1981. The historical evolution of the Ukrainian problem,
Revolution and nationalism in the modern world. Cleveland: J.T. Zubal.
Ichijo, A. 2002. "The Scope of Theories of Nationalism: Comments on the Scottish and
Japanese Experiences." Geopolitics no. 7 (2):53-74.
Ichijo, Atsuko, and Gordana Uzelac. 2005. When is the nation? Towards an
understanding of theories of nationalism. London ; New York: Routledge.
Jeffries, Ian. 2011. Economic developments in contemporary Russia. Milton Park,
Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge.
Kasianov, Georgii. 1992. Ukrainska inteligentsiia I920-x –30-x rokiv: sotsialnyi portret
ta istorychna dolia. Kyiv: Hlobus.
Kasianov, G. V. and Danylenko, V. M. 1991. Stalinizm i Ulkrainska inteligentsiia. Kyiv:
Naukova Dumka.
Keating, Michael, and David Bleiman. 1979. Labour and Scottish nationalism. London:
Macmillan.
Kedourie, Elie. 1993. Nationalism. 4th, expanded ed. Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, Mass.,
USA: Blackwell.
Kidd, Colin. 2008. Union and unionism: political thought in Scotland, 1500-2000.
Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kidd, Colin, and Renaud Morieux. 2003. "Comptes rendus – British Identities before
Nationa-lism. Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600-1800."
Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, no. 50 (3).
The Kilbrandon Report, HMSO. 1973. In Scott, P. H. 1997. Scotland, an unwon cause:
an anthology with a commentary. Edinburgh: Canongate Press.
King, Charles, and Neil J. Melvin. 1999. "Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign
Policy, and Security in Eurasia." International Security no. 24 (3):108-138.
Kinnvall, Catarina. 2004. “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and
the Search for Ontological Security.” Political Psychology 25 (5)k.
Kubicek, Paul. 2000. "Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and
Legislative Behaviour." Europe Asia Studies no. 52 (2):273-294.
Kubiiovych, Volodymyr, and Danylo Husar Struk. 1984. Encyclopedia of Ukraine. 5
vols. Toronto: Buffalo.
Kuromiya, H. 2005. "Political leadership and Ukrainian nationalism, 1938-1989. The
burden of history." Problems of Post-Communism no. 52 (1):39-48.
Kuzio, T. 1998. "Ukraine between East and West: Essays on cultural history to the early
eighteenth century." Slavic and East European journal no. 42 (2):340-341.
Kuzio, T. 1999. "National identity and foreign policy: nationalism and leadership in
Poland, Russia, and Ukraine." International Affairs no. 75 (1):152-153.

129

Kuzio, T.; Wilson, A. 1994. Ukraine: From Perestroika to Independence. New York: St.
Martin's Press.
Kymlicka, Will. 2001. Politics in the vernacular: nationalism, multiculturalism and
citizenship. Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press.
Leith, Murray Stewart, and Martin Steven. 2010. "Party over Policy? Scottish
Nationalism and the Politics of Independence." The Political Quarterly no.
81(2):263-269.
Legislation.gov.uk. 1998. “Scotland Act 1998”. Accessed on May 26, 2012.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/schedule/5
Legislation.gov.uk. 2005. “Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005.” Accessed on May
26, 2012. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2005/7/introduction
Legislation.gov.uk. 2012. “Scotland Act 2012”. Accessed on May 26, 2012.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/11/pdfs/ukpga_20120011_en.pdf
Lemekh, Halyna. 2010. Ukrainian immigrants in New York : collision of two worlds,
The New Americans : recent immigration and American society; Variation: New
Americans (LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC). El Paso [Tex.]: LFB Scholarly Pub.
LLC.
Lowig, Evan. 1979. “The formation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church (U.A.P.TS)
a confrontation between Orthodoxy and nationalism.” PhD diss., St Vladimir's
Orthodox Theological Seminary.
Luciuk, Lubomyr Y. 1986. "Unintended Consequences in Refugee Resettlement: PostWar Ukrainian Refugee Immigration to Canada." International Migration Review
no. 20 (2):467-482.
Lypovetsky, Sviatoslav. 2009. “Eight decades of struggle.” The Day Weekly Digest,
July 17. Accessed on May 23, 2012. http://www.day.kiev.ua/264657/
MacCormick, Neil. 1970. The Scottish debate: essays on Scottish nationalism. London:
Oxford University Press.
MacDiarmid, Hugh. 1968. “Scottish nationalism.” In Celtic nationalism, edited by
Owen Dudley Edwards. London: Routledge & K. Paul.
MacGregor, D.R. 1969. “On the importance of regions of Scotland,” in J. N. Wolfe, ed.,
Government and nationalism in Scotland: an enquiry by members of the
University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh: Edinburgh U.P.: 153-164
MacKintosh, John.1974. “The New Appeal of Nationalism” in Scott, P. H. 1997.
Scotland, an unwon cause: an anthology with a commentary. Edinburgh:
Canongate Press.
MacLellan Reber, Pascal Thierry. 2000. “From William Wallace to devolution: an
analysis of the impact that William Wallace and Robert the Bruce had on Scottish
nationalism and devolution.” PhD diss., University of South Carolina.
Madden, Cheryl. 2003. Holodomor : the Ukrainian genocide 1932 - 1933, Canadian
American Slavic studies. Idyllwild, Calif.: Schlacks.
Madsen, Michael D. 2007. “A fragmented Ukraine part of the West or apart from the
West?” PhD diss., Naval Postgraduate School.
Magocsi, Paul R. 2010.[1996]. A History of Ukraine: The land and its peoples. Second
ed. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Magocsi, Paul R. 2002. The roots of Ukrainian nationalism : Galicia as Ukraine's
Piedmont. Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.

130

Makuch, Andrij Borys. 2001. Encyclopedia of Ukraine: index and errata. Edmonton:
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press.
Mandryk, Mariia. 2006. U raïns’ i natsionali m : stanovlennia mi voienn dob .
Kyiv: Vyd-vo im. Oleny Telihy.
Marie, J. J. 2000. "1933, the black year: Testimonies on the Ukrainian famine."
Quinzaine Litteraire (794):20-21.
Marples, David R. 2006. "Stepan Bandera : the resurrection of a Ukrainian national
hero."
Europe-Asia studies (trykt utg.). no. 58 (4): 555-566.
Marr, Andrew. 1992. The Battle for Scotland. London: Penguin Books.
Martin, Eryn Lori. 1978. The lion clamant : an historical survey of Scottish nationalism.
Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of Foreign Studies.
McCrone, David. 1992. Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation.
London: Routledge.
Menon R., and Motyl A.J. 2011. "Counterrevolution in Kiev: Hope fades for Ukraine".
Foreign Affairs. 90 (6): 137-148.
Mikhnovsky, Mykola. 1967. The independent Ukraine (Samostiina Ukraïna). London:
Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain.
Morton, Graeme. 1993. “Unionist-nationalism: the historical construction of Scottish
national identity, Edinburgh, 1830-1860.” Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh.
Motyl, Alexander J. 1980. The turn to the right: the ideological origins and development
of Ukrainian nationalism; 1919 - 1929, East European monographs, 65. Boulder:
East Europ. Monogr.
Motyl, Alexander J. 1993. Dilemmas of Independence. Ukraine After Totalitarianism.
New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
Motyl, A. J. 2010. "Can Ukraine Have a History?" Problems of Post-Communism no. 57
(3):55-61.
Muir, Edwin. 1935. “Scottish Journey” in Scott, P. H. 1997. Scotland, an unwon cause:
an anthology with a commentary. Edinburgh: Canongate Press.
Naimark, Norman. 2010. Stalin’s Genocides. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press
Nairn, Tom. 1981. The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism. Second,
Expanded ed. London: New Left Books.
__________1997. Faces of nationalism: Janus revisited. London: Verso.
Narodnyi Rukh of Ukraine. “About the party”. Accessed on August 15, 2012
http://www.nru.org.ua/about-party.html
Newman, Saul. 2000. “Nationalism in Postindustrial Societies: Why States Still Matter.”
Comparative Politics 33 (1):21-41.
"The news of the week - Other Post-Soviet States - Ukraine - Kuchma to Be Questioned
Further re Gongadze Murder." 2005. The Current digest of the post-Soviet press.
no. 57 (11):17.
Osaulenko, Olexander H. 2008. Statistical yearbook of Ukraine for 2007. Kyiv:
Konsultant, Ltd.
Paniotto, Vladimir. 1991."The Ukrainian movement for perestroika - 'Rukh': a
sociological survey." Soviet studies no. 43 (1): 177-181.

131

Pavlyuk, Lyudmyla. 2005. "Extreme Rhetoric in the 2004 Presidential Campaign:
Images of Geopolitical and Regional Division." Canadian Slavonic Papers /
Revue Canadienne des Slavistes no. 47 (3/4):293-316.
Petryna, Adriana. 2002. Life Exposed: biological citizens after Chornobyl. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press
Pope, Robert. 2001. Religion and national identity: Wales and Scotland c.1700-2000.
Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
Potichnyj, Peter J. 1991. "The Referendum and Presidential Elections in Ukraine."
Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes no. 33 (2):123-138.
Preston, P. 2008. "Cutting Scotland Loose: Soft Nationalism and Independence-inEurope." British Journal of Politics & International Relations no. 10 (4):717-728.
The Program of the Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union. 2011 [2009].
http://www.svoboda.org.ua/ pro_partiyu/prohrama/. Accessed on August 26,
2012.
Religious Information Service of Ukraine (RISU). 2012. “Ukrainian Orthodox Church –
Kyivan
Patriarchate.”
http://risu.org.ua/en/index/reference/major_religions/~%D0%A3%D0%
9F%D0%A6+ %D0%9A%D0%9F/45457
Reshetar, John Stephen. 1972. The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920; a study in
nationalism, World affairs: national and international viewpoints. New York:
Arno Press.
Reuters Financial Glossary. 2012. “Maastricht Criteria”. Accessed on May 26, 2012.
http://glossary.reuters.com/index.php/Maastricht_Criteria
Riggs, Fred W. 2002. “Globalization, Ethnic Diversity, and Nationalism: The Challenge
for Democracies.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 581: 35-47.
Sarolea, Charles. 1929. Burns and Scottish nationalism, Leaflet. Glasgow: Scottish
National Party.
Satzewich, Vic. 2002. The Ukrainian diaspora; Global diasporas. London, New York:
Routledge.
Schoene-Harwood, Berthold. 2007. The Edinburgh companion to contemporary Scottish
literature. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Sciborsky, Mykola. 1941. Nacionalna borba ukrajinaca [Cist prihod ove studije
namijenjen je za Ukrajinsko Prosvjetno-kulturno Drustvo u Zagrebu]. Zagreb:
Hrvatska Drzavna Tiskarna.
Scott, P. H. 1992. Scotland in Europe: dialogue with a skeptical friend. Edinburgh:
Canongate Press.
Scott, P. H. 1997. Scotland, an unwon cause: an anthology with a commentary.
Edinburgh: Canongate.
Scottish Constitutional Convention. 1990. Towards Scotland's parliament : a report to
the Scottish people. Edinburgh: Scottish Constitutional Convention.
Scottish Enterprise. 2010. “Exporting and Economic Growth. September 2010.”
Accessed
on
April
16,
2013.
http://www.scottishenterprise.com/resources/publications/def/exporting-and-economic-growth.aspx

132

The Scottish Government. 2001. “Analysis of Religion in the 2001 Census: Summary
Report” Accessed on May 26, 2012. http://www.scotland.gov.uk
/Publications/2005/02/20757/ 53570
The Scottish Government. 2011. “Arts, Culture and Sport.” Accessed on May 26, 2012.
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/ArtsCultureSport/arts/GaelicLanguage/Demo
graphics
The Scottish Government. 2012. “High Level Summary of Statistics Trend Last update:
Tuesday 21 February 2012 Employment Rate (Based on population aged 16-64).”
Accessed on May 26, 2012.
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Labour-Market/ Trend
EconomicActivity
The Scottish Government. 2013. “Public Sector Net Debt.” Accessed on April 18, 2013.
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0041/00418419.pdf
Scottish National Party. 1997. Yes we can win the best for Scotland: the SNP General
Election manifesto 1997. Edinburgh: Scottish National Party.
Scottish National Party. 1999. Enterprise, compassion, democracy: Scotland's party for
Scotland's Parliament. The Scottish National Party manifesto for the Scottish
Parliament elections 6th May 1999. Edinburgh: Scottish National Party.
Scottish National Party. 2011. Re-Elect: A Scottish Government Working for Scotland.
Edinburgh: Scottish National Party.
Scottish Secretariat. 1971. Scotland's scrap of paper: full text of Treaty of Union of
1707, with notes, Declaration of Independence, Radical Rising 1820, policy of
Scottish nationalism. Penicuik: Scots Secretariat.
Semotiuk, Andriy J. [na]. The Ukrainian Holodomor – Was it a Genocide? Accessed on
May 27, 2012. http://faminegenocide.com/resources/was_it_holodomor.htm
Shekhovtsov, A. 2011. "The Creeping Resurgence of the Ukrainian Radical Right? The
Case of the Freedom Party." Eur. Asia Stud. Europe - Asia Studies no. 63 (2):203208.
Sillars, Jim. 1988. "No Turning Back: The Case for Scottish Independence within the
European Community." In Scotland, an unwon cause: an anthology with a
commentary, edited by P.H. Scott. Edinburgh: Canongate Press.
Sim, Duncan .2011. American Scots: The Scottish Diaspora and the USA. Edinburgh:
Dunedin Press
Skrbiš, Zlatko. 1999. Long-distance nationalism: diasporas, homelands and identities,
Research in migration and ethnic relations series. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Pub.
Smith, Anthony D. 1972. Theories of nationalism. New York: Harper & Row.
Smith, Anthony D. 1992. Ethnicity and nationalism, International studies in sociology
and social anthropology. Leiden ; New York: E.J. Brill.
Smith, Anthony D. 1995. Nations and nationalism in a global era. Cambridge, UK;
Cambridge, Mass: Polity Press ; B. Blackwell.
Smith, Anthony D. 2001. Nationalism: theory, ideology, history, key concepts.
Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity Press ; Blackwell.
Smith, Anthony D., and John Hutchinson. 1994. Nationalism. Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press.
Snyder, Louis L. 1964. The dynamics of nationalism; readings in its meaning and
development, University series in history. Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand.

133

_____________ 1968. The new nationalism. Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Spencer, Philip, and Howard Wollman. 2002. Nationalism: a critical introduction.
London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage
Stephen, J. 2010. "Scottish Nationalism and Stuart Unionism: The Edinburgh Council,
1745." Journal of British Studies no. 49 (1):47-72.
Subtelny, Orest. 1988. Ukraine. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
The Sydney Morning Herald. “A Scottish Party,” 9 February 1907. Accessed on July 23,
2012. http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/28152873
Szporluk, Roman. 1997. "Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State."
Daedalus no. 126 (3):85-119.
Taylor, Brian. 1999. The Scottish Parliament. Edinburgh: Polygon.
Trading Economics. 2013. “Ukraine”. Accessed on March 26, 2013.
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/ indicators
Trumpener, Katie. 1997. Bardic nationalism: the romantic novel and the British Empire.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
The UK Parliament. 2011. “Ukraine, the EU, Russia and Tymoshenko,” last modified
November 10, 2011. www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06117.pdf
Ukrainian National Committee of the United States. 1919. Ukraine on the road to
freedom. Selections of articles, reprints and communications concerning the
Ukrainian people in Europe. New York: Ukrainian National Committee of the
United States
Velychenko, Stephen. 1997. "Empire loyalism and minority nationalism in Great Britain
and imperial Russia, 1707 to 1914: Institutions, law, and nationality in Scotland
and Ukraine." Comparative Studies in Society and History no. 39 (3):413-441.
Veselova, O. M., editor of compilation. 2009. Pam'iat’ Narod : Henots d V U raїni
Holodom 1932-1933 Rokiv: Svidchennia. Kyïv: Vydavnychyi dim "Kalyta".
Walkinshaw, Colin. 1935. The Scots Tragedy. A history of Scottish nationalism. With
genealogical tables. London: Routledge & Sons.
Wilson, Andrew. 1997. Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith.
Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press
Wilson, Andrew. 2009. The Ukrainians : unexpected nation. 3d ed. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Wolfe, Billy. 1973. Scotland lives. Edinburgh: Reprographia.
Wolfe, J. N., and ed. 1969. Government and nationalism in Scotland: an enquiry by
members of the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh: Edinburgh U.P.
Woodwell, Douglas. 2007. Nationalism in international relations: norms, foreign policy,
and enmity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wright, Sue. 2004. Language policy and language planning: from nationalism to
globalisation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Young, Douglas, Clara Young, David D. Murison. 1977. A clear voice: Douglas Young,
poet and polymath : a selection from his writing with a memoir. Loanhead:
Macdonald Publishers.
_____________. n.d. Excerpt from “Chasing an Ancient Greek,” in Douglas Young, ed.,
A clear voice: Douglas Young, poet and polymath: a selection from his writing
with a memoir. Loanhead: Macdonald Publishers: 72-80.

134

Young, Clara and David D. Murison. n.d. “Douglas Young: a memoir,” in Douglas
Young, ed., A clear voice: Douglas Young, poet and polymath: a selection from
his writing with a memoir. Loanhead: Macdonald Publishers: 9-34.
Wedeen, Lisa. 2008. Peripheral Visions: publics, power and performance in Yemen.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Zales’ka Onyshkevych, Larysa M. L., and Mariia Revakovych. 2009. Contemporary
Ukraine on the cultural map of Europe. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. in
cooperation with the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

